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The cla^isiccii cjnccjptton ot an aoono l ie s/atem was tlu*t 
of na tura l h.^raony of individual i n t ^ i ^ s t s an4 w i l l s . I t was 
« r ^ e d b / physiocrats In Frarice and Ada:3 wiaith In :.ngland 
t h a t It the tiapedliaents which human i n s t i t u t i o n s hay® liaposed 
upon tli8 free play of t iatural toraioncies Iti the sphere af 
industry and co'xn&rQG were reaoved) a benef ic ia l ana ha2m>nious 
order would @2^ r@©« Freed fro".i obs t ruc t ions , n:.tiire would 
giire a pos i t ive gaidanco to indivldu£.l3 In the conduct of 
affidrs» i'^ ach taan would be "led as Ir/ an i nv i s ib l e hand 
to promotQ an end which was no par t of h i s i n t e n t i o n " . ' 
3y pursuing h i s own i n t e r e s t s , he •jrosjotea that of fche 
socie ty more e f f ec tua l ly than when l^ .o r ea l ly des i r e s to 
pro'iiiote i t . This na tura l harmony, I t was contended, *ms 
not iionfined to th€ ;:tctlona of Individuals only» throu^i 
individuiii conduct, i t harmonises the seeming conf l ic t of 
competing busl-.ess and t r ade , le^sding man thro':Jsgh divided 
labour so to cooperate as to bring to a l l t h e i r proper 
share in these- gainful operations* 
In sue ct 3yst«a, i t v/as clftiinu^d t h a t the 
ntitur«l pr ice*, ' a na tura l wages* ' a Uoturul order* which 
1. Adara SmLth »W'eaith of a t ions* Book I I I . Ch* If, 7 o l . I 
!fethu«ii end Co# Ltd . , London, 1950. 
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hunuin nature ^ould discover for i t s e l f and aen ' s n^^tural 
l i b e r t y w i l l be simply tho absoncQ of an/ hindrance to tbi^s 
srx>ntan«ous ^ctlon of huaan mature.^ 
«fhen p o l i t i c a l economy a t u r e d in to * special ised s tud/ 
« t the hands of David I ca rdo , t h i s i nv i s ib l e hand was no 
longer required, .nil tha,t was needed wag tha t th« o rd inar i ly 
i n t e l i i g s n t rs&n ^ o u l d u t h i s labour or h i s cap i t a l to i t s 
most gainful use, giving as l i t t l e and takings as :2uch as 
poss ib le . In t h i s way, eoonoaic resourcQS as an aggregate 
k'O'Jld be u t i l i s e d as proiduotively as possible and the larges t 
body of wealth would be d i s t r i bu t ed in das proportions araong 
a l l who had consoiously cooperated in i t s crQution. I f pro" 
*reas i s harriperad for a while by succeysful aanufacturers .-nd 
raerchants, coapt; t i t ioa mu^t aonjpel thera ...luickly to h-.nd down 
in lower pric^-^s to the general public a l l but a f ract ion of 
the indus t ry . 
The evolution of the a&rglnal is t doctrine in ;sore 
recent t ia ies , which descr ibes the tiovemoit of minutely d i v i s i -
ble u n i t s af c a p i t a l and labour in to business and rri^tdes 
of maxXtrnm e f f ic iency and i.-roductlvity, has givon a more 
precise saoaning to the concept of l a i soez f a i r e . I f t h i s 
d i v i s i b i l i t y und tree inabili ty of u l l forass of cap i t a l and 
labour ac tua l ly ©xistsd, they would guaraoitee a niitural 
2» Jasies Bonar •Philosophy mid P o l i t i c a l ilconoay" p . 177, 
George Allen and Unwln Ltd«, I I I "d i t i on , April i922# 
haraony which would iiapel over/on© to do h i s boat and get 
what he was worth, Ta the words of J«3« ^ la rk , "ty® d i s t r i -
bution of the incos^ of the society Is CDntroiled by a nat^iral 
liiVv of voiiltxi und t h a t tha law, i f i t waited without 
f r i c t i o n would gi /e to every agent of production, tise amount 
at wealth, vfrdcb th.-t agent c i ^a t e s . " ' ' Froa each agent 
^ d ia t inguishabie ahare in ;jroauction and to each a co r r s s -
ponding rtward. ;-",ven i f there were con f l i c t s of i n t e r e s t s 
and saladjustsacnts, the/wew regarded as flaws o r f r i c t ions 
in tVit; operat ion of th<j system which, on the whole, s^ rojiced 
hareionlously. ilost of theaiwerQ t rea ted us temporary d i s t u r -
bances naturi;.! ^nd inevi tab le in a growing organisra. Tlisywere 
TBiSQdietl in cours« of tlsm by the co'iipetition i i the economy 
which was thought to be ^alieabl© enou^. to adjust i t s e l f 
^utoa^ t i c a l l y , guided by thi=» equil ibrium of supply ^nd deaand, 
T?-tis process , i t was added, would be accelerated and 
rsudo More accurate h/ the spread of education and of 
r e l i a b l e Q<K)noaic data a-aong a l l c l a s s e s . 
But contemporary capi ta l ism has bel iad nanf JT the 
sanguine expectat ions of e a r l i e r economists, Gsi>€CitJ.ly in 
the f i e ld s of d i s t r i b u t i o n , for rhe ex i c t workin^; of cotioeti-
t io ' i haa 'OGen consider-bly ha.-apered by the concentrat ion 
of piX)duction in fewer and fewer handa. In the age befors 
ca;5it:*iisra, cosioetition was a oredorainant force to break 
down a l l the s t i f f formalised econanic re la t ionship} out 
3. J .3 .Clark "Dis t r ibut ion of VJealth" p. 3. C^-^ew York,1899) 
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prolonged and i n t ens i f l e a be/ond a ce r t a in l i a i t , i t began 
t o reverse i t s e f f e c t s . ftpom being a soc ia l ly d i s in t eg -
r a t i n g force , i t began to build up new re la t ionsh ip and 
new i n s t i t u t i o n s * As John i t r a t c h e y ap t ly points out 
•* the competitive process by i t s own ru th l e s s s t rength , and 
in accordance with i t s own inner l o g i c , cont inual ly 
cr©i*tes bi^^ger and fewer u n i t s with which to figjit out the 
competit ive b a t t l e . " * Since the e i ^ t e e n t h century, the 
indiv idual craftsraan, the individual aerchant and l a t e r 
the individual i n d u s t r i a l 1 s t , h&s been replaced by the 
par tnersh ip and the firm* This l a turn has ^Qti superseded 
by the j o in t atock Qotapany. Later on, the small pr ivate 
j o i n t Stock Conipany has i t s e l f been outclassed by the 
large Public Corporat ions. F ina l ly , there has cotje in to 
ejiistence giant Corporations, usua l ly a dozen or so in 
each indus t ry , soiaetisies in the fora of t r u s t s , eoabines 
or c a r t e l s , occmdonally althougii not t y p i c a l l y , as 
serat-monopolies or even laonopolies. Such giant u n i t s 
are now the dominant feature of contemporary c a . i t a l i s a . 
The extent to which t h i s process of concentration has 
gone can be iieen fron the behaviour of soae of the 
leading and advanced c a p i t a l i s t count r ies of the 
present century. 
4 . John a t ra t ehey . *Vontejaporary Capital ls ia" j^p. 20-21. 
Printed in Great B r i t a in by Richard Clay and Coapany, LTD, 
Bungay, Suffolk, 1956. 
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To begin with, l i t us take the example of the 
Atmriem econo-ny as i t i s the rsost advanced c a p i t a l i s t 
socie ty of our time and as inforraatlon on tho s t ructure 
of the Af3«rican ©oonoay i s considered to b© the best 
and aiost e l abora te . i^rofessor Oalbrai th in h i s book 
"American Capitalism** wri t«s ** tha t the heads of 
Corporations t ha t produce betwoGn a t h i r d and a hal f of 
the na t ional products of the UnitGd S ta t e s could be 
seated comfortably in almost any neighbourhood Eiotlon-
pictupo thea t re (between 400 ana 500)*"^ • • • . • • • " a recent 
inves t iga t ion by the Federal Trade Consalssion a^ows t h a t 
for the year 1946, the 113 l a r g e s t manufacturing corpora-
t i o n s ovmed 46 porcent of the proper ty , plant and ©quipraent 
employed in raanufaoturlng.*' ® 
There are nusierous i ndus t r i e s where the number of 
firms serving the sase market resjains large and where 
no one or no s a a l l number have any considerable proportion 
of the t o t a l business; but one of the outstanding 
contemporary a u t h o r i t i e s on narket organisat ion has 
oondmied t h a t "the p r inc ipa l ind ica t ions of s tudies of 
Araerican market s t ruc ture are (among o the r s ) tha t concent-
r a t i on of output among r e l a t i v e l y few f i l e r s i s the 
dominant pattern**' ^ 
5 , Cuoted in •KJontcjiuporiiry Capital ism", op#cit#pp.21-22 
6* The Federal Trade ComiBisslon, *The Concentr^ition of 
Productive Facilities**, 1947.(^ i)ashingtoni U.S.t-Oovem-
aent Printing Office, 1949). 
7» Joe S« Bain in **A survey of Conteaaporary Economics" 
(Philadelphia! Blakinston Co,, 1946), p«136« 
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In Br i t a in a l s o , condit ions are almost the smm* 
According to 1936 census of production, i t I s founci 
t h a t in any given Industry, about a quarter of the 
l a ^ u r force worked in the three l a rges t f i r a s in tha t 
indus t ry . There are in Br i ta in under 12,000 "pub l i c " 
Jo in t Stock voapaaics a l toge ther and the^e 12,000 u n i t s 
ar® responsible for , i t i s es t imated, about on@-half 
of the en t i r e ©conoraic a c t i v i t y of *;h0 coaiauiiity. Thus 
thQ^Q 12,000 f i r a s do as much business as a l l the priviate 
Jo in t Stock Co"ipanie3, the nationotlised i n d u s t r i e s , 
d i r e c t s t a t e entcrnri^^es, thts cooperative laoveaent 
ana a i l the InnumQrablii firsas, par taersh ips ar^i on©nmn 
business of a l l k inds , put together.® 
With regard to Qernian capi ta l i s ia , i t 
was ac tua l ly the leader in tha f i e lds of 
corieentration ^^ i-Ki this tsndenc/ w&a a t i t s 
aenith under tha Third Fuiich, According to 
prass r epo r t s , the process of concentration 
has again 'MQn going on in a l l i t s 
vigour since the ea r ly f i f t i e s . ' ^ 
3# John Stratchey •* Cont^mpoYuv/ Ca^.itali^ja* 
op*oit« p« S3« 
9% Ibid p . 24» 
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The example of these three leading c a p i t a l i s t 
countr ies of the world conclusively proves t h a t the process 
of concentration of production in the hands of a l imited 
few iB an undisputed f ac t . I t also proves tha t as the 
economy expands,the tendency i s iaorc and more in 
the d i rec t ion of concentrat ion ra ther than di f fus ion. 
The r e su l t i s tha t the managers of these firms are able 
to affect p r i ces ins tead of being affected by Uiem, Pr ices , 
from being object ive data which move automatically with 
no nan' 3 w i l l , beconiG things which may be moved within 
c e r t a i n l i m i t s , by the conscious decis ions of groups 
of men. viThen t h i s i s accepted a l l the complacency 
about the self=regulat ing and automatic mechanism of 
capi ta l ism becomes untenable. This new power to 
influence pr ices gives the entrepreneurs the pov/er 
to influence the l eve l of pjiofits a l s o . Although there 
are ce r t a in l imi t ing fac tors which prevent the margins 
from being widened, the l i m i t s within which they can 
be widened are by no means small. This has enabled 
entrepreneurs to crea te and sustain large p r o f i t s therey 
c rea t ing i n e q u i t i e s in the d i s t r i b u t i o n of income. 
An inequitable d i s t r i b u t i o n of income may be condu-
cive to accumulation and consis tent with eff ic iency so long 
as there i s an acquiescence in the ex i s t ing mode of 
d i s t r i b u t i o n . But when the workers become conscious of 
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the Ino qui t i e s of ^ l e i r economic l o t , t h i s awareness 
r eac t s upon t h e i r ©fflclency by causing an unrest and 
<Xi8Content 5/ith the current " sac ia l dGt&min-^tlon. of 
va lues" . When mi aotuaX sense of the inequi ty of 
d i s t r i b u t i o n becoaea firsily entrenched in the ninds 
of the majority of workers, i t i n t e r f e r e s with t h e i r 
e a r l i e r autotaatic e f f i c iency . For the present , t h i s 
nsw !aoral fact of widespread «aci itcntc discontoiit on tho 
P*irt of large sect ions of .-.'oriiers i s a matter of great 
concern to a l l thoae who des i re peacsful progress . This 
now fact m i l i t a t e s against ef f ic iency i>.nd product iv i ty 
of indus t ry , thereby hassperinr^ the harsonious blending 
of the huaan u n i t s , i n the econoraie yysteia. I t i s becorae 
manifest tha t i f energy and ef f ic iency aro to be restored to 
the system, sorac^  conscious policy of " i n d u s t r i a l peace" 
bar to be evohre^ and appl ied, i n order tha t the e f f i c i en t 
cooperation of the fac to rs of production sjay 1)0 accomplished. 
There are aany signs i n i n d u s t r i a l B:urope and the tJnlted 
iitateai of America of an Increasing v/illingness on the part 
of workers and i n d u s t r i a l i s t s to ©xperijaent in methods of 
a t t a i n i n g i n d u s t r i a l peace with a c l e a r recognit ion that 
ths? e x i s t i n g econoraie system docs not d,d@quately f u l f i l 
the equi table and harrsonlous functions with which the 
c l a s s i c a l economists endowed i t . 
Thus prof i t i s the wind-alll a t which labour t i l t s 
very o f t sn . I t i s the raain c i t a d e l a t which labour 
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d i rec ts i t s repeated attack, "for th® climate of our day I s 
host i le to inc»a^ di f ferent ia ls In general, foreign 
dif ferent ia ls in par t icular , and to handsoae profi ts 
to the extreaw. This being the case, profit-sharing 
I s a voluntary device in i t i a ted by employers to 
reconcile the claims of labour to a share of the surplus 
In the industry. I t does not In any way weaken or 
Infringe upan the r i ^ t s of labour to Improve I t s 
material conditions by invoking the aid o* law, 
easrelsing collective bargaining througji trade union 
aovesjent or arriving at a working agreement with 
aanagenient to accept the principle of conciliation 
and arbitration* Profit-sharing i s a new pri clple 
of rewarding industr ia l labour. Though usually lalK)ur 
I s rewarded in the foi^ of wages, profit-sharing when 
accepted allows the division of net profi ts between 
capi ta l and labour, according to some form of pre-
a r ran^d fbrmula. I t i s an attempt to satisfy 
labour on the question of profi ts by seeking to 
aake him a profi t- taker as well as a wage-earner. Efy 
and large, i t i s an Inductive approach to the problem 
of industr ia l peace. 
10. W. Ar«iur Irewls "Theory of l^conoalc ''»rowth» p . 182 Qeorge Alien And ITnwln Ltd., Second laipression, 1956. 
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A TimomilCAL CASE FOR PROFIT-SIUilliW 
WITH EKPLOIEES. 
EcoE^mic theory in I t s tpa^ i t looa l form, l^ iaa 
pp iaa r l ly been one of s t a t i c e q u l l l b r l u a . I t was 
concerned v i t h the priel i ic of a co l l e c t i on of gooi^s ©ju? 
services ff the usknoyen of the problen being ^©t®rali^d 
by th.« r e < i u l i ^ fisiober of kaoim cons tan t s . I t was argasd 
tha t in an uacba&ging f r ie t io i s less world^ s t a t i c lavs 
tfet@nslz^ the r^Bsu^ration for various product IT© agents . 
In such a s l t i i a t l o % a l l f ac to r s get t h e i r ImiMited 
oargizial products aof r#e« ip t s exact ly equal c o s t s . Ho 
surplus acirarues t» t l ^ owner* But i n the t^naa lc wjrld of 
f a c t s , hcyvmrer^ a sw^plus incoae in excess of contractual 
cos t s does a r i s e . I t i s only gradually eliminated by the 
forces of competition and cont inual ly r e i ^ a t s i t s e l f under 
the s t r e s s of changes ang new f r i c t i o n s . J*B» Claric was 
the f i r s t eeon(»d.st to develop such a view of p r o f i t . 
"An invention" he says "aalces i t possible t o produce 
soBethine ^ore cheaply* I t ^ w s f i r s t a p ro f i t to 
entrepreneurs . . . • • • • t l ^ n ^ d s something t o wages and 
I n t e r e s t , t h i s i s e q u i m l e n t to a c rea t ion of naw ¥»alth« 
a 
I t has Bade ^ d e f i n i t e addi t ion to the incoae of the 
society^ and from the monent i*ien the iaproved aethod 
has been put in to opera t ion the s t a t i c a ta i^ard of 
wages ( t h a t i s the worker 's product iv i ty) has been higher* 
th® ra te tovaHs which the pa;? of tlie Xabottper i s mm 
teodiag is not yftmt I t vas heferm t! e l!»r@ntion vms 
appiiod, Imt i t id a mm s^ higher r a t e . Images mm 
teod to ©qual vfjat labiaur can produce an^ this a»r» 
tbau that i t eota^ foiwerly pro^tic©. ^teo «ie tvtH 
f rui ts of inventi<m s l a l l h&ve diffasea theaaelires 
tliKmghowt societyi the ©arniB^s of labcmr ir i l l equal 
the new standarf! r a t e (thrcmch the \^ii|^i]^ of tfae 
e{»3p«titiim for lalioiir*). I^t another isnrdntion be smBm^ 
that alflK> 0ff@€ta an B^&owusm^ l a |iri:>3iietioiw I t also 
ereatas a profit | a i^ th i s pi^f i t l ike t l ^ f i r s t^ i s 
an elusive mm lAiieih eoterprenenrs grasp Imt ean^>t hold, 
This ^itSi l i ^ th® former one, s l ips in tiise ^hi^ugh 
the i r fix^@rs and I>est9^^ i t i ^ l f ^m a l l members of 
sociaty*" 
fluiuigh the theor^f raeogaisas car ta ia dynaaic 
el®Eii@Qta in th<3 meonamy^ i t is assant ial ly s t a t i c in 
! • J .B . Clai^* *Pistrilmtioa of Meiath". p, 405. op.eit* 
To C l a ^ t prof i t , i a a»otl^r seas©, i s the 
cooseqi^m^ of *frictio»*» tfea interval batwean th© 
aettsal vagas and t t ^ Stat ic Standard i s the resu l t 
of frieticms for i f coapatitlon vorfe«<e vithout l e t 
or hindlrai^e, pi£r« tmsinass profi t wmM Im 
amiihilata^ as fast i t eoul^ be created. Ibi61. p . 410* 
"ykssn i t not for that in ternal , ontrepranenrs as 
such vottia fftt iMjithini:, hoirevary aach they might 
sM to the «forld*s pr<^tictiva ptyi^r* 1^16, p . 411* 
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iiatare* Modern buslnsss devices l ike r e s t r i c t ive praetiees, 
product differexitiatlon, advertising technique e t c . , may 
make i t possible to prolong the tesporary gains of a 
quasi-o^nopolistic t o r t arising from successful innovations* 
I t i s these inventions vhieh play a predcNidnant part in 
the "dyitejaic theory" of J«B. dark* 
Marshall balanced the Batter rather differently* 
1i%®re Clark has emphasised a tendency for abnoriaal profits 
to disappear^ ^ r s h a l l devoted more at tent ion to short-
period in %^ich they existed and his concept of 
'•Qttasi-rent'* was the result* In the short-period, in his 
vieV| returns frcKa the emplo;ina^nt of productive factars 
were in the nature of r en t s , t^ing priee-deterainod r a t t e r 
than prl^o^etenaining. In the lo i^ period, t^wever, 
returns segi^gated thM»6lves into nomal factor prices 
sufficient to ca l l forth the necessary supply c^ the 
agents of production concerned and rents result ing fr<»i 
pei^ EBanent scmopolistie sit^atioim* Anything in the way of 
peraanent prof i t , not resolvable into ^^ges, in teres t or 
rent had no ida<»i in {%rshall*s systea* 
According to I^ rsha l l , tb^ cost to which priiws 
tended to correspond in the long-run was tim marginal 
cost I that i s , that i s the cost of the iBKJst expensive 
increiMnt of the product obtained by u t i l i s ing ix»ifficient 
* TbB theory though i t i s called dynaaic, does not f i t 
into the timB honour^ def in i t io i^ of dynasisa* For 
^caiaple vide the defini t ion **£eonoaic dynanics i s the 
study of eeonoaie ^esostezusn in re la t ion to 
precMding ai^ succeedii^ events*** (Quoted in "E^u^Ksies 
Dynanics" by Williaia J . Baumol* p . 2,) 
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factors of production or by working others Intensively and 
at great . expense. Whenever price was in excess of 
marginal cost, expansion of oatp^t was encouraged. Hew 
firms were attracted to the industry and existing 
business stimulated to produce a greater quantity. 
Conversely, when prices fell below aarginal costs, there 
was an Icducement to contract output, fiiefficlent finas 
or plants might shut down anci others operate on a 
reduced scale# 
The following diagrams will clearly illustrate 
Marshall's short»run ai^ long-run prices. 
f 
*j-(iJ ^-Ci) 
to figure ( l ) , M.P, i s the price of the output 
OM ai^ HM i s i t s average c»st« The industry i s not 
in equilibrium. I t i s earning a large profit which 
in Marshall's terminology i s called "Quasi-rent.** 
« 5 -
In figure <II), the flra is in full equllibriua 
sinec AR is taagent to AC. Theire is only normal 
profit, which i3 earnings of management, 
Under comi^titiTe condition, it is argued that 
a producer vill bring forth an output of such size 
that marginal revenue equals marginal cost and average 
revenue equals average cost. That producers will carry 
their production as far as the point where the revenue 
fron the marginal increment of output 3^st covers the 
cost of this increment is the basic assumption of the 
marginal theory. But if in the case of the least 
efficient firm in the industry, average revenue is less 
than average cost, then the firm concerned is incurring 
a loss and vmst ultimately go out of business. This 
brings about a fall in the supply of commodity. The 
price, therefore, rises ii^reasing the average revenue of 
the retaining firms. On the other hand, if the average 
revenue for the marginal or least efficient firm in 
the industry is greater than average cost, new firms 
will enter lowering prices and therefore lading down 
average revenues. But what about the firms that are 
more advantageously situated? Clearly tliej owe their 
advantage to some non-competitive situation such as a 
more favourable location, better business ^ j^aanageraent etc. 
The extra-returns which reailt from these superiorities 
are surplus or rent, so that it can be said that if 
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rents are included In costs, then all firms are in the 
position of the least efficient firm with respect to 
balancing of average revenue and average cost. And under 
the influence of competition such advantages are non-
existing and that Biarginal revenue equals marginal cost 
and average revenue equals average costs. In more 
technical parlance, prices are from the standpoint of the 
iiaSividual firm, not variables but parameters and where 
this is so, there exists a state of equilibrium in which 
all outputs are at their maximam and all factors fully 
employed and rewarded according to their marginal producti-
vity. But Marshall was careful to point out that even in the 
long run, when marginal cost equals marginal revenue and 
average cost equals average revenue, there is what is 
called "normal profit**• This he designates as ^earnings of 
managements**, which is an element of cost* 
At this stage, it is necessary to eiujuire and find 
out whether competition of the type envisaged by Marshall 
obtains at present in the actual world of realities. 
Traditionally, it had been admitted that \rtiere competition 
was displaced by absolute monopoly or something approaching 
it, the price was determined by the will of the monopolist. 
Therefore, the cost principle no longer applied to what 
was now a deliberately contrived scarcity. But in all 
intermediate situations, where sellers and buyers are 
numerous, elements which rendered the market imperfect 
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and caused it to depart from the abstract ideal of competition 
were simply treated as "frictions" . These frictions, it was 
argued only mucdled and at times diverted, but did not check 
the great underlying current which was towards a competitive 
equilibrium. Given that equilibrium, there was a presumption 
that economic resources would be employed with rnaximum satis-
factions. Sraffa vigOBously attacked the assumption that 
the "frictions" were in fact a secondary and fugitive pheno-
menon. He argued that they were stable and indeed cumulative 
and yielded a solution consistent not with competition, but 
monopolistic equilibrium. Hence he contended that monopoly, 
and not free corspe tition, was the more appropriate assumption 
in the market theory.' 
This point of view was later d eveloped by Joan Robinson 
and Professor Chataberlin.^ The latter has especially 
dealt with "Product differentiation" by brands and 
advertisements. As he has said, "Wherever 
selling costs are incurred - and they are incurred in 
some measure for almost all commodities - tft cast the 
5. "The Laws of Returns Under Competitive Conditions" by 
Sraffa, "Economic Journal, 1926. Vol, XTTLpp, 535-550 
Compare Weiser "Social Economics" pp« 221-P22. 
"Monopolied institutions which we shall have to examine 
are a different sort. They have in fact traits of monopoly, 
they confer monopolistic power. But at the same time, they 
are subject in other directions to the pressure of competi-
tion or are otherwise restricted. They are .... intermediate 
forms, lying midway between monopoly and competition 
Mixtures of this sort •...••• have great practical and even 
theoretical significance, but it will be best to distinguish 
them from ponopolied instittltions proper," 
4. Joan Robinson "Economics of Imperfect Competition" 
Prof. Chamber 1 in. "The Theory of Mono|iolistic 
Competition." 
• a -
price problem in terms of competitive demand and cost 
curves is not merely inaccurate, it is impossible....... 
Under condition of pure competition, there would be no selling 
costs.........In summary, the competitive cost curve %rtiich 
includes selling costs is inconsistent with Itself, it is 
useless, it is misleading and it is of very limited 
5 
meaning." in other words, the beneficient type of 
competition is replaced by moxK>polistic competiton. 
In the above conditions, equilibrium is very 
difficult to attainj even if eventually attained, it 
does not ensure either full employment or maximum output 
in the sense of jBrfect competition. It may exist without 
full employment. It is bound to exist at a level of 
output much below the maxiaajm mark| because profit 
conserving strategy imposes itself. This practically 
implies that factors are rewarded less than their 
marginal productivity and profits contain always an 
element of direct awnopoly gainj that is gain acquired 
by restriction. The Important element of "good-will" in 
all business valuations is seem largely to represent a 
capitalisation of such monopoly gains. There is monopoly 
5. Professor Charaberlin. "The Theory of Monopolistic Competi-
tion." pp. 175-176. Harvard University Press, 1933* 
Compare A.R. Burns "Decline of Ctmpetition" p. 158, Elements 
of Monopoly have always been interwoven with competition, but 
monopoly elements have increased in importance. They can no 
longer be regarded as occasional and relatively unimportant 
aberratio-S from competition. They are such an organie part of 
the industrial system that it is useless to hope that they can 
b© rearedied by law and the industrial system brought into 
conformity with the idea of perfect competition. 
• 9 r 
6 
element in profit in a capitalist econcmy* 
The extent to vhlch elements of monopoly or 
monopolistic competition in the market of coaEaodities 
reduce the real earnings of the workers can be stated 
with a certain degree of precision. It is usually said 
that a factor of production is exploited if it is employed 
at a price which is less than its marginal net productivity. 
It is in the interest of every employer to use such an 
amount of each factor of production that its mar^ nal 
cost is equal to its marginal net productivity to him. 
If marginal productivity were greater than the mar^nal 
cost of labour, he would find it profitable to increase the 
number of men employ^, if it is less, to diminish, the 
number. Accordingly, 'exploitation' of labour in the sense 
that it is paid less than marginal net productivity to 
the employer is impossible so long as the market for 
labour is perfect. There is, however, a type of 
"exploitation" which arises as a result of imperfection 
in the market for commodities, entirely aside from the 
question of whether there is perfect competition in the 
puirchasing of labour. feHaen the selling market for 
e<MBodities J.S pe:^ect, the marginal revenue to the firm 
which is the addition to total revenue produced by 
6# Schumpeter. "The Theory of Economic Development" p. 152. 
Cambridge, Massachusets, Harvard University Pfess, 1951 
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s«XllBe an additional unit of output ^ i s equal to the 
price of the otMiraodity anS the aiirEiDal produetivity of 
laboiuf i s therefore equal to the rmlvm or price of the 
aargirml piisrsicaX imit* III otli^r %forasy the &imr&%% 
price asS the i^rgiaal revmam are the s^m under 
eoQditioQs of i^rfect e o i ^ t i t i ^ i y in the aioket for 
^Hmodltimmm This foUowis froa the fact that i isreases 
in the otttpit of iiiaividual first, uaSer the martot 
cireu^taneeeD hsx^ esmwsS do m>t loiirer price. "Stm 
mount that each s e l l e r can offer i s such a s^all part 
of the t o t a l supply of the cf»»K>dity that Tariations d# 
not affect ^ i c e and he can dispose of as such as be 
can offer a t the rtdline price* If there i s perfect 
coiipetitio% in the saHcet for labour tfOf^rs v i l l be paid 
their nar^ nal pli^sieal products t i s^s a^rginal revemte, 
vhieh coincides v i th ivice* 
yi^n^ howei^ry the sel l ing aarlcet i s characterised 
by iAperfeet or Kii^iKilistic coapetitimif a^rginal revenue 
v i l l be less than pr ice , or average revenue and since 
waimrB a r e paid luader the assumption ^ perfect 
competition in the market for labour, thei r 
aargiiial phsysieal prt^uet t i a ^ marsinal rewinsi® to 
airerage re^Nmue or price, i s the aeasure o£ exploitation 
a t t r ibutable to imperfection in the sel l ing liailEet. 
7. Karry A. i i i i i s and Boyale £• Montg^^ry* **Labours* 
Prot^»BB and »mm Basic LaiKHir Problei^*" p» 196. 
l^c Crav-Hill Book C<»apasy lac*, Bev tca^ . 19S3. 
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What is actually meant by exploitation is, usually, that 
the wage is less than the marginal physical product of 
labour valued at its selling price.® 
The reason why marginal revenue is less than average 
revenue under condition of imperfect competition, whereas 
the two are identical when competition is perfect is not 
difficult to discover. Under perfect competition, each 
additional unit the individual producer offers brings the 
Same price. Total revenue, therefore, increases Igr the 
price received for the addlticnal unit, and so long as 
average reimaie remains constant with an increasing output 
marginal revenue and average revenue will coincide. But 
under imperfect competition, the demand for the product 
of the individual producer is not perfectly elastic. 
Additions to output lower price or average revenue and 
this fall in price affects all units sold, not merely the 
the final- or marginal products. The net addition to total 
revenue produced by selling an additional unit is the 
price received for that unit minus the loss on all 
previous units due to the fact that their prices have 
been forced down by the increase in output. Patently, 
then, marginal revenue is less than average revenue 
under Imperfect competition. Average revenue is total revenue 
8. Professor Pigou "Economics of Welfare" p. 594.Macmillan 
& Co. LoiuSon June 1920. 
Vide the definition of Mrs. Robinson "Economics of 
Imperfect Competition" p. 283. "We shall say that a group 
of workers are being exploited when their wages is less 
than the marginal physical product that they are producing. 
Values at the price at which it is being sold". 
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divided by the raiaber of units. Marginal revenue is the 
net charge in total revenue and is affected not only 
by the loss on previous units when successive ones mm t 
be sold at a lower price. Each producer may be as aimed 
to regulate his output in such a way that the addition 
to his total revenue from selling an additional unit just 
equals the addition to his coats from selling that unit 
(since if he sold one unit less, he would lose more of 
revenue than he saved of cost and if he produced one unit 
more, he would incur more of cost than he gained of 
revenue); ana under conditions of imperfect competition, 
production will be carried to that point where marginal cost 
equals marginal revenue idiich is less tiian price, the 
difference between the two going into enterprise. The 
demand curve for labour (demand curve and productivity 
curve being assumed to correspoufl because of competition 
In the buying of labour) under imperfect competition in 
the market for comaaodities is marginal to, that is below, 
the demand carte under perfect competition, since the 
marginal productivity of labour to the individual firm is 
the cnarginal physical product of labour multiplied by the 
marginal revenue to the firm, awl marginal revenue to the 
firm is less than price. Hence "exploitation* in the sense 
that labour is paid less than its marginal physical 
product valued at its selling price, would obtain, 
- 13 -
©venthotigh tht? vage ©quailed -.largiisai reveraie to the 
In she abo?® figur©, if the ammnt of 1*10 
product i s increased fro® OA to OB by the ad<!ltion of 
axK>ther un i t of labour ^  the ^aluo of the aargirial 
product i s AB'^ H, the T&lue of t ie aarginal revenue 
product i s OBQfi «» OABI or ABQB «- SHBf. me siargiDal 
reveuue product smy be defined by the use of the 
aarginal r^^mmm eurve^ Zt i s t t ^ margir^al {diifsicaX 
I»roduet oui t ip i iea by the martUml revenue* If HE i s 
the aurgiiml revenue curve, i t Is AM^» If BP i s the 
AmmM tmrm for the proaact uader ii^»erfect cc^petiticmt 
eoQd an ad€itioBal u i^ t of la^sur ii^ereases t\m product 
from OA to OB, the value of his aargiiml laroeuct i s 
iy@QH« Bis Marginal i^rvem^ product i s A^ G«4IBPM« Sii^e 
in aff^ii^ awre labmur, th^ eatarepreneur i s guidet! ^ 
the siareiQal revenue prodti^t ra thsr than by mg^gi^tJL 
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product, it follows that he will pay the laarglnal 
unit of labour only ABEF, though it is proc^uclng the 
marginal product ABQH, Therefore, FEQH is the measure 
of exploitation. 
The acciumilation of profits which contain elements 
of such direct monopoly gains by essployers vrill not 
be taken to happily by the worker. A raan who feels 
that he is not getting a fair share of his contribution 
to society because sc«aebof?y else is getting a blf^ ger 
slice is naturally an angry man. Noble thoup.hts are 
denier' to him because he feels the sense of injustice 
done to him. Sooner or later, this will teiif- to develop 
a psychology of discontent and criticism anong the ranks 
of labour* One of the greatest advantages enjoyed by the 
nineteenth centuGry enterprisers was that thoy were able 
to maintain effective and personal contact with their 
employees, since they were concentratlnp both ownership 
ai»1 control in the same hands. But such a phenomenon 
has become a thinu of the pa st in the f ac*i of 
iHEiensc irapersonal corporations where ]aanage;nent is totally 
divorced from ownership. If the laanagements were composed 
. of persons \rho were o-^ mers of large absolute amounts of 
capital, ei/enthouc^ ' a small portion of th-^  •whole, their 
individual interest as owners might lead them to act 
geiKjrally in the interest of the owners. But in a 
number of respects the interest df th«ae in control may 
substantially diverge from that of the owners. The 
management may even be in a position to benefit by 
9 
the bankruptcy of the corporation. 
Such managements who are out to feather their 
own nests rather than safeguarding the interest of 
the owners will not anfl cannot take to the discontent 
of thQ labour rather seriously. The consequence will be 
ill-feeling anc? tension which would eventually lead to 
strikes, look-out etc. Though strike is a unilateral 
action, strikes entail loss of wages to workers, profit 
to the managements, goods and services to the consumers 
and last but not least morale to public. In short, the 
life of a modern community is profoundly affected by the 
forms of production and the relationships at work which 
10 
go on within it. The following statistics prepared 
by the I.L.O. Delhi Branch, shows that the number of 
strikes and lock-outs have Increased since the war in the 
leading countries of the world. 
9. E.A.G. Robinson "Monopoly** p. 226* Cambridge Economic 
Handbooks - XI Nlsbet & Co. Ltd., Lc^ odon 
10. This Is one of the basic assumptions of the 
"Duke of Edingurgh*s Study Conference on the 
Human Problems of Industrial CoBmninitles** within 
the Commen-vealth and Empire, which opened at 
Otxfoi^  on July 9, 1956. Ref. Indian Labour 
Gazettej^ July, 1956, p. A2, 
• 1^ -
l^ ^uada s^ l o s t aiffiually per thcmsaxid w)rkers. 
1 • 5 ^ 
Countries § 1940 - 1944 ft 1945 * 1947. 
2 S 
Caaada 315 U 4 7 
U.S.A. 909 S899 
ZHifimark 47 1062 
Svitserlaod 12 12S 
OQited Kingd<»i 178 ma 
India 537 601 
This state of affairs is highly inimieal to th« 
present systea of production and to the industrial structure 
at large. Therefore, in order to preserve industrial 
peace and to increase the tempo of production, it is 
necessary that labour ^ould be given a stake and a 
status in the industry in the form of profit-sharing. 
This will tend to create a feeling in the worker that 
he is not a »ere appendage of the sachine, a s»re autc»iaton 
vhich is expected only to obey, tmt an integral part of 
the industrial system* As a prominent American businessman 
has put it^ "In a delK»eratie capitalism such as ours, one 
vay to broaden the capitalistic system is to see that 
11 
more people hai^ a stake in it<^ . 
11. Brie Johnston. "Labour shcmld hare a s take in Capitalism" 
in Itev 7ork Times Magaslne 34th February, 1946. p. SO. 
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3e^d0s t h i s , arguuaents supoorting labour's c la ia 
to shaire industry 's prof i ts gather arouna an investaient 
analog/* Th© labouring man's iiwestsient In the business i s 
h i s job. Tho employee, i t i s ssdd, invests h i s t iae 
and energy in the success of h is company* '?o risics 
unemployment, accident and old age d i s u t i l i t y in serving 
h i s employer t h r o u ^ t'r-m years* He i s therefore enti t led 
to pax^icipate in profi ts resul t ing, in part , from his 
investawnt and r i sk . Wiiilaia Green, ^^ ^^ ^^ rican Federation 
of Labour President, t e s t i ^ i n g before the Senate 
Coopittee investigating profit-sharing, decli^reds " In 
r ea l i ty , labour i s a partner in production not from the 
investment of capi ta l , but from the investment of experience 
12 
and work ab i l i t y . *• 
The result ing Senate '^port depreciated the business 
claim that labour i s not ent i t led to share prof i t s . 
Pointing to the fact tliat the person who buys a share 
of stock in a corporation shares i t s profits oven 
t h o u ^ he does not ' labour' enou^ to sign h i s proxy vote 
for the anmal stock-holders aeeting, the report argsied 
that the labouring man, throui^ h is work, actively 
helps create prof i t s . Therefore, Uie employee should 
share in the profit pioduced by h i s e f for ts . 
12. Kenneth H. jKjoapson "Profit-aliaring'', p . 97. 
Harper and Brothers Publishers, "ew 'fork, 1949. 
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APPEWIX TQ CHAPTE'i | 
I t i s found tha t In sp i te of a progressive increaso in 
the net -yalues produced by labour, the annual ©amlngs of 
the worker has been moving in a remarkably constant r a t i o . 
The production census of the United at t i tes of America, 
Canada and the United Kingdom amply bears out t h i s fact* 
A l thou^ the f igures for U»S,A, Manufacturing run back 
to 1359, the years are not s t r i c t l y comparable, since the 
aethod in the a i a p i l a t i o n of the census of l^nufactures 
has beBn changed froa t i i ^ to tirMJ. The t o t a l period^ 1053 
to 1939 i s divided i n t o four sections* 
CD 18&9«^9* This period included s a a l l dosKJstic and hand 
i n d u s t r i e s ociitted from 189i onward* I t shows tha t the percen* 
tage of 'Jet productions paid to labour a t each census* 
1359 *•* *•• 44*4 per cent 
1869 ••* ••* 44*7 * * 
1879 48*3 " • 
1889 44*91 » " 
1879 Was a yeur of estresie depression* With t h i s 
©Inception, the percentages over the 40 years are 
reaai^ably uniform* 
(2 ) 1899-1927. This period covers a t i a e of enoraous 
economic esqpansion, employment was near ly doubled, the 
i n d u s t r i a l wage b i l l r o ^ from 1*8 to 10*1 mil l ion 
d o l l a r s ! wage r a t e s and p r i ce s soared to dizzy h e i # i t s 
i n the \K}om years of 1919-20, and then f e l l rapidly* 
The whole period was character ised by a revolut ion in 
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aechazdaation. But, despite these conditions, the labour 
percentage of the net production shoiiRS an astonishing 
degree of uniforoltyt 
1899 • • • 4017^ 
1904 • • « 40.45? 
1909 • • • 39 .3^ 
1914 . • . • • • 40 .2^ 
1919 • • • 40.4^ 
1921 . . . • • • 43 .2^ 
1923 • • • 41 .3^ 
1925 . . . • • • sa.9,f 
1927 • • • sa.sjg 
Frora 1899-1919, the maxiaam variation was only 1.4^. 
With the sudden drop in prices between 1920 (index 151) 
and 1921 (ix^ex 104), the percentage rose to the abnoraal 
level of 43,0jS, The years 1925 and 1927 show an altogether 
lower level. But this tii^, post-war reorganisation had 
been well established, and one of its characteristics was 
the large growth of the white collar worker who probably 
absorbed a much larger share of the net product in the form 
of staff salaries, thus altering the rates of prodxactive 
wages. 
(3) 1929-33 
1929 • • • • • • 36 .4^ 
1931 • • • . . . 37.0jg 
1933 • . • . . . oo.X^ 
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This period eoimrs very wide jfluctuations in trade} 
0fflpl(^ 3naent fell froa 8*3 millioos in 1929 to 5«8 Billions 
in 1932. Wholesale prices from index 95 to 71| wage 
rates from 109 to 87, Despite these, the ratio again remained 
remarkably uniform* 
(4) 1985-59 (last year of eensus). 
19S5 .•• •.. S9«41.^ 
19S7 39,31^ 
1939 ..• ••. 39.41^ 
The following figure represents tfc® \rfiole period in 
foiar sections* . It shoved the ratio of the average ammal 
earnings to the average net production per worker ejapl<Q'ed, 
During these years* 
Wage-rates moved froa 39 to S60 (index 1913 « 100) 
Whole-Sale prices from 61 to 150 and back to 37» The 
total wage bill from f. 370 mil. to I. ?0S0 ndllions. 
The increase in mechanisation and th« revolution in 
organisation canBot be measured nui^rieally* ?et| through 
these great changes, booms and slumps, and in spite of 
strikes, lockouts and the eeoiu^ mlc turisoil of var, the 
aimual earning of the worl^r is seen to move 
in a remarkably constant ratio to the i^t n^lue, 
he produces. 
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bl£T PPODUCTION 
<«5? '<7 '77 '?^ '?f /»o< '«?'/4 't<f'^/itj itr'-tr ''i9:ff'3s '3s-'37 'S9 
U.S.A. All Mannfacturlng. 
1, Percentage of Net production paid out In wages. 
2, Logarithamic graph of the ratio of wages to net 
productions per worker employed. 
The only years for which statistics afford a 
comparison are 1924, 1930 and 1955, the years of the census 
of production. The London and Cambridge Economic Service 
has comiaated the total wage bill for operations only which, 
on the figures of net production given in the census of 
production, show the following percentages* 
1924 • • • . . . 45 ,9^ 
1930 . . . . . . 46.83; 
1935 . . . . . . 4 5 . l ^ i 
Sources» The calculations are made from the suraraary at 
the beginning of volume 1, U.S. census of 
Manufactures, 1939. 
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The evidence Is quite scanty, but, so far as it 
goes, it all points to tl^ saiae eondusion. 
Far more complete figures for Canadian Manufacture 
are available, and the results are plotted in the 
following figure. Although the figures tend to skiov a 
greater variation in the percentages than is the case 
in U.S.A^ Manufacturing, for considerable periods, the 
constancy is noticeable, for instance between 1929 ar^ 
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1. Percentage of Net production paid out in wages. 
2. Logarithmic graph of the ratio of annual 
earnings to net production per worker employed. 
The above figures clearly indicate that though the 
share of labour has been increasing in the absolute sense, 
the ratio of their earnings to Ket production has been 
remaining almost constant. This shows that so long as 
the workers are rewarded by the wage-system aloi», their 
progress is bound to be slow. Profit-sharing, if introduced 
will not only supplement their wages, but will also give 
them a stake in the concerns in which they are working. 
Besides this, the concentration of such a considerable 
part of the production in the hands of the higher 
income group has been regarded as oite of the fundamental 
causes of Trade Cycle. It is believed that a general 
adoption of profit-sharing in industry will not only 
serve to reduce the inequality in the distribution of 
wealth but also teno to minimise the swings of the 
business cycles by channelling purchasing power to 
the lower wage group xjhom Keynes considered as having 
a "high propensity to cons-ume". 
Sourcei Calculated from the figures supplied in the 
Canada year Book, 1943-44. p. 405, 
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CBAPYSa II 
In all the statistics published on the subject prior 
to the first world war, the definition of profit-sharing 
was taken to refer to definite arrangeiaents under which 
employees regularly receive in addition to their wages or 
salipries, a share on some pre-determined basis in the 
profits of the undertaking, the sum allocated to employees 
varying with the level of profits. Thus the International 
Ccmgress on profit-sharing which met at Paris in 1889, 
defined profit-sharing as *an agreement freely entered 
illto by which the employees receive a share fixed in 
1 
advance of the profits". The congress interpreted it to 
include both legally binding agreements and those in which 
there was no other than moral obligation, emphasis was 
upon the necessity of determining in advance, the method 
of sharing profits. Closely following the Congress, the 
Report on profit-sharing and Labour Copartnership in tiie 
United Kingdom defined it as "a scheme whereby the workers 
receive in partial r^mneration of their labour, and in 
addition to their wages, a share fixed before-hand in the 
profits rselised by the undertaking to which the 
2 
profit-sharing term relates". Accordingly, all types of 
1. Article on Profit-sharing. Encyclopaedia of Social 
Sciences, op.eit. Vol. XII. p. 490 
2* Eoeyclopaedia Britannica. op.cit. ?ol. X7III. p. 559. 
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piece-work payments and all arrangements for the payments 
of bonus varying according to output, sales, savings in 
production costs, ate. were excluded. Sijailarly, 
arrangeaents under which an employer decides entirely 
at his discretion whether to pay a bonus, anfl if a bonus 
is paid, wer§ normally excluded. 
With the development of various forms of employee 
welfare plans some writers on profit-sharing especially in 
the United States of America tended to v;iden the meaning 
of the term to include other measures. In an enquiry made 
on the subject by the United State IiMiustrial Counsellors 
profit-sharing was defined in a wider way as ps^ments in 
the form of cash, stodic, o|>tions, warrants or otherwise, 
given under a predetermined and continuiJug policy by the 
management of a company to all or ar^ group of its 
officers or employees in addition to their established 
wages or salaries. Specially excluded were such forms 
of extra-wages or salary compensation as royalties or other 
payments based directly upon the adoption of specific 
innovations or suggestions, sale commissions, individual 
bonuses based solely on measured production or reduction 
in operating cost, attei^ance and Xmas bonuses, payments 
on insurance or to retirement or other benefits or saviig 
plans not based directly on profits. It also cQ.6 not 
include payments by any individual contract for the 
employment of a specified person, at compensation 
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determined in whole or in part by volume of profit. The 
United States Senate Committee on profit-sharing gave 
a more comprehensive scope to profit-sharing and defired 
ifas all employee benefit plans to which the employer 
contributes any sums or because of which the employer 
incurs ai^ expense". 
But these wide generalisations which have been used 
for all practical studies of profit-sharing in the United 
States did not find favour with the British experts on 
the subject. But of late, even in the United Kingdom, 
the conservative definition is being slowly widened to 
accommodate new changes in the field of profit-sharing. 
In the course of a recent investigation into the 
subject in the United Kingdom, considerable arrangements 
were discovered by which although no pre-determined 
basis was laid down, a bonus out of profits was regularly 
allocated to employees, the amount of which fluctuated in 
practice broadly in accordance with the level of profits. 
Arrangements which were wholly excluded from the pre-war 
statistics have been included in the present surv^, 
because they have been found to be operating in consonance 
with the spirit of profit-sharii^ and as having as 
3. Quoted in "Profit-sharing for Wage Earners and 
Executives'* by Bryce M, Stewart and Walter 
J. Couper. op.cit. p.13. 
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objectives not differing fundamentally from those 
schemes, in which the basis of allocation is 
4 
specifically laid do\m in advance. 
Another departure from the pre-war definition may 
he mentioned. In the International congress referred to 
above, considerable emphasis was placed on the 
necessity for a profit-sharing scheme to be one which 
extends to all, or the large majority of, of the 
employees of the firm in question. Accordingly, the 
Ministry of Labour's pre-war statistics excluded not 
only arrangements for the sharing of profits with only 
a few special employees (e.g. managers) but also number 
of schemes in which participation was not extended to 
the bulk of those employ^ sd in the undertaking being confined 
to those classified as "staff" or to particular sections of 
the undertaking. In the recent enquiry, already referred 
to, a small number of similar schemes was encountered. In 
some of these undertakings, the classes of employees who 
are excluded from participation are covered by other 
bonus arrangements such as output boiras systems. In 
all these cases noted, the employees who do participate 
represent a whole group or class and do not consist simply 
of a few specially selectee' employees. Accordingl,y, the 
4, Profit-sharing and Copartnership Report of the United 
Ki23^<»B, Quote No. 3348 dated June 1956, op. cit. 
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schemes have been treated as examples of profit-sharing, 
within the limited fiel(^  in which they operate aijfl they 
were therefore incluaec^  in the survey. Thus both in the 
United States of America and the United Kingdom, the scope 
of the subject has been considerably enlarged in order 
to accommodate new branches of development. 
Profit-sharing as practised in foreign countries falls 
under three categories. They are 
(a) Cash payments are made at the end of stipulated periods. 
(b) Participation is deferred by placing the profits 
which are to be divided, in a savings account, provident 
fund, or annuity fund, 
(c) Payment is made in the s'^ ape of shares of stock. 
By far the most conmon and popular form of profit-
sharing is cash payment. This consists of two-thirds of 
the plans introduced in Great Brit4in and a considerable 
mimber of those in vogue in the United States, About 
10,000 American firms now operate employee profit-
sharing plans according to the United States Bureau of 
Ijaternal Revenue. These firms range in size from the 
Mail Order Firm with IS,000 employees to a wide variety 
of Smaller Enterprises such as newspapers, retail stores, 
banks anc* factories. 
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About 85 variations of two principal types (the first 
two) of plans are in operation. There are current payment 
plans in which workers share the profits periodically and 
deferred plans in which the employees' share of the profits 
Is placed in a Trust Fun<5 for future distribution, Maiqr 
companies mix the two plans in which one-third of the 
profit-sharing funds is distributed outright, ons-third 
placed in reserve and the rest towards building up a 
5 
Retirement ftind. 
Deferred participation is carried on In sorae concerns 
by placing the employees' share of profits in an account on 
which he may draw at any time on short notice. In this type 
of profit-sharing scheme, it is more common for the account 
to be placed to the workers' credit in a provident or 
superannuation fund in which case the bonus cannot 
ordinarily be withdrawn while the worker is in the 
employ of the Companiy. Frequently, it is retained, 
partly or wholly for investment in the enterprises, 
yielding 3 to 6 percent interest. The accumulations 
are usually payable upon retirement, termination of employ-
ment, permanent disability, death of the participant or 
in specified cases of urgeht need. Usually workers who 
leave the service of the company, go out on strike or are 
dishonorably discharged, are debarred from participation in 
5. Ind an Labour Gazette, March 1950, p, 6SS, 
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the benefits, although in some plans employees on 
account of ill-health, or for other good reasons 
receive a part of the savings. This method has not found 
general acceptance, because the indefinite postponement of 
participation has not given the necessary incentive to 
increased efficiency or good-will. 
The third type makes payment in the form of shares 
of stock which are issued to euiployees in soiae Instances 
without giving any sort of recognition to superior 
service, for a term of two to five years. A number of 
plans provide for the issue of stock to employees at a 
price below the market rate, payments to be made in 
instalments. Under the English system, employees holding 
shares are given a cumulative preferred dividend am? in 
others the workers receive dividends with holding 
regular shares, certificates being given to them which 
are not marketable as are the shares held by ordinary 
investors. Where shares are issued free or on favourable 
terms, there is ordinarily a maximuia limit to the number 
set aside for this p irpose. In England this aaxlraam 
ranges from £ 50/- to £ 1000/- for each person. In the 
United States, the number of shares that can be held 
by individual workers varies widely; but tho usual basis 
is the workers' earning capacity. Apart frora the method 
of payment, current profit-sharing sfchemes differ in 
three main \my3, 
(l) The nature of profits shared — that is the 
method of calctrlating the total amount of 
profit to be distributed. 
(S) The application of the share — the method 
by \dileh employees• shares in the distribution 
are arrived at. 
(3) The qualifications for a share — the 
conditions of employees* eligibility. 
In formal profit-sharing schemes, the determination 
of the profits to be shared is described in a great variety 
of ways. In son^ cases, it is so nearly an arbitrary 
declaration of an inc'etenainate sum, by the Boards as 
almost to disqualify the distribution as a profit-sharing 
schemeJ for example, such a statement as that a "fixed sum" 
will be distributed "after all charges have met". In 
other cases, at the other extreme, the charges to be met 
out of the gross profits are specified In considerable 
detail and the disposal of the residue is defined by the 
allocation of fixed proportions to a number of purposes, 
Including the profit sharing bonus. There are usually three 
ctMiiaon methods which are used for this purpose. They are 
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(a) the d i r e c t sharing of p ro f i t s (b) the wage dividend 
plan and (c) the percentafe-of-pay system on the 
Datum-Line-Method. 
(a? T]ig px^9<f% .ghartog^ ^ Profit?.' 
Under this type which is the most common, the 
employees* share of the profits is fixed at a definite 
percentage of the prctfits earned. In such schemesj the 
profits are divided before making any provision for a return 
on capital or for the payment of taxes. In others, after 
certain specified deductions are made from the gross 
profits for depreciation, provision for anticipated 
expenditure, reserve etc., the balance is divided 
50-50 betvmen the share-holders and the employees. 
The significance of this division depends on the size 
of the labour force or of that portion which is 
eligible for the bonus and the number of sharel^lders. 
In consequence, this type of scheme has sometimes run 
into difficulties on account of substantial alterations 
in the size of the number of either party to ttie division. 
The main advantage is the comparative simplicity of its 
operation and the impression it gives of equality of 
fair treatiBent of the two sides in industry. A typical 
example is "The Sears, Roebuck Plan" (a large Mail 
order Firm) which was establisfeed in the United States 
6 
of ijndrica in 1916. It is a deferred distribution 
6. Quoted in "Profit-sharing: A Review" By P.S.Harasimhan. 
p. 11. Reprinted from the International Labour Review, 
Vo, XVII, Ko. 6, December 1950. 
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plan with a distinct bias on savings by the employees. 
All employees, after a c^ ptlnuoiis service of one year 
with the company are entitled to join the plan. Those 
who participate are required to deposit in the 
profit-^sharing fund 5 percent, of their wages. The 
firm in its turn contributes to the fund a percentage 
of its consolidated net income on the following 
slidinfs scale. Five per cent if the consolidated net 
income is less than 40 million dollars for the year; 
6 per cent, if it amounts to 40 million dollars or more, 
but is less than 60 million dollars, 7 per cent, if it 
amounts 60 million or more, but less than 80 millionj 8 
per cent if it is between 80 and 100 millionj 9 per cent 
if it amounts to 100 million or more. In 1947, the 
company's net income reached 107 million. Each 
employee's share of the company's contribution to the 
profit-sharing fund is determined according to the length 
of his service with the company and his own deposit in 
the fund, rising from a sura equal to the deposit made 
during the previous year in tne case of mi employee with 
less than five years' service to a sum equal to four 
times the deposit made during the preceding year in case 
of an employee over fifty years of age anc with 
fifteen or aiore years* continuous service. The fund 
is administered by a Board of Trustees — three company 
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officers and two employees. An employee can withdraw 
his share in the funr? upon retirement, death, 
cessation of employtncnt or certified emergency. The 
firm's proflt-sharinp; fund is valued at 200 million 
dollars and over 81000 employees or almost 99 per cent 
of those eligible have joined the programme out of their 
own free will. 
This method is a variant of the above, and is to 
make the bonus equivalent to dividend paid in excess of 
a fixed minlimim rate of dividend. In this case, a 
minimal return on capital Is in effect Included in 1iie 
prior charges of the profits, before a 50-50 division of 
the residue between shareholders and employees. The 
Eastman Kodak Company's plan which has been functioning 
since 1912 ia a current distribution plan of the 
7 
above type. The employees' share of p ro f i t s i s 
re la ted to the dividends declared for s tock-holders and 
i s d i s t r ibu ted each year in cash. The firni has pot 
about 40,000 workers Dn€ a l l employees, hired on or 
before the f i r s t October each year pa r t i c ipa t e in 
p ro f i t s i f s t i l l on the pay- ro l l of the firra when 
profit-bonus i s paid in March of the following year . 
For each PO cents by v/hich the di\^ldend declared on 
COTimon stock exceeded 70 cents per share , during the 
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preceding year, the eligible employees receive 5 per cent 
of their total earnings from the ccMapany (excluding 
the profit bonus) in the five years preceding the 
year in which payment is made. During the period, the 
plan has been in operation, over 86 million dollars 
have been distributed to employees as their share of 
the company's profitsj and in March 1948 49,300 
employees received the largest dividend in the company's 
history — a total of 11»6 million dollars. 
Both in this variant and the basic laethod 
described earlier, the payment of dividends on 
preference shares is usually Included among the prior 
charges and the 50-50 division is related only to 
ordinary share-holding. 
Among the methods of determining distributable 
profits which are not related to dividends, the most 
common are those in \Aich a datua-line is drawn which 
the profits must exceed before any distribution to 
employees is made, the amount of the distribution being 
usually the whole or portion of the excess. Such a 
•line* may be drawn at any point before or after 
charging any particular items of expenditure and the 
practice of the companj'^  adopting this method varies widely 
in the choice of which side of the 'lirm* various items 
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shall be reckoned. Because of this elasticity in 
application, the method does not differ substantially 
in its result from those based simply on a share of 
"net profits" and the chief reason why it has been 
used by companies seeas to be its effects of 
giving warning that there will be no profit-sharing 
in bad times arw? the relief it affords from having 
to calculate and distribute very small profit-shares 
in years of very low net profits. 
In some cases, the *datum-line* takes the form 
of a percentage or proportion of the year*s profits as 
a percentage of previous year's profits. In other 
cases, notably those of old established private companies 
with little or no capital share-holding other than 
• family* or 'founder* and not raich variation from year 
to year in turnover or labour costi, the datum-line 
Bay not be simply a fixed figure, the purpose and 
composition of which are not re^ g^ aled. 
An example of this type is to be found in the 
Howntree and Company's profit-sharing schen®, drawn 
up in 1923 which is a straight-forwaj^ cash distribution 
plan* From the gross profits of the compare, taxes 
are first deducted as also a return of 7i per cent on 
8. Ibid, pp, 12-134 
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the capital invested in the business as the ^standard 
wage of capital"• Of the balance of profit remaining, 
10 per cent is paid to a dividend reserve account 
(until this reserve amounts to one year*s standard 
wage of capital) to provide for the payiaent of 
dividends during years of poor earnings. Of the net 
profits of the company computeci on this basis, one-tenth 
goes to the Directors, four-tenths as their extra-share 
to capital contribution and one-half to the employees, 
the share of each employee being in proportion to his 
weekly earnings. All payments are generally made in 
cash and the plan is administered by the profit-sharing 
eoiaalttee of nine members, a majority of whoa are 
employees. An interesting provision of the plan is 
the right given to this coraiittee, if it so decides 
to appoint ^1 employees' Accountant whose fees are 
payable out of labour's share of profits, to check 
the profit statement drawn up by the company. 
The second of the ways in which schemes differ, 
that is the way in which the distributable profits is 
applied and the employees share in it are arrived 
at — shows an even greater variation that the ways in 
which they differ in determining the profit to be 
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d is tributes • A great deal of ingenuity has been 
applied especially in the earlier days of profit-
sharing to devising methods of distribution and soae 
extremely complicated systems have been evolved. 
Hovadays, such ingenuity appears to be at a 
discount and the majority of schemes introduced in 
recent years have relatively simple methods of applying 
and distributing profits. The customary method in the 
last ten years has been to apply the amount of 
distributable profits to the total wages and in 
proportion to individual pay» with loading for long 
service. 
In great many cases, the scheme is operated 
through a Trust, especially where the whole of the 
profit sharing bonus is not paid in cada. The Trust 
receives the distributable profits from the company and 
applies it according to a Trust Deed, The Trustees 
usually include ^aployee representatives. 
In a small number of ccaapanies, the bonus is 
distributed at a flat rate, regardless of rate of pay 
and length of service, or any other differentiation. 
In a rather large number of schemes, the application 
of bonus tD basic psiy, whether wages or salary, 
without any loading for status or length of service 
and without any account of overtime or other 
- 39 -
incpements to pay. In most cases, the total profit to 
be share<^  Is aivided by a ntimber of * points* 
representing the total of basic pay pliB other points 
for a variety of special qud ifi cat ions such as 
length of service, status etc., to arrive at a basic 
Value for each point and each individual share is 
calculated by the number of point values he is entitled 
to. Scaaetimes, the result of the application of the 
total share to the total wages bill is expressed 
after so many extra works* wages. 
It is in the method of loading the basic 
entitlement that a company's view of the functions of 
profit-sharing is more often revealed. For example, 
companies which gave a high and increasing loading for 
length of service may be thought to regard profit-sharing 
primarily as a reward for loyalty and also to 
subscribe to the view that it is the oldest employees 
who most need a share as a contribution to their 
income on retirement or dependants if they die. Those 
who begin the length of service loading early and 
maintain it at a constant rate perhaps attach oKsre 
importance to profit-sharing as an inducement to loyalty, 
rather than as a reward of it and possibly have a 
higher expectation than the former group of its value 
in instilling a habit of thrift in the young. On tim 
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other haiid, those companies which do not load for 
length of service but increase the bonus share in 
accordance with status or quality of work may 
perhaps attach significance to profit-sharing as an 
incentive to production. The Imperial Clieaical 
Industries which very recently introduced a scheme of 
©mployee-shareholding on a basis of profit-sharing 
excluded long service loading on the grounf' that it 
would detract from the idea that a profit-sharing is 
something earned each year by the corporate efforts of 
all concerned* In sc^e cases, an attempt is made 
to give some weight to all these factors which result 
in the adoption of extremely complex formula. Generally| 
however, in the majority of cases the workers* share 
in the profits is linked to his annual earnings 
exclusive of overtime, 
(3) Qualifications for a Share, 
The third of the main ways in which profit-
sharing differs — that of eligibility of employees for 
participation — throws up another example of the 
artificiality of the conventioBS which historically has 
been built up around the subjefit. The cojoaonest 
9, Manager, March 1956. "Profit-Sharing", pp. 209-S16* 
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condition of eligibility among companies with 
profit-sharing scheaes is a period of service with 
the f iina. In a recent survey conducted in the 
United Kingdom, of sixty old well-known schemes in the 
coimtry, fifty have some service qualifications. Half 
of them laake the length of service one year, a 
quarter make it six months and the remainE?er 
requires a longer period either two or t ree or 
five or twelve years. 
By far the most important aspect of the 
administration of profit-sharing schemes in the opinion 
of a number of its experienced practitioners is the 
provision made to inform the beneficiaries of the way 
their share" is arrived at. Some go so far as to 
say that nowadays the most substantial benefit to be 
expected from profit-sharing is its educational value, 
in enlightening employees by aeans of something in 
which they have a direct personal interest about the 
"facts of life" in business. It is certainly the 
ease, that the companies which seemed to have derived 
most advantage are those which have effective systems 
of bringing the facts that lie behind the announcement of 
the year's share, not merely to the notice, but to the 
attention of their employees. 
10. Manger. Ibid. fp. 209-216. op. clt. 
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Kot all companies have special mechanism of 
ccffiumnication for this purpose, many rely on existing 
cham:iels, such as work councils* Where there is 
special s^chanism, it generally takes the form of 
an administering committee for the profit-sharing 
schece composed of trian.igement and employee 
representatives. In a number of cases, they are 
the Trustees of the Trust Fund, The functions of 
the committee are* 
(a) To he informed of t?ie financial positlon| 
(b) To agree the cciLeaiatioii according to the 
prescribed formula of the amount available 
for profit-sharing; 
Cc) To check its application to whatever is 
the recognised aggregate entitlement in 
its distribution; and 
(d) To settle any question arising on 
individual entitlement. 
Above all, it is the function of the comaittee 
to see that the essential facts about the annual 
suLlocation are broadcast to and understood by the 
employees. In this process, it is the general 
experience that valuable and necessary as is the 
posting of notices or the circulation of printed 
statements, the most effective form of communication 
is by w)pd of mouth from the employee and manag^ient 
representatives on the committee. The occasion on 
which this coBSBunieation is made varies from coapaz^ 
to compai^ at the tliae of audit, at the publication 
of accounts, on the day of annual general meeting, at 
the declaration of dividends shortly before annual 
holidays, or at regular Intervals, It is clearly 
easier to make periodic announcements if there is 
a starwling committee concerned with the scheme, 
The nature of financial information disclosed to 
the committee depends on the circumstances of 
particular company including the annual published accounts if 
any, but it is increasingly the ijractice to disclose at 
least as naich as is disclosec to the share hole'ers and to 
disclose it in terms which relate it as closely as 
possible to the day to day experience of the men on 
the factory floor on the works office. 
At the introduction of the scheme nowadays, care 
is generally taken to consult before-har«5 not only the 
employees, but also the Trade Union Representatives* 
Trade Unions tend as a rule to dissociate v/ith some care 
from profit-sharing, but they have not recently set 
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themselves to oppose the introduction of scheai^ which 
have been fully explained to them before-hand and on 
•which their advice has been s ought on any points that 
might seem inimical to their interests. 
Various managements have introduced profit-sharing 
with various metives. They range from pure altruism 
to gross ©goisa. Between the two extremes, there lies 
the hybrid motive of altruisUc egoism — where 
profits are shared with the workers in the expectation of 
increasing largely the sum total of profit and hence the 
share aceruino to capital. Among the oblectix'"es that 
are conaaonly declared in the TJnited States of Americai 
the most important have beeni 
(1) The avoidance of strikes and the maintenance 
of a contended labour force, 
(.2) To act as incentive to increased efficiency 
and greater output, 
(3) To bring about certain flexibility in the 
wage system by an automatic adjustment of 
the total remuneration of labour to 
business fluctuations, 
(4) To instil in labour the desire of Saving 
and a sense of security, 
(5) To help reducing labour turnover and 
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(6) To provide for old age and finally to 
preserve capitalism against threat 
of liquidation, by givir^ labour a 
stake and status in it* 
Apart from these widely publicised motives, 
certain managecKnts have instituted profit-sharing with 
the object of achieving some clandestine ends. One of 
these has been the desire on the part of management to 
combat the growing influence of trade unionism aaong the 
ranks of labour. All such schemes s tarted with th is 
dubious motive had actually accentuated rather than 
attenaiating Industrial unrest, and eventually, they 
had foundered on the rock of labours* increasing 
hostility. Another such motive has been the desire 
on the part of certain managements to use profit-
sharing as an alternative to paying the prevailing 
wage scales. In America, during the war and post-war 
periods, a crop of schemes came into existence as a 
consequence of the managements* desire to avoid 
taxation. According to a report published by the 
Industrial Relations Counselors, in 1946, "the spread 
of profit-sharing plans and the increased distribution 
under ttiem in prosperous times support the notion 
that there is an element of tax-avoidance in profit-
sharing". 
11. Boyce M. Stewart and Walter J. Cmiper. "Profit-Sharing 
and Stock-Ownership for Wagd Earners and Executives 
(Hew York, Industrial Relations Ccmoselors, Inc. 1945) 
p. 46. op, cit. 
The table below shows the result of the most 
ccMaprehensive study of the Hatlorial Industrial Conference 
Board, Executives of 182 profit-sharing companies 
OBntloxui the goals listed In the table. It will be seen 
that approximately 60 per cent, of the companies expect 
their plans to result in either better labour 
relations or greater work productivity. 
Purpose. Number of Percentage, 
companies. 
To improve morale 48 24,6 
To regard extra effort 36 19,8 
To increase efficiency 24 13,2 
To promote systematic saving 23 12,6 
Because of belief in principle 18 9,9 
To reduce labour turnover 17 9,3 
To adjust compensation 12 9,3 
As preparation for transfering 
business to employees 4 2,2 
Total 182 100 
Sources National Industrial Conference Board, Inc. 
Profit-sharing, New York, N,Y, 134, p,14. 
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In the Stewart and Couper study, the reasons 
for instituting profit-sharing plans were secured 
from 94 Executives. These management objectives 
are listed in the table subjoined. Indicative of 
growth in popularity of deferred distribution plans 
is the most frequent reason for plan adoption , 
providing for retirement of benefits. This ^ a l 
was not stated in the previous table 
%y^p?)^^,i^i? Qfr.1 .^gt^ lyg As tostlti^tUjBK H alms* 
' ^ 1 
il 
Reasons fop adopting profit-sharing S Number of plans, 
plans, i 
8 
To provide for retirement benefits 36 
To stimulate greater effort or 31 
interest 
To reward exceptional service 20 
To encourage employee savings 7 
Sources Bryce M, Stewart and Walter J. Couper^ "Profit-
Sharing and Stock Omiership for Wage-Earners and 
Executives", Monograph No. 10, Kew York, 
Industrial Relatioiis Counselors, Inc, 1945, 
p. 23. op. cit* 
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Qunm m 
PROFIT-SHARISO — ITS GESESIS AND GROWTH. 
The desire to reform society is said to be as old as 
huBianity itself, although the first written evidence of 
it appeared only with Plato's Republic. Just as 
Plato \\Tote his Republic and Sir Thomas More his 
TJtopia to eradicate the socid evils of ttieir tiiaes, so 
also profit-sharing vas started both in its classical 
home of France and later on in the Hnltcd KingdoKi as a 
manifest expression of the Social Reforn Movement that 
swept Europe during tlie nineteenth century. 
The genesis of profit-sliaring has to be 
traced back to the 'produce-sharing' \iaich was practised 
in agriculture, fishing and mining froEi very olden times. 
The remnants of this method still linger in the share of 
the produce often granted to workers in these industries. 
But with the growth of modern large-scale production and 
the ffiinaite division of labour, the system was rendered 
impossible of extension, as the goods produced by mar^ 
of the industrial workers were unfit for direct consumption. 
The specialisation of function witVx the resulting growth 
in the size of industrial units has meant the 
depersonalisation of industry. Interests as well as 
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employments have been narrowed, specialised and 
distinguished so that capital and labour which were 
employed in production came to regard their interest so 
opposed to e ach other. Each began to claim a larger 
share of the produce of their conuaon venture. Some 
means had to be discovered in order to reconcile these 
conflicting claims and it was to bridge this over-widening 
chasm that profit-sharing came into existence. 
FRAMCE. 
France is considered to be the classical home of 
profit-sharing. Though the principle of labour participation 
in industrial profits was adopted in the country as early 
as 1775, it was systematically put into practice only from 
1842, by a Parisian Painter by name Leclaire. Since he 
was the pioneer in the field, he was called and 
rightly so the father of profit-sharing. He carried 
profit-sharing a long way on the road, not merely to 
co-partnership but to complete democracy in industry. 
Born of very poor parents and in very humble circumstances, 
Leclaire by dint of his honesty, ability and moral 
rectitude, gradually rose to the position of one of the 
most conspicuous ''Captains" of French industry. His 
whole life can be aptly termed as a continuous 
experiment with the concept of profit-sharing. 
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|,ee3,alre the Father of Profit-sharing« 
Edmund-Jean Leclalre was born in 1801 In a small 
village about 100 miles south-east of Paris. Being the son 
of a poor cobbler, he had very little of schooling and was 
constrained to leave his education at the early age of ten. 
For about two years, much against his will, he had to become 
a tender of cattle. But he was so thoroughly out of Joints 
with his work that he discarded after two years and got 
himself apprentised to a mason. But even in this new vocation, 
life to him was far from being satisfactory. At the age of 
seventeen, he took hlra^ elf to the city of Paris where he 
became an apprentise to a painter. Here also, he was the 
object of much privation and harsh treatment, but undaunted 
by the uncongentAl circumstances, he stuck to his Job tenaci-
ously. He worked hard, conducted hitaself well and thus rose 
to the position of an overseer. Impressed by his perseverence 
and goor? workmanship, his master increased his pay which 
enabled him to save substantially. Always conscious of his 
natural abilities and aptitudes, he supplemented his 
meagre education by taking 1- ssons during leisure hours. 
At the age of S2, he married. By this time, he 
became a good decorator, his wages rising to eight francs 
a day. When be attained S6, he severed his connections 
with his master and s et up an independent career by 
starting a shop of his o\rfn, the capital of which did not 
exceed a thousand francs. Though his capital was but 
scant, bis eimrgy ai^ enthusiasm were uiabounded. 
*WlM>©irer worked on the lac'der near hlia was electrified 
by hi3 zeal. Alert ai^ adroit, h© astonished his 
felioifs by many a bol<a feat, mastered them, obliged 
thea to imitate hJji, lost not a sainute, and hardly toofe 
tiiae to eat tl^ frugal iseal which ifedam© Loclaire brought"; 
In 1829 ®^ contracted to paint s&ven houses at a cost of 
SO,CK)0 francs i^ieh was wxch below the usual rate, He 
inspired his emplcyees to better work by paying higher 
wages, and thas he was able to pocket a clean profit 
of about 6,000 francs, in his maiden attempt. The 
excellent work done by l«0claire anc? his group soon 
attracted the attention of mar^ Parisian architects who 
patronised him with increasir^ orcers. In 18?»4, he 
shifted his shop to a bigger building anc' from then, he 
eoulf very easily count aEwnc his new patrons such 
institutions as the BanI: of France anc* many Hail-Road 
companies. He Imd on his wage-roll a regular labour 
force ranginE from 60 to 80, all very intimately attached 
to him* He at^ vaiiced money whenever wages ytem low to 
be recovered di^ ring i-erio^ s of plenty. But he was a 
task-master too. Unable to cope up with the strict 
disciplliie, many workers left him only to return to their 
old naster after an iterlude of c^ runkenness anr? vagabooSage. 
1, H.A. GilQan "Profit-Sharing between Employer and 
Eaployee". p. 67. XK>ndon, Maesillan and Co., Ltd., 1900 
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So eotiplete was h i s influence on the workers tha t they 
mire prepared to %rork even on Sundays^ 
In 1833, I ^c l a i r e persuaded h is permanent worlc^ Hin 
to form a "Ifetaal ai5 Society" ^ i c h was to becoi^ the 
cornerstone of h i s subsequent p ro f i t - sha r ine sches^. This 
was supported h;/ uwatlily subscr ipt ions ai^- l i iai ted to 
a j ^ r iod of 15 yoars , towards the enc? of which aceuaulated 
fuods were dislnix^ed among the members* liia gex^erous heart 
yearned for doing g rea te r serv ices to h i s employees. 
Especial ly the p l igh t of old workers a f t e r re t i reaer i t , or 
when a bus i i ^ s s was sold evoked his coapassion. 
I t was with t*iis aim that Leclaire evolved his 
p rof i t - shar ing schesie* In June 1840, '(y& assembled h i s 
bes t and t rus ted Hsen and explainer to them a t cons i -
derable length his p rof i t - shar ing prograaiae, am^. sought 
t h e i r help and cooperation in i t s laplsaffintation. His appeal 
dit' not evoke any favourable response, as t he i r minds were 
clog red with suspicion and misapprehension, After two 
years of education of h i s viorkers, he fins^lly aiBUHiiieed 
h i s scheme in February 134?>; but even a f t e r the l a s t two 
years of education and prepara t ion , h is t^rkcKJii were not 
completely free frosn suspicion. However, in febrm ry 184S, 
he asseublcf' h i s 44 pa in te rs wiio v/ere e l i g ib l e for 
p ro f i t - sha r ing of the previous year aa*? fltmi: upon the 
table a bag of coin containing, l'^,Sf?6 f rancs . When 
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distributed each got an average of £ 11. This had the 
remarkable effect of dispalling the doubts of even the 
most incredulous. For the year 1843, the profits divided 
were more than half as large again as 1842, the number 
of participants having gone up to 82. The following table 
gives the result for the first six years of experiment. 
\ 5 5 r 
JlYear jl Nuaber of Participants 11 Sum Divided 5 













For the first six years, the average amount divided 
aaoag the aembers on the basis of wages earned during 
the year was 18|765 francs, that is about 3,753 dollarsi 
The sua distributed among the vorica»ii varied according 
to the amount of their yearly wages. The average per 
wortcer for the first five years was 279 francs, or 
56 dollars, for the next five years, in which the 
average number of participants was twice as great, the 
average bonus was 227 frsincs or 45 dollars. 
Source. Ibid p.79 
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One of the limitations of Leclaire's profit-sharing 
scheme was that it was confined to his permanent workmen 
who vrere called the "noyau" or kernel. Thoigh the nuraber 
of v/orkers increased year after year, it was only the 
permanent members who were entitled to share the profits 
until 1870, In that year, s tung by the remark of a 
Socialist "your house is nothing but a box of little 
masters who make a profit out of the others" Leclaire 
persuaded the ?fetual Provident; Punrl Society to alter 
the scheme in such a xfa^ ' as to embrace the whole of the 
employees* Since 1870, every worker efflp!i.oyed by the 
firm even for a single day was entitled to a share of 
the profits, in proportion to his wages for the time he 
was employed. In the first year of tVie change Itself, 
758 sliared in the profits. In 1371, 1038, in 1880, 1125, 
and in 191S, 15>77. 
The profit-slriaring scheme started by Leclaire in 
184S wau a simple arrar^ement between himself and his 
workers. Until 1852, he was the only owner of the business. 
In i,'"at year, he took as partner M. Alfred I>ufouj?naux, the 
son of one of his foremen and trained him in the house. 
In 1354 tae Muttial Provident Fund Society was put upon the 
profits of the business. Previously, it had to depend 
upon the subscriptions of its lae.iibers, hencefortVi, the 
whule funds of the Society were to be given by the 
business in each year. These gifts, however, were at that 
tiiTO vholly de|}exident upon Leclaire*s g>od will. The 
Mutual Provident Funfl Society was, according to its 
constitution, fom»d for fifteen jears only. In 1854, 
It was given an extension for another fifteen years, 
at the end of wbich the funds would be shared among the 
numbers* On this occasion, Leclaire prevailed upon the 
Eiefflbers that the Society should be made perR&nent, the 
sharing of profits being replaced by retiring pensions 
for members. In 1863, the Society was legally incorpo-
rated and made a perpetual litsilted partner. Leclaire 
and his partners retained (accortUng to the French Law) 
unlimited liability for the debts cf the business, but 
the Society assumed only limited liability. The finishing 
touch to the organisation was given in 1869, when the 
business itself ^as laaele a permanent legal individuality. 
From this date Leclaire shared no profit of the 
business except a 5 percent interest on the capital. 
Wishing that th€^  organisation should learn to conduct 
itself alone, he had alreadj retired from Paris to a 
couTity hoB» where he breathed his last in 187S, 
It is of some interest to dwell at some length on 
the constitution of the scheme. It is already seen that 
there are two partners ±^.0 have got unlimited liability. 
Then there is the Mutual Provident Fund Society with 
limited liability. Towards the start, the capital was 
400,000 francs bvt 189C, this raised to 800,000 francs 
of 500,000 francs belonged to the Matual Provident Fund 
Society and the rest was ovned by the unlimited partners, 
in addition to its share in the business, the Mutual 
Provident Fund Society had a large capital, part of 
which was lent to the business. In 1908, the amount so 
lent cam© to 826,000 francs, so that the society had 
altogether about £ 53,000 in the business. 
With regard to the division of profits, 5 percent 
is paid on the capital of the partners. Of the remaining 
profits, 85 percent is given either in cash or in 
benefits, to labour and onljr 15 percent to the managing 
partners. As to the 85 percent which 3>es to the workers, 
50 percent is dividend on wages to which all the workers 
atre equally entitled according to wages earned. Ho 
divldemS was payable on overtiiae, piece rate or special 
remuneration. The remaining 35 percent which is paid to 
the ^tual Provident Fund Society also benofits the 
article of the workers to some extent; but the members 
of the Society benefitted most. Provision was also made 
for putting part of the profits to a Reserve Fund of 
200,000 francs which for a long time stood at its 
full amount. 
A Managing Partner was elected for life? but 
could resign whenever he liked. Either Managing Partner 
acting jointly with the President of the Mutual Provident 
Fund Society could require the other Managing Partner 
to retire, but this could ©nly be done on the report of 
the tvo members of the Hoyau appointed to examine the 
accounts, A retiring Managing Partner c<mld make no 
claim on the Reserve Wnrxl or the profit of the year, or 
the goodwill or property of the business; he was entitled 
to the salary to the end of the frear and a lump sum of 
£ 240/ extra. He could also claim his share of the 
capital on retirement. 
Besides the Managing Partners, the strength of the 
society lay in the Hoyau of about 156 selected employees. 
Every member of the Hoyau should be between 25 and 40 
years of age, and be able to read, write and to figures. 
He should also have a sound knowledge of his trade and 
should have good character and conduct. He should be 
nominated by a corwiliatlon Ccwaraittee and be elected by the 
ger^ral meeting of the Hoyau, During slack period^ it is 
the members of the Noyau who have the first claim to work. 
The Hoyau had to perform very important duties. In case 
the Managing Director dies or retires, it elects from 
the employees of the firm his siaccessor. It had to 
discharge this onerous responsibility five times and on 
all tJiese occasions, its discretion had heea thoroughly 
justified, in order not to limit the choice, it Is 
provided that the new partner may contribute his share 
of the capital from his share of profits. Every year, It 
elects eight members to a conciliation comniittee raentioned 
above. One of the maimging partners is also a member and 
chairman. The coamittee might warn, suspend or dismiss 
any member from the Noyau, the Provident Fund Society 
or froia the employment of the firm Itself, if he misbehaves* 
It has also to examine the applications of those workers 
who seek entry into the Boyau. It elects annually all 
tb.e foreign of the business from a list prepared by the 
managers. 
Kext in importance is the Mutual Provident Society. 
i'he Biniaaim qualificaUion for saembership is that such 
a worker should be a aember of the noyau, should have good 
health and have been in the employ of the firm for a 
period of five years. It renders ma^y services such as 
medical bei^fit and sick pay, maternity benefit, pensions 
of £ 60/- a year to every member who has reached the age 
of fifty and served the firm for 20 years, free life 
insurance for £ 40/- and funeral benefit. In the event 
of the firm being wound up, its reserve fund, good will 
anrl property would fall to the Mutual Provident Society, 
which hi^ its statutes must then become a "Retiring Fund" for 
incapacitated house-painters. 
The constitution of the business is such as alirost 
to take it beyond the scope of ordinary co-partnership 
m 
between wcarkers aiu? employers, into the realm of 
cooperative productive so<iieties. But it does not 
embrance all the salient features of a cooperative 
prcxluctive society. Executive power and a considerable 
part of the capital and profit remain in the hands of 
the unlitaited partners. Although the entire number of 
workers share largely in the profits, aenibership and 
its allied powers remain vested in a comparitively few. 
It raay therefore be regarded as a partnership between 
the unlimited partners and the members of the Mutual 
Provident Society, with a very liberal profit-s^rin^ 
arrangement between partnership on tfye one side and 
v;orkmen on the other side. 
Thus the profit-sharing schene that Leclaire started 
has more than fulfilled the just aspirations of the 
founder. Even after his death, it vent from progress to 
progress and blessed both the giver and the taker. 
Beginning business froa aliaost nothing, he left £ 48,000/-
on his death, and often enough declared that but for 
prof it-sirring he could not have amassed so much even by 
fraudulent means. What he ainsBd at and accoraplished was 
no reorganisation of society^ no revolution in the world of 
labour, but a true evolution into an industrial system 
better than the pure wage system, Ko wonder he is called 
the "Father of Profit-sharing," 
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Hext i n Importanc© to Lec la i r e ' s 
proflt-iiharlxig aeheae was "The F a a l l l a t e r e a t Guise" 
founfled by Jean Baptist© Anflr© GcK'iri, \ililch eojojred an 
internatlejQal reputat ion^ The great fotmflries a t Guise 
Hianufactiired cas t i ron wares for the ki tchen BM general 
use and heating apparatus of d i f fe ren t va r j ^ t i e s* I t 
tfas Godin's inventive geraiis that was responsible for 
replacing sheet i ron by eas t i ron for the f i r s t time 
in the isanufacture of s toves . Ifhen he s t a r t ed tlie business 
i n 1840, he liafl only a hanrU\ii of uor^iaen lair.ibering about 
??0} but by 1880, the labour force s^iellea up to 1400 a t 
Guise aiK' 300 in the various branches, aide by s ide with 
h i s e rea t aamifacture, ',*orl^d another orgaiiisatlon for 
lautual ©16 .aaonr. thti \.?orkiaen, financed by the proprietor? 
but he couW introduce p ro f i t - sha r ing only as l a t e as 1877. 
Like Led a i r e , he too had to t ide over the i n i t i a l d i f f i cu l ty 
brought about by the Ignorance and iai3«»irected incredul i ty 
of imji^ of h is men. On the da^ '^  of the f i r s t d i s t r i b u t l o i of 
about 100,000 francs aany of h i s workers f l a t l y refused 
to accept t h e i r por t ion on the plea ttiat tl ey kr^w no th l i^ 
about the object of such a r i s t r i b u t l o n . Undaunted by 
t h e i r r e f u s a l , he deposited the e n t i r e acKmnt in a bank 
only t o fine' t h a t the works®n caxm one a f te r gaiother to 
draw t h e i r share a f t e r some t ime. 
The entire bonus of 172,266 francs for a period of 
three jrears from 1877«1,879 was distributed in cash. 
But in X880, the establishment was converted into a Joint-
stock company with limited liability and it was only froa 
thence onwards that profit-sharing was starbed in his 
business in the real sense of the tens. What he aimed at 
was not an annual distribution of boims, but a progressive 
transfer of business and of tlie asaociated "Familistere" 
into the hands of his workmen. Every detail of the 
business was so adjusted as to suit this end. The plan 
of computation of profits for division was as follows* 
Ten percent on the value of the movable property of the 
society and five percent on the immovable property towards 
depreciation was the first charge on profits. Secondly, 
five percent interest on capital was deducted. Then a certain 
amount was set apart for the educational activities of 
the Famil'stere, and also a sum equal to 2 percent of 
the wages and salaries of the year towards pension fund. 
The net profits which remained after having provided for 
the above items was then divided thus. The Reserve Furid 
received 25 percent. Another 25 percent went to the 
management, the remainder being alloted to capital as 
a super-dividend, and to labour as a bonus on wages. The 
usual interest on the capital of the establlshaent and 
the whole amount paid out during the year in wages and 
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Salaries were adc'ed together. The proportion each sum 
bears to the total amount determined the shares of capital 
and labour. Thus in 1880, interest amounted to 230,000 
francs and wages to 1,888,000 francs. The bonus to labour 
accordingly^ was a little over eight times the amount of 
the super-dividend on capital. The bonus was not 
distributed in cash, but was all capitalised and applied 
towards the purchase of shares in the business. Ho man 
was eligible for participation unless he already owned a 
share i hiit every facility was given in the purchase of 
stock by employees, Godin himself was gradually selling 
off his capital to his workmen until his death and he 
expected the process to continue until such time as Madam 
Godin retained only the direction of the business. He 
wanted his workmen to Imitate him in this field by releasing 
their shares to the younger in order that the ownership of 
the establishment remained in the hands of the actual worker. 
Godin*3 own capital in the business amounted to 4,600,000 
francs in 1880. But the total capital of his had risen 
to 6,000,000 francs in 1883 of which S,753,500 francs were 
sold to workmen by 1887. 
The organisation of worker participators formed a 
hierarchical order. At the apex are the first-class 
partners (associes). Then comes the s econd-class jeoOtors 
or associates (Societaries). The third-class members or 
profit^sharers (participants) constitute the third 
category. All these three classes are shareholders 
while th« fourth class members who are not ii^lvldual 
share-holders, are known as helpers (auxiliaries). 
On June 30, 1912, the first class-members raimberec' 
426; the second-class 66; and third-class members 1188, 
The fourth class consisted of 926 members. There were 
also at tl^t time 487 share-holders not employed by 
the company. These were retired employees or their 
representatives whose shares had not yet been paid outj 
they are known as "persons interested" or (interesses). 
The qualifications for a first-class member are that 
he should be able to read arifl write and of good conduct; 
he should have worked for the society at least five 
years, should be 25 years of age, own £ 20/- in share 
capital and should have been elected by the first class 
members. For a second-class member, the qualifications 
are; to have been three years employed, t) be 21 years old, 
to live in the building of the society, to be free from 
active military service. For the third-class member} 
to have been one year erapliyed by the society and to be 
21 years of age; but not necessarily to live in the 
buildings. The second anc' third-class members are 
admitted by the conitrdttee of raanaFement and the manafdng 
director. 
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The first-class members are like Leclalre*s Noyau, 
a selected band, the backbone of the society. They 
constitute the annual general meeting and give their 
advice wai all important expenditure outside the ordinary 
operations of the society and on proposed improvements. 
They accept or reject the annual accounts submitted to 
them, they appoint the Comniittee ox Inspection and three 
members of the committee of management. On occasion, they 
elect a new Managing Director, who is the ujDlimited 
partner. 
The Managing Director has the sole right to sign 
for the society, and to represent the society. He appoints 
and dismisses its officials and presents his Report 
annually to the General Meeting of the first-class members. 
The Committee of Inspection consists of three members 
appointed annually by the general meeting of the first-class 
members. It is their duty to see that the statutes of the 
society are observed, and that the books and correspondence 
are in order and to verify the account and balance sheet 
submitted by the Managing partner to the annual meeting, 
TJieir duties therefore closely correspond to those of 
auditors in an English company. 
In dividing the bonus, each •participant* claimed 
one part, each *Socletary' one and a half parts and 
every 'associate' two parts. In 1887, there were 
95 associates, 209 socletaries and 491 participants. 
The boxBis of all classes amounted in 1882 to 50 p.c, 
25 p,c«, and 15 p.c, respectively, on theip wages. 
From January 1880 to December 1885, a sum of 1,969,000 
francs was applied to the conversion of shares in favour 
of workmen, Puriap these four years, the xvorkaen 
receiver' in cash, 185,000 francs as Interest and 
dividenfl on their stock. The following table shows 
the number, size and total and average value of the shares 
owned by the workers in June 1883, 
8 5 5 5 ^ 
S Size of share i No. of shares S Total value ii Average value 
6 Francs ft i Francs Francs. 
100 and less 15 10,426 78 
101 - 500 138 52,840 251 
501 - 1000 167 152,662 794 
1001 - 5000 518 706,010 2220 
5001 - 10000 12 85,651 6969 
10001 - 15000 2 22,251 11,115 
15001 - 50000 4 151,941 52,985 
Above 50,000 5 829,508 -
Source. Ib id , p . 185, 
Over anfl above t h i s pecimiary advantage, t t e 
soc ie ty eoxi£eTT^ on i t s members benef i t s of ix^urance 
funds, cooperat ive s t o r e , schools , i^ rks an<3 gai^ens, 
the vush houses and baths and the thea t re* The 
schools are wort l^ of spec ia l o^ntiocu At a time when 
education was not such an accepted p r inc ip le as today, 
Godin made every provision for education oat of the 
p rof i t for the educaticm of the chi ldren of the Famil is tere . 
The founder, i t i s to ld "foresaw tha t each generation of 
\ ^ rke r s wcoild seek t o a s s a i l the benef i t s of the 
Associat ion to i t s oim descendants arid tha t thus the 
future p r o s i ^ r i t y of the work woolr? depend on the 
education given to the r i s i n g generat ion" . 
Instances of sj toi lar exemplary schemes can be 
ffittXtipliodi ba t the above two s c h ^ e s speak for themselves 
the enormous s t r i d e s p rof i t - sha r ing achieved in France 
even a t as ea r ly a s t a fe as the 19th century. 
The e a r l i e s t knowjx exaiaplo of pr f i t - sha r ing \ra9 
Ir.trof'ucef' in Englar^d by tYie B r i t i s h Union iirc- Insurance 
Coapany lu 18?0, This was followed by the acoption of a 
profit-3ht;.rlnc: scl:«5ae in the General Insiiranc© Cosapany i n 
1360. But only wheii the Christ iai i a o c i a l i s t s , encouraged 
2, K.A, Gilman "Prof i t -shar ing between Employer And 
Employee", p . \fo op, c i t . 
by the success which profit-sharing acquired in France, 
took a keen interest that it became a live movement in the 
country. From 1850 this group had exerted a growing 
influence upon the infant cooperative movement and 
hence profit-sharing was widely adopted in cooperative 
societies. The first outstanding scheme of historical 
importance outside the cooperative movement, was that of 
Henry Briggs, Sons & Company, a firm of coal owners in 
Yorkshire, But this scheme whicli worked very successfully 
3 
in the initial stages failed later. 
In 1889, a profit-sharing scheme was started in 
the South Metropolitan Gas Company, which provided for 
the payment of a cash bonus varying inversely with the price 
of gas. As the dividend payable to share-holders under the 
company*s Act also varied Inversely with the price of gas, 
the employees' bonus v/as linked ulth the share-holders* 
dividends ami thus with the company's earnings. The 
scheme underwent a revision in 1894 by which only 50 p.c, 
of t' e bonus was tbereafter payable in ca^i, the other 
half being utilised for purchasing the ordinary stock of 
the company. By frequent revision, strong iriducements 
were given to the workers to leave the x/ithdrawable half 
3, Bncyclopaedla Britanniea, Vol, ;C/III p. 559, 
London, 5.938. 
Of their bonus on inv*straents with the object of eventusil 
investmerit. From 1910, provision was made that part of 
the bonus which could be vrithdrawn must be left with the 
ctHapany to ttccuiaulate at interest or invested in the 
stock of the company. It might be withdrawn only under 
very special circumstances. Tlie Same of the scheaie was 
changed from profit-sharing to •Copartnership* as the 
latter was more representative of the content HTIC^' 
character of the scheme. It was for tiie first time made 
statutory in 19S0, The basis of the scheme was further 
altered by which the surplus profits, after t! e payment of 
the prescribed basic rates of dividend on tlf company's 
stock were divided in thp proportion of S^  to the consumers 
by way of reduction in prices ar»f tl e reiiTiaininE i in 
equal parts to the ordinary share-holders in the form of 
increased dividends, and to the partieipatinp;, workers in the 
shape of bonus at a uniform percentage on the salaries and 
wages. 
Towards 1926, the employees of the company owned 
capital in the company to the order of £ 500,000 besides 
deposits at interest to the tune of nearly another 
£ 250,000. In another gas Company, the employees owned 
4 
£ 750,000 of the company's ordinary stock. 
4.Encyclopaedia Britannica. Vol. XVIII p. 559, 
London, 1938» 
The f i r s t r epor t which was published by the I»abour 
Department of the Board of Trade records the existence of 
101 proflt- 'Sharing business in 1894 embracing about 
28000 ©eaployees. When a s imi la r study was undertaken by 
the Board of Trade in 191S, i t was fouDfl tha t trie t o t a l 
nUEiber of scheu^s had increased to 133 with 106,000 
5 
workers. In comparing tho two repor t f , the i d i t o r 
remarked "the f a c t tliat coaes laost prominently to l i g h t 
i s the raarkeft increase in those forms of prof i t - shar ing in 
which the method adopted i s e i t he r to invest the idiole or 
par t of the bonus in shares , . o r in other ways to 
secure tha t the employees sha l l possess a f inancia l stake 
i n the c a p i t a l of bus iness . dcheraes of t h i s so r t have 
6 
met vith a large measure of success". 
Till 1929, the movei^at was making consistent 
progress, though the initiation of new schemes was 
irregular. It occurred in bursts of activity, fhe 
periods conducive to the launching were the years of 
1889-1912, 1908-1909, 1912-1914 and 1919-1920. It was 
found that periods of activity usually coincided with 
periods oi good employment and industrial unrest. At 
such times, there seems to be recurring tendency on the 
part of employers to resort to the expedient of 
profit-stiaring as a possible remedy for  
6. Aneurin Williams "Copartnership and profit-sharing" p.65, 
London, Williams And Horgate, 1915. 
6. Ibid p. 64, 
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unrest. By 1927, there were about 577 plans of all types out of 
which 280 were discontinued. The following table shows the total 
number of schemes launched in the various periods mentioned, 
the number of such schemes abandoned by the end of 1927 and the 
numbers and range of those surviving as shown in the Ministry of 
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,{Approximate no, of 
•ieniployees entitled 
8to participate. 
Before 35 31 4 1700 800 
1881-1890 80 69 11 17000 13,900 
1891 - 1900 78 65 13 8900 7,500 
1901 - 1910 82 44 38 87500 54,700 
1911 - 1918 96 57 58 56300 24,700 
1919 57 18 39 35000 22,400 
1920 56 12 44 58800 16,600 
1921 14 1 13 27900 11,800 
1922 12 1 11 3300 2,700 
1923 18 1 17 29000 22,800 
1924 13 • • • 13 31200 12,800 
1925 12 1 11 31100 5,400 
1926 11 f » 11 15700 10,000 
1927 14 • • • 14 5900 24,000 
TOTAL 577 280 297 409400 208,500 
7, Board of Trade Report 1920. Quoted in "Copartnership Today" p.12 
(A Survey of Profit-sharing and Co-partnership Schemes in 
Industry), published by the Conservative Political Centre 2-8 
Victoria Street, London, 3.W,I, printed by Oliver Bridge 
And Co., Ltd. July 1955. 
Source* Encyclopaedia BritaJmlca Vol. XVIII. p,559 op.cit. 
With the onset of the great depression of 1929, 
the aovement received a rude set-back. As a consequence 
many schemes disappearedj but many really sound schemes 
were able to weather the storia successfully. By 1932, 
there were in Great Britain 469 profit-sharing scheaes 
of all typos and the number abandoned was over 350, 
Those in private undertaking embraced S20,000 workers, 
a minority of the total number employed, 93 of the plans 
with 48,700 workers were lii&ied up with share-oxmership 
or copartnership. The movement languished further and in 
1937, after more than half a century of development, the 
total number of enterprises known to practise copartnership 
and profit-sharing was 410, the number of irorkers employed 
being 429,000. Particulars regarding the progress or 
otherv?ise of the movement during the period between 1939 
and 1953 are not available as m> enquiries were raade 
during this time. But in the latest enquiry conducted in 
1954, it is found that it has made rapid recovery, and 
that about 551 plans embracing about 52,2105 workers 
are in existence. The following table shows tlie various 
types of plans in existence at the end of 1954 and the 
8, Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences. Vo. XII. p. 489, The 
l-iacmillan Co. Kew York (1949.) 
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number of employees such plans cover. 
Hi^ mb^ r 9t s^ hQB^ eg appXylflg tc? Emplpyees 
in GgQeraA s^^, %9 straff s>% 
the end of 1954. 
Type of Scheme S No. of I Ho. of 5 No. of 
il schemes, i  persons 8 participants 
ii 6 esaployed. S 
1. Schemes operating 
on a pre-arranged 
basis? (Applying 
to employoes in 
general), 400 570,909 380,865 
S. Applying only to 
staff or to a 
particalar 
section. 21 42,979 8,568 
Totals 421 613,888 589,433 
3, Other arrange-
ments broat-ly of 
a profit-sharing 
character. 130 160,3S1 1?2,672 
Granr! Total* 551 774,219 522,105 
Froiu the foregoing, it can bo seen that profit-sharing 
has har a long history in England the course of which was 
not very smooth. A large number of schemes has been 
Source: Heport of the Enquiry in 1954, Quote Ko. R 3345 
dated June 1956. 
._ sf, 'i 
started, but are no longer existing. Many SOUIKI schemes 
have really stood the test of time. But in several cases, 
the schemes were brought to an end by the winding up of 
the business concerned by amalgaiaatlons with other under-
takings or by other changes in the business. Although 
complete figures cannot be given, particulars are available 
in respect of 605 discontinued schemes and tbese schemes 
are analysed by duration and by the cause of terainition, 
the latter being in most cases the cause as reported by 
the firm concerned. A few of the firias were short-lived, 
but over one half appear to have operated for period s of 
ten years or more and a considerable number lasted twenty 
years or longer. As regards the circum tances leacing to 
the t ernination of the schemes, these were in very many 
cases connected with changes in the organisation of the 
business and in such cases the ending of the scheme may not 
have been due to any lack of success attaching to the 
schemes themselves. In this connection, special snention 
must be made of the situation brought about by the nationa-
lisation of the Electric Industry in 1943 and of the Gas 
Industry in 1949. Before the war, a considerable propor-
tion of the principal company which owned undertakings in 
these industries - especially t'lose in the pas industry, 
were operating profit-sharing or copartnership scheme. 
Following the nationalisation of the gas industry, the 
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schemes then in force were continued in a modified form 
until i4arch 1951 after which arrangement was made for 
the fo^ 'mer "coparti^rship" to continue to receive, while 
they remained in the service of the 'Area Gas Board* by 
whom they were employed at the time of the arrangement, 
an annual fixed payment for a specified oeriod equivalent 
to the bonus paid for the last coaipleted year before 31st 
March 1951. This arrangement cannot be regarded as 
constituting profit-sharing and accordingly these gas 
cor.pany schemes have been included as terminated schemes 
si.own in the following table. They account for 57 of 
the schemes classed as terminated because of "changes in or 
transfer of, business". Schemes in electricity under-
taking alGo were continued in a modified form for 
three years after the nationalisation of the electricity 
industry and these account for a further seven schemes 
classed as ter inated for these reasons. 
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35 96 96 81 62 176 59 605 
Source: Report on the Enquiry conducted in 1954. Quc>te No. 3345 
dated June 1956. op. cit. 
In the course of the latest enquiry it was also found 
that 31 schemes prima facie based on profit-sharing and 
copartnership principles or defined by their promoters 
as such have been introduced since 1954. Of these 31 
schemes, 24 are of the profit-bonus type and 5 are coparter-
ship schemes providing for the issue of shares to employees 
on specially favourable terms. A number of other firms 
are believed bo have introduced schemes recently or to be 
planning such action, says the report. Summing up the 
course of profit-sharing in the United Kingdom, 
J.B.P. Ribinson remarks that '*the emergence in the past 
100 years, despite of disappointment and bad times, of a 
limited but fairly constant number of such schemes covering 
at most some 2i p.c. of industrial labour in the United 
Kingdom, but seldom covering less than half a million 
workers and not restricted to any particular trades or 
industries, nor to firms of any particular size, can be 
advanced in support of a contention that profit-sharing 
meets some deep-seated need in the national character 
wh'ch impels owners and managers, apart from any question 
of expediency, to devise ways of sharing tiielr profits 
9 
with tholr employees" 
9. Manager, p. 210. March 1956. 
TIP vmm >^T^p ^r ^#iiigAi 
whereas i n Great B r i t a i n m^ on th© continent of 
iurop@» pr4flt»alMriiig was a a a a i f e s t expression of the 
Social il0forffi Hoveiaetot, l a the U n l t ^ i>tat©s of Aia«rica 
the b a l l has b«9ii s e t r o l l i n g by the ac t ion of c e r t a i n 
ent lMsias t ie eni repreneurs . Althoueh the f i r s t p r o f i t -
sbariiiE plan ^ a t e s so f a r badk as 1794, i t was the 
gr<^ing bu3i i^ss prosper i ty during the f i r s t world war 
BX^ a f t e r t h a t focussed public a t t e n t i o n on p r o f i t -
shar ing . Th© period in question '."as c .nspicuoyg for 
i t s high p r i c e , aoimting laboiar tiBreat c*ia! «?ecliiiirig 
labour pro#t tc t iv l ty . 
Alber t Gal la t ine^ aecre ta ry of the Treasury under 
Freslr 'ent Jefferson arid Ma<!i3on ia regar*^©^ as the pioneer 
in the fielt" of Aiaerican p r o f i t - s h a r i n g . The f i r s t 
prograsaae about which soae c l r a r prcwjf e x i s t s was s t a r t ed 
i n t367, by the S ta t e «ihoe aia? lea ther Coiapai^, Worcester, 
l4as3a^Kisets» This was follo*fe€ by the laost f^acrm 
of Aiaericas p rof i t - sha r ing seheiae kriOVi as the Proctor 
and Ga:ible which operates even today• 
Writing on ^ e r i e a n proflt-shiarir*g in t a89 , Cilsiaa 
founS t 3 plans in opera t ion . Panl J^atroe i n 1396 d i s -
covered 50 ioo r i can pl.*ns, but only IS imre ac tua l ly 
10* GIJLLma."Profit-shari! g between Eaployer and l^ployee* 
op«cit«p« 359 
1 1 , Kenneth M. Thompsoiu •Prof i t - shar ing* op .c i t* p . 10, 
"A T \ 5 0 
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functioning.^^ Another study conr'ucted by Canby Balderston 
in 1937 reported that at least 36 plans had been Initiated 
in the United States upto 1900 as shown in the following 
tabulation. 
„ . , - . , . . . . No. of plans initiated 
Period of initiation. in specified periods. 
Prior to 1881 - .... 6 
1381 - 1390 23 
1890 - 1900 7 
1901 - 1910 17 
1911 - 1920 75 
1921 - 1930 24 
1931 - 1936 33 
TotalJ 185 
During the first decade of the present century, only 
17 new plana came into being, one of them being that of 
Ilg. Electric Ventilating Company, Chicago, a plan currently 
in operation. Among the vell-knovn plans established 
between 1910-'918 are those of the Kastinan Kodak Cotapai^ r, 
(191S) 3 ars Roebuck and Coitioany (1916) and the Juslyn 
Manufacturing and Supply Company.^' In 1917, the 
IS. Paul I^ inroe "Profit-sharing in the United States". 
American Journal of Sociology, Vol. I 14ay 1896, p._689. 
Sources Canbey Balderston "Profit-sharing for WaFe-Earners" 
Quoted in "Profit-sharing by Thompson. op.cit.p.12. 
13. Senate Report. "Survey of Experiences in P.S. and possibi* 
lities of Incentive Taxation," Ho.610.pp.71-73 lists 
many American plans by date of adoption. 
United States Labour Bureau of Statistics found 60 plans 
in operation under which distribution of stipulated part of 
the net profits to at least one-third of the company's total 
wage-earners and that under a much larger number, profits 
14 
were shared vlth a fev employees only,' 
A study conducted in 1920, reported the extstenc© 
of 97 plans which were distributed as follows: Genuine 
profit-sharing plans 41, limited profit-sharinp plans 14, wage 
bonus plans 30 and saving sharing plans 12, In the same year, 
the I^ ational Civic Federation, which cave a wirer definition 
to profit-sharing fourx! 214 American plans, of which 46 were 
15 
pcrceKtage plans, 145 special distribution plans and exceptional"^5, 
As has already been stated, the movement got a fillip 
and a fresh vigour owing to the brisk business activity and 
hlfh profits during the v/ar and post-war popiod. A notable 
feature of the 1950*3 was the raanagement's growing interest 
in Employee Stock Ownership plans. Because of the sharp rise 
in the price of the stock, the purch-se of co-pc-.ny stock 
by employees was found much attactive. This period also 
witn ssfd an increased interest in prof it-ar.aring prorranmie 
relating to the laaragerial and esGCUtive group. 
14, "Profit-sharing in the United States" isullefcin of the 
United States Bureau of Labour Statistics. No. S08, 
Deceriber 1916. p.9. 
15, Bryce M. Stewart, "Profit-3hairing for wapc-earners and 
Executives'* p,3. Industrial Relations Counselors. Inc. 
1951. 
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The great depression that paralysed the American 
economy in 1929 administered a rude shock to the movement. 
Business failures and business losses that were well-nigh 
wide-spread led to the virtual abandonment or suspension 
of many genuine profit-sharing plans of the employees. In 
an article on the subject published in the Encyclopaedia of 
Social Sciences in 1934, it was remakred that "profit-sharing 
is rare in the United States and seems to be losing ground ... 
Ho nation stands out conspicuously against the trend of 
declining practice". The findings of the National 
Industrial Board was still more alarming. Among the 161 
plans for employees taken up for investigation, 96 were 
discontinued, 15 were listed inactive. The 50 active plans 
17 
formed only 50 p.c. of the entire known plans. Never-
theless, Balderston found 33 plans initated during the 
period 1931-1936. 
In the most elaborate of the all American studies 
conducted by the Senate Committee in 1938, it was found 
that more than 90CK) firms were practising some kind of 
employee benefit or welfare plans. Out of these 728 
companies were reported to be sharing profits with employees. 
16. Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences. Vol. XII p.487-491 op.cit. 
17. National Industrial Conference Board,P.S, and other 
Supplementary compensation plans covering wage-earners. 
Studies in personal policy No, 2. p. 2. 
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A survey conducted in 1945 shows that 108 plans 
covering all employees have been established in the United 
States. The number of profit-sharing plans initiated aoci 
their status in Jaxiuary 1945 are shown in the tabulation 
shown below. 
Period of initiation. liuaber of plans. 
Plans covering all 
employeas. 
8 V K 
fi Initiated { Disconti- ^ Still 
I i n perifft! fi nued by fi Active 
i H January ^ January 
S it 1945 S 1945 
Before 1910 
1910 - 1914 
1915 - 1919 
1920 - 1924 
1925 •* 1929 
1930 - 1934 
1935 - 1939 
1940 - 1944 
Unknown 
5 2 3 
6 1 5 
12 7 5 
12 7 5 
7 5 2 
7 2 5 
19 6 13 
32 4 28 
8 4 4 
Source! Bryce M. S tewar t and Walter J . Couper, 
P r o f i t - S h a r i n g and Stock Ownership for Wage-
Ea rne r s and E x e c u t i v e s , Monograph No. 10, 
I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s Counse lors , I n c . Hew York.H.Y, 
1945 .p .22 . 
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The period following the last war was characterised 
by high business profits. In some companies the profits 
which accumulated were so high that it constituted a source 
of embarrassment to the managesaents. As in the previous war 
and post-war period, this created a renewed Interest in 
profit-sharing arrangements. Hopes of mitigating labour 
disgruntleraent which paralled rise in profits through 
the sharing of the company earnings found their expression 
in the initation of new plans. But a peculiar feature that 
was noticeable during this period was the increasing adoption 
of special plans for Executives designed to serve as finan-
cial incentives. Relatively, vei'y little is known regarding 
the experience with profit-sharing for Executives as these 
plans were often enough conceived and administered in close 
secrecy. It is commonly believed that a large number of 
establishments have profit-sharing plans confined to their 
principal employees* These systems, however, do not get 
the publicity that is given to plans of the general type 
so that complete information is difficult to obtain and 
comparatively few cases have come to the notice of the 
Board. 
18. National Industrial Conference Board "Practiaal 
Experience with Profit-sharing in Industrial 
Establishments'* Boston, 1920. Research Report 
Ho. 29.p.18. 
From the above details, it is clearly discernible 
that profit-sharing still retains its vitality in the 
U.S.A. in spite of the gloomy prognosis of the certain 
critics. As profit-sharing is very closely associated with 
business activity, it got a good impetus during the v;ar and 
post-war periods. In the opinion of an American 
authority, profit-sharing seems destined to pi ciy a Hiore 
19 
important part in American Industry. 
A study of the course of profit-sharing in the 
above three countries enables us to make the following 
observations. 
(a) Profit-sharing retains some of its earlier 
vigour and vitality. 
(b) It blossoms forth during times of prosperity 
and languishes during periods of depression. 
(c) It is an empirical approach to the problem 
of industrial peace. 
19. Kenneth Thompson " Profit-sharing" op.cit. p. 15. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PROFIT-SHARIiiG IN INDIA. 
The concept of profit-sharing as a method of fostering 
better industrial relations has been in practice in the wes-
tern countries for more than a century. But it has been 
introduced into the industrial structure of India only quite 
recently. By far, the largest nuaber of schemes in vogue 
in this country are bonus plans which were generally regarded 
as an ex-gratia payment arising out of the good-will of the 
managements and the prosperity of the firms concerned. This 
renders necessary an examination into these plans to find out 
whether they rightly come under the category of profit-sharing 
bonus plans or not. 
The artificiality of the interpretation given to term 
profit-sharing is apparent as soon as consideration is given 
to the methods used to determine the s^ount of profits to be 
shared. The term is nonaally limited to the description of 
the schemes in which the amount to be shared or the 
method of calculating it, is fixed and announced in advance. 
Such fixing is not expected to be by agreement or by any 
legally enforceable contract, but simply by a unilateral 
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declaration, usually by the board, that such and such 
an aiiiount will be set aside or a similar provision made, 
out of the profits of the company each year or some other 
period for the benefit of the employees. This statement 
may be qualified by reservations enabling the board to 
cancel, modify or postpone the arrangement if special 
difficulties arise, or the undertaking may be contingent 
upon a certain set of circumstances arising say for 
example, a datura-line of minimum net profits belov/ which 
no sharing will be made or a prec<mdition of a minimum 
distribution of dividends to share-holders. Frequently, 
the escape clauses and iiualifications have been so 
extensive as to make the undertaking largely valueless 
except as an repression of a good intention. Companies 
which do not give such an undertaking in advance however, 
but leave any distribution to employees to the discretion 
of the board each year were not generally regarded as 
practising profit-sharing in the United K.ingdom.^  
This rules out from profit-sharing the extensive 
practice of Xroas and holiday bonuses and any foi^ of 
distribution in cash or credit which is not promised as 
a regular practice in accordance with a formula fixed 
in advance. There is very little distinction between a 
1. Ministry of Labour Report 19^0 (London H.M, Stationery 
Office). ^ 
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formal scheme of profit-sharing and the established custom 
in innumerable firms of making bonus payments on the same 
occasion each year the size of v/hich varies directly v/ith 
the amount of profits made or expected in the year. They 
are both the sharing of profits, and if the company is not 
doin^ 'well enough or is not well disposed towards its 
workers to pay handsome ad hoc bonuses there is unlikely 
to be any gain in the institution of a formal scheme. 
there may in fact, for the workers, be some element of 
loss, since long term formal schemes are usually based on 
very conservative calculations which may lead to a 
smaller amount being distributed in any particular year 
than the board of management might, in the exercise of 
unlettered discretion, think fit to make. 
The attitude of workers on this point seems to 
vary. In some years, they prefer to be in a position to 
calculate as soon as annual accounts of the company are 
published, the amount of their bonus by reference to the 
pre-determined fonaula; in other cases, the element of 
gamble in not knowing before-hand how much the bonus will 
be, is a positive attraction. One company in Lancashire 
v^ich had for many years distributed handsome bonuses at Xmas 
time asked its employees recently if they would like 
a formal profit-sharing scheme to be introduced instead 
and received the reply that the employees vrould rather 
have it left as it v;as. Hence there seems to be not 
much of a substance in this arbitrary distinction. It 
is this fact that muat have weired very strongly with 
the American Senate Committee of 1939 i»fhich recorded 
profit-sharing as all payments to employees regardless 
of the lora in which they are allocated or distributed 
which are in addition to the market or basic v^ age rate. 
This wide generalisation has been further strengthened by 
the comprehensive definition of the United States Council 
of Profit-sharing in Industries, which defined profit-
sharing "as any procedure in which an employer pays to all 
employees in addition to good rate of regular pay, special 
current or deferred sijuas, based not only upon individual 
or group performance but on the prosperity of the business 
as a whole. In the face of the above definitions, bonus 
schemes in India can be considered as a variant of the 
conventional type of profit-sharing schemes. 
LABOUR HAS A RIGHT TO 3HAES IN PROFITS. 
In India, after a very careful study of the subject, 
it has been decided upon good authority that bonus, in 
spite of its nature of having the form anc3 colour of an 
ex gratia payment and that it may not be inclined in the 
2. J.B. Perry Robinson. "Profit-sharing" Manager, March,1956. 
p.212,{ip.cit. 
3. Council of P.S. Industries Declaration of Principles 
and Constitution, p.1. 
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terms of any contract entered into by an employer and 
his employees, as soon as a demand for bonus is refused, all 
the elements of trade dispute arise, and that for this 
reason, it cannot be regarded as an ex gratia payment. The 
Adjudicators invariably held that on grounds of equity 
and Justice, the worker could make such a demand. Thus 
the Bonus Disputes CoBMiittee, which was aet up by the 
Bombay Government in 1924 declared after examining the 
basis of bonus v*ich was paid to Mill Workers for five 
years since 1919, that the "mill workers have not 
established any enforceable claim, customary, legal, or 
equitable to the payment annually of a bonus; but in view 
of the nature of the claim" the Committee held that "it 
is a question of bargaining between the workers and the 
employers in itfhich consideration might be given to principle 
of equity. It is not a question of cetermining what 
is the contract between the parties." * 
The Industrial Coxirt Bombay, in its award, in the 
dispute between the Textile 'labour Association, Ahmedabad 
and the Ahraadabad Mill Owners* Association held that 
although bonus was an ex-gratia payment and could not be 
legally demanded, yet such payment was made by the employers 
because of the relationship whidi existed between them 
and their employees and because of the work which the workers 
4. Bombay Labour Gazette.March 1924, p.p.16-17. 
are doing for them. It heia that bonus was In the 
nature of a reward. The court further observed that 
"a reward is anything given or paid in return for anything 
done as kindness, service, etc. It includes adf^ itional 
gratuitous payment according to agreement. If the workers 
say that in a certain year, the employers have made handsome 
profits, end the employers can therefore afford to pay 
them something more than stipulated wages, they are asking 
for the ad( itional payment as a reward for work already 
done hy them which has resulted in such profitr. Such addi-
tional payment is not a pure gift, because a gift may 
have no relation to any work done or to be doae by the donee, 
but it is reward in as much as it is asked for as an extra 
payment for ^ork actually done. It is true that it 
cannot be enforced in a court of law, because it is not 
a legal right. But it does not follow that it cannot 
become a subject matter of an industrial dispute between 
the employers and the v/orkers, if the latter detaand 
such a payment as revrard in the form of bonus."' 
In some of the disputes, the Adjudicators took 
a juristic view of the demand for bonus and hrld that 
the demand of the workers could be sustained only it 
was proved that there was an explicit or implied 
contract between the parties. But this juristic view 
5, Bombay Labour Gazette. October 1945. pp.124-1!?7. 
was not accepted by the majority of Adjudicators, who 
maintained that the demand has to be examined from a 
broader view of equity, Justice and jrood conscience. The 
Industrial Court Bombay, in their award relating to a 
dispute between the Mill Owners* Association, Bombay, 
and employees of the member mills observed "Mill Owners 
Association^ contention that bonus is an ex-gratia pay-
ment is true from the standpoint of civil law, which can 
only enforce the terms of contract between the parties, 
but in the domain of industrial relations between employers 
and workers, the rights and duties of the parties, are not 
governed merely by civil law, but by collective bargaining 
in the settlement of disputes arising out of the demands 
by one or another for more earnings, better conditions of 
work and increased production? 
Deciding the issue whether employees are entitled 
to bonus as of right or on any other ground, Mr. W. Cowley, 
in his award relating to a dispute between the Lahore 
Electric Supply Company and its employees renarked that 
"It is quite obviously not a legal right which can be 
enforced in a court of law. Only if the payment of a share 
in the profits of the workers was part of their contract 
for service as in the case of a profit-sharing enterprise 
like the Tatas could share in the profits be a legal right. 
6. Ibid. June 1947,p.p.76-77. 
On the other hand, there is equally no doubt that the 
advancement of economic thought and industrial relations 
has led to a state of affairs where the workers' claim for 
a share in the profits of the industry may be legitimate 
and may have a certain moral and economic right*" The 
Industrial Tribunal appointed by the Governrient of West 
Bengal in the dispute between the eraployers of thirty-six 
Cotton Mills in West Jiengal anc their employees remarked 
"Bonus may be an ex-gratia payraent, but vhen it is demanded 
for work done out of which the employers make hi^h profits 
the dcmanc' is not for any payraent gratis, but price of 
labour," It further observed "In the matter of granting 
bonus the underlying principle i.'hich calls for consideration 
is that the demanr^  for bonus, though not based on legal rights 
arising out of a contract expressed or implied, has to be 
a 
decic-ed on broad principles of equity and justice.* 
Such a view is probably based on '.he fact that a 
distinction exists in almost all countries between the 
functions of ordinary judicial authority charged with the 
duties of conciliation and arbitration. As the I.LO 
re.Tiarks "the function of conciliation and arbitra ion is to 
establish a coupromise between the interi ats of the parties 
to the dispute and to create a new basis icr mutual relation -
that Is to say - to make IQM an' not, as In the judicial 
7. Award enforced under the Punjab Govt. Order Ko. 1117-
EI-46/5759 dated 16.!5.1946. 
8. Award enforced under the West Bengal Govt. Order 
No. 2956 Lab.dated 21.8.43. 
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settlement of a dispute on rights to interpret ". 
B0IJU3 IJ A Form OF PR0FIT-3HARIKG. 
In more recent av/ards, certain Adjudicators have 
taken the view that bonus is a form of profit-sharing. 
They have maintained that profits being the result of joint 
effort of various factors of production and labour being 
one such factor, it should be entitled to a share In the 
profits. For example, Mp. S.H. Modak, in his award in 
a dispute in the Amlrta Bazar Patrika remarked "The 
Idea is that where adequate profits have been derived by 
a coiapai^  with the aid and cooperation of the employees, 
a part of the profit should be paid to the employees In 
the shape of bonus in so far as the employees also have 
10 
helped in the process of profit being derived," 
The Industrial Tribunal in West Bengal which 
dealt with the dispute in 36 cotton Hills in that state 
held thctt "the underlying principle for the payment of 
bonus is that the employee has contributed by IgSour for 
the earning of the profits of the company,.,, The 
only just and equitable principle upon which an employer 
can be called upon to grant a bonus to the employees is to 
consider the amount of profit made by the employer in any 
9. I.L,0, Conciliation anc Arbitration in Industrial 
Disputes, p, 90. 
10, Award enforced under West Bengal Government Order 
Ko. 1931/I^b., dated 12,5,1948. 
-* 93 * 
year aofl the general f inanc ia l cojatlitlons of tfm 
concern aafl i t s capaci ty t o bear t h i s a<?ditional burden 
of granting bonus without i apa i r ing the eff ic iency or 
in jur ing the business in &n^ v i t a l matter*'. Mr, Ju s t i c e 
Chagla in an Indus t r i a l Dispute in the General 
Ifetors ( India) L td . , Bombay, obsarved " I t i s a l aos t 
the tmiversa l ly accepted pr inc ip le nae tha t the 
p ro f i t s are laade possible by the cont r ibu t ion tha t 
both cap i t a l and labour make i n any i>artlcular 
indus t ry , and I think i t i s a l so eooeeded t h a t labour 
has a r i g h t to share In the increased p ro f i t s that are 
aade i n ax^ p a r t i c u l a r per iod ." Mr. E^^Kasav^tl^ 
i n h is award r e l a t i n g to a d ispute in the Standard 
Vacuum Oil Cc^pany, Bombay, has referred to the change 
which has taken place in the ©raployer-^aployee relation?-
ship in the world which has led to the idea of copartner* 
ship i n the industry and tj p rof i t - shar ing between 
c a p i t a l ai«3 labour,'*"' The Mjt^ficator in the dispute 
between the eiaployers and the employees of the Taj 
Tanneries, Agra, recoraiaended the payment of bonus on 
the grcmnd t h a t bonus has been accepted as a l eg i t imate 
claim of the worloaan in a l l the irjr?uatries 1^ way of 
14 p ro f i t - sha r ing . In an award r e l a t i n g to an AluAiniun 
11» Award enforced under West Bengal Goverrsfient Order 
Bo« 2956/Iiab., dated SI .8 .1943. 
12 . Boabay Govem&ent Gazet te , dated Sd«S*1943« 
13« liabour Gase t te , Boabay Imt^mber 194S, p . 853. 
f a c t o r y i n Ma«'ra3, tha Ad^uciicatop hold tb view t h a t 
boiiua a s an e x - g r a t i a payiaent i s an explof^e*? view and 
thi . t a l l p r o g r e s s i v e employers have acc<=:yt0d he p o - i t i o n 
tb^it the px-ofit3 of a manufactur ing concern a r e the r e s u l t 
of a kiiid of c o o p e r a t i v e e f f o r t on the p a r t of the worls^rs 
anr' t:ie aajnage.3e-nt« In t,hi3 view th© workers a r e ccns 1-
dered t o hav^e a ri^fiit t o sha re i n the p r o f i t s by t.:ay of 
bonus J a t .• r.y r a t e i u t h e y a r s in w ich subfr tant la l 
p r o f i t s have been earned by the f a c t o r y . ^ ^ F i l i a l ly 
o r i Venlcatararaayya; i n h i s award r c l a t i i i f to a d i a p a t e 
oetween t h e workers and raanageKents of a o t o r t r a n s p o r t 
s e r v i c e i s t h e ladras S t a t e observed t ! ia t t'le l u e s t i o n 
of bornis has to be exanined in t h l i p h t of t h e chained 
out look of eaployer-w r k e r r e l a t i o n s h i p . Equi ty r e q u i r e s 
t h a t p r o f i t s of the j o i n t e f f o r t s shoiild be shared by 
b o t h . ^ ^ 
IF THE LIVIi^G V»AGE-i'I!Ai<r AiO) U I^ Oi rti.ACE: D, 
BQi4Ui AiiUilES t i l CIIARACTCH Oh TII£ DEFICIEKCY 
OF 4 LEGinMATE li^CuMI, uMuliD TKV. o'£A^TA^ 
In sosie o t h e r awards , the Adjudica o r s have 
exnressed t h e view t h a t workers* c l a i a fo r a share i n 
15 . Award eiiforced uarler Madras Govt. ^ o . "i.O. Ma. 
ito.11430^ da ted 31s t I-laich 1947. 
16 . Award eiiforcec^ uiK'er i ^ d r a s Govt. Order i*o.2t69/ 
Develop'.r»ent, da ted ^ '3 .4 .194S. 
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profits is talcen for grart ed if the industry or undertaking 
is making a profit and if it is paying wages to wockers which 
are below the living wage standard. This principle has been 
forcibly enunciated by the Industrial CoiB*t Bombay. In its 
avrard in a dispute between the Mill Owners' Association, 
Boraba7, and the employees of the meaber mills, the court 
remarked that the justification for such d emand ( that is 
demand for bonus) as In-'ustrial matter arises specially 
when va; es fall short of li-ing wage stanr'ard and the indus-
try r.iakf:-:-> huge profits parts of which are due to the contri-
bution nhich the workers make in increasing the production. 
The deraanc' for bonus is therefore an industrial claim when 
either of both these conditions are satisfied. It is to be 
remonibered that adequate vages and dearuess allovrance, if any, 
for increased cost of living are the first charge on the 
industry, but the workers may reasonably ask or a bonus 
when there are enhanced profits, when dividends are paid out 
after providing for taxation and depreciation especially 
when their wa^ e^s are below the living vage standard.^ 
This view was endorsed by the Industrial Tribunal which 
was appointed by the Government of V/est Benral in October 
1947, in connection with the industrial dispute between 
the employers of 36 col ton mills and their employees. The 
17. Labour Gazette, Boi*ay, June 1947. p.p. 776-77 
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Industrial Tribunal which vas appointed to adjudicate 
in a dispute in the Mazgaon Docks Ltd., -while reiterating 
this principle, went a step furthe>r and stated that 
••the claiin of workmen for a bonus, so long as that living 
standard ( that is living wage standard fixe, for cotton-
textile workers in Boaibay) has not been attained, will 
remain justifiable anc it must have precedence over 
items of cost such as iianaging Agents* refounerations and 
18 
coramissioas, taxation provision and all reserves". 
In an award in a dispute between the Mill Owners* 
Association ^ 'ombay, aiad 80 textile *'iill3 in Bom ay, the 
lixcuatrial court reiterated the view expressed by it in 
the 1947 award relating to bonus. The coi»t observed 
that aach demand (that is demand for bomis) derives 
its strength where the living wage starsflard has not 
been reached, from a feeling <f deficiency in the 
means to attain the necessary standard of living. 
Therefore, bonus in such circumstances no doubt served 
as a tesiporary satisfaction, wholly or in part of 
this need. Theoretically adequate wages and dearness 
allowance should be the first charge on an 
industry,•.,..•• •» Labour as well as working 
capital employed in the industry both contribute to 
profit made and both are, therefore, entitled to claim 
18» Award enforced under Bombay Governraent Order 
Eo. 9246/34-1 dated 17.6»194a, 
a legitimate return out of profit and such legitimate 
return so far as labour is concerned tmist be "based on the 
living vage stan''ard. It is hew ever, to be remembered, 
that a claim to bonus xaight be adraiaslblc even if the 
living vrage standard were completely attained. It raay, 
therefore, be st&.ted th^t so long as living vrage standard 
has not been attained, the bonu^ partakes pri;.iurily of 
the character of satisfaction, often pcirtial i.nc' temporary, 
of the deficiency of legitimate income of the average 
worker in an indnstrjj anr' once such income has been attained, 
it vould also partake the character of profit-sharing. 
Ov/ixig to this dual character of bonus, It would be a 
mistake to regard a demand for borais as a deiUind for 
profit-sharing pure and slTiple. Even if it bo held as 
the committee on profit-sharing have hel*"", that pi'ofit-
sharing on a 50-55 basis would be equitable it voul'' be 
proper in our opinion vhen the li"in,p' wage standard has not 
been reached, for labour to donand even a greater share 
after the gross profits have beon reduced by depreciatJ.on, 
reasofiable reserves and dividend :^n!d sultabl provision 
for taxation. ' * 
The above roferences have been called for in orcer 
to sb.oxif that in Infia, the varioui; avards have- estab-
lished that labot;^ r has a riglit to share ii. the ^jrofits of 
the industry in which it is v.'orking, and tl^ at such shariug 
is a kind of profit-sharing pure and simple. 
19, Avrard published,in Bombay Govejjranent Gazette Extr^ 
ordinary dated 5th May 1949, 
« 93 « 
LAW AuT) PBACTICE IK IHDIA. 
In India, so far no lav has been passed in order 
to regulate profit-sharing schemes. The largest number 
of schemes have arisen from the awards of the 
Industrial Tribunals, and the amount which is paid 
as bonus is decided in an arbltray mariner every 
year and it is not unconuaon th;..t an Adjudicator is 
appointed to decide the quantum of bonus. The 
lack of uniformity in the prixiciple has resulber in 
a large variety of methods adopted. The rate at 
which bonus is paid by some of these undertakings in 
recent years as also the conditions attached to 
their payment are given in the statement in the 
appendix towards the end of this chapter. From the 
tab;i.ej it v-ill be seen that there is a large 
Hfliltiplicity of methods adopted by different under-
takings for paying bonus. This variation is mainly 
due to the absence of any agreed principle for the 
determination and distribution of bonus. 
QUANTUM OF BOKUS. 
So far as the quantum of bonus is concerned no 
fixed principle is descernible in the findings of the 
Industrial Tribunals, courts etc. The consideration 
taken into account trhile a^ trarding bonus have generally 
been the financial condition of a unit or an industry 
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and its capacity to bear the burden. Generally speaking, 
the net profit of the concern or of the industry has 
been taken into accoujat in fixing the rate of bonus. 
There has been no uniformity in regard to the definition 
of "profit". However, abnormal appropriations in the 
balance slieet for losses in tiie past years, for 
machinery or building, depreciation, replacement etc., 
have not been reckoner- by the Adjudicators for determining 
net profits during any particular year, tor example, 
in a clsiJute between the employers and the employees of 
the Chittavalsa Jute Mills, i^ adras, the employera 
opposed a demaiic for a bonus on the ground that deprecia* 
tion had not been fully wiped out and therefore, there 
were no surplus profits. The Adjudicators rejected the 
contention of the eiaployers and declci.red "I aia not 
prepared to accept the contention that a bonus is 
liable to be paid only out of wtiat may bo called the 
absolute or the surplus profits. -hy should the 
worker who has contributed by his labour to the 
enormous profits in the course of some years be 
deprived of bonus, because still in previous years 
20 
here were losses." Mr. D.G, Hamerker, in his award t-
relating to the Hazagaon Pocks Ltd., Bor.ibay, objected 
20. Award enforced under liadras Governmert Order 
Ko. G.O. Ms. 2300 dated 23.5.1947. 
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t o the huge amonit s e t a s i d e by t i e company fo r b u i l d i n g 
replacement and r e p a i r , r e s e r v e s and remarked "while 
no o b j e c t i o n can r easonab ly be t aken t o tl:e p r o v i s i o n s 
for genera l r e s e r v e s , bad deb t s and t a x a t i o n , i t 
appears to me t h a t the t>rorkraen*s c la im to an adequate 
bonus should have precedence over the company's 
21 
r e s e r v e s fo r machinery, replacement anr r e p a i r s " . 
Some .-<?indicators have favoured the linl^iing of 
the quantum of tiie bonus x^^ith t h e d i v l d e i ^ s pa id . In 
most c a s e s , the Adjud ica tors have f ixed the r a t e of 
bonus a f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g the pas t p r a c t i c e , p r o f i t s 
earned and the c a p a c i t y of t h e i n d u s t r y to bear the 
burden . The p r a c t i c e geiB r a l l y accepted by 
Adjud ica to r s has been t o award bonus in terras of b a s i c 
monthly xragea exc lud ing dea rness a l lowance a l though 
t h e r e a r e a few awards i n which t h e r a t e has been 
f ixed i n terms of monthly e a r n i n g s , 
MODE Q]! PABlElJT, 
The Adjud ica to r s and I n d u s t r i a l T r ibuna l s g e n e r a l l y 
s e t a time l i m i t w i t h i n which the payment i s to be made, 
I^ Tien the amount involved was l a r g e , reconmiendations were 
made t o the e f f e c t t h a t paymen should be laade i n tM> 
i n s t a l m e n t s . So f a r , Ad jud ica to r s have i n v a r i a b l y 
recomnender the payment of bonus i n cash . Recent! y 
2 1 , Award enforced under Bombay Government Order 
Mo, 9426/34-1 dated 1 7 . 6 . 1 9 4 8 , 
however, when the Industrial Court, Bombay, awarded 
4i months' basic earnings as a bonus aggregating 
to over four crores of rupees, they felt that they 
might recommend that a part of the amount should be locked 
up in savings certificates etc. ITney, however, felt 
that because of the pro\''isions of the pay^ nent of Wages 
Act, they could not lUiike such a recoanendation. In 
their award, they have observed that it seems to them 
desirable for the legislature to look into the question 
and see whether it would be feasible in suitable cases, 
for the Industrial courts to order such a mode of 
payiaent. This suggestion was promptly acted upon by 
the Government of India and on the 11th June 1949, 
they issued an Ordinance called the "Industrial 
Tribunals Payment of Bonus (National Savings Certificates) 
Ordinance 1949, The Ordinance provides that it shall 
be lawful for any Industrial Tribunal when making an 
award in relation to any industrial dispute, to direct 
that the bonus which may become payable under the award, 
shall to the extent of any part thereof, mt exceeding 
half tlie amount of the bonus in any case, be paid in the 
form of post office National Savings Certificates of such 
denominational values as may be specified by the 
Industritil Tribunal, provided that no such direction 
shall bo made under this siibsection, if it will have 
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the effect of reducing the bonus payable In cash to the 
workmen to less than the amount of basic wages payable to 
him for a month*s service. Any direction nade by an 
Industrial Court in terms of this ordinance is to be 
binding on the parties in the same manner and to the same 
extent as the award. 
COMDITIOKo OF T^LIGIblLITY. 
Even in regard to the conditions laid c'own by 
va:.*ious Adjudicators for qualifying for feonus, there is 
hardly any uniformity. While some have been conspicuous 
by tiieir silence on this subject, others have laid 
do\m a minlaum period of service. Generally, no quali-
fyinr period of service is prescribed in those awards 
in whicli bonus is linked to the earning of vrorkers 
during the year concerned. This principle was 
followed by the Industrial Tribunals appointee by the 
Governraents of Iladras and V^ est Bengal to adjudicate in 
trade disijutes in the cotton Textile Mills in their 
respective states. However both these Tribun^ds 
recommended that no bonus should be paid to those 
workers who were absent for more than 60 days during 
the year. The minimum pe^ i^od of service, proscribed by 
different Adjudicators for qualifying for a borais 
ranges fro;^  one month to one year. V/herever a coaip^ -ete 
year's service uaa prescribed, as the coiKHtlon for 
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rece iv ing bonus, workers with a short period of 
serv ice were granted a par t of the bonus. The general 
p r a c t i c e , however, appears to be t o grant boiBis to 
workers who have worked a t l e a s t for one aonth. The 
I i ^ u s t r l a l Ccmrt, Bcwibay, while dealing with the 
dispute regarding hoima for the ^ear 1946-1347, i n 
the Cottoii I ^ i t i l e >lil s oi Boaba. c i t y , recoiaaended 
tha t onl^ those j,er3ons who have worked for a t l e a s t 75 
days durijig the year should be paid boraia a t the fu l l 
r a t e aiirf for those who have vorket'' for l e s s than 75 
days, but more skian 32 days, shcaild be paid a t half 
the r a t e* I t dlf' uot recoi^i^nd aiiy bonus for those who 
worked for l e s s than 52 days. The i^djudicators have 
usua l ly roco2i2i02i5?.©d the graiit of bonus to tbos^ workers 
who were discharged or who l e f t th serv ice of the under-
takliii: fwtlm.:- t t e year concei'ited. Geneial ly, the 
Adjudicators teve rtjDt recorsiiended the pQ.yismut of bonus 
to tJiose ifho were discharged for Eaiscoiiduct or misbehaviour 
durinf th«; year for t^iich bonus was granted. 
SCH£;4RS OF TllK TRADITIOMAL TYPE. 
Although the Imlk of p rof i t - shar ing sehcaes in the 
country has been the r e s u l t of coopulsoiy awards of 
loaus t r la ) I 'ribunals, the re i s a handful of scheiaes s t a r t ed 
vo lun ta r i ly by the employers, ^aonf: such schemes, cotse 
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those of the Tata Iron and 3 tee l Couipargr Lt<?, The 3 t e t l 
Corporation of Bei^al L t ^ . , The Indian Iron and 3t©el 
ConpDW ^•tf'., Th© Tlnpla te Coapany of India Lt<3«, and 
The Buckingham an<? Camat ic Mills Ltd. 
I t was in the year 1933-1954 t h a t the coapai:Qr for 
the f i r s t time gave a honas t o i t s oaployees. In tha t 
year , boms vas paid t o those earning under Hs. 500 a 
aonth« The next boisis was extended Lo a l l employees oM 
t h i s payiaent eontimied tfercwgh the years 1935& 1936. Cvring 
these years^ no cont rac t M&S entered i n to for the 
purpose of paying boiais. 
In 19S6-1937, ttie &»mpany f i r s t declared a scheiae 
of p ro f i t - sha r ing in which the bonus was l inked with the 
ai7idezk!s paid t o the share-holders . In t h i s schenie^ i f 
i n a yea r , the dividend exceeded one crore of rupees, 
for every 25 lakhs in axeess of t ha t c r o r e , half a 
month's wage would be paid t o the employee, "i'his scheme 
continued i n force t i l l the year 1944-1945. Under t h i s 
scheme, which las ted for nine yea r s , the amount s e t 
apar t for p ro f i t - sha r ing bomis according to the ca lcu la -
t i on was d i s t r i lmted ailing the employees i n proport ion to 
32, Indian Labour Gazet te , Vol. VII, Wo. 9, March 
1950, pp. 6S0-33. 
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their rate of pay. If the smployee had his name on the 
rolls of the company and had served a miniBum period of 
one year, he would be paid as bonus a sum equivalent to 
the wages for a certain number of days without regard to 
his attenflance during the year for which the profits were 
calculated. Thus a man with one year's miniaaim service 
could get the full profit-sharing bonus payable at his 
incoHB level, even though he had not attended work for 
a single day during the year. 
In 1945, the company entered into an agreement 
with the Workers' Union which linked the profit-sharing 
bonus not to the diid^ idends, but to the total net profits 
and the plan is the best example of the conventional 
type of profit-sharing scheme practised in India. 
According to the revised agreement, out of the gross 
profits after deduction of the depreciation ( as 
allowed for under income-tax regulations) payment of 
taxes, payment of tlm guaranteed interest on preference 
shares and five per cent dividend on other shares, 
22i per cent of the remaining sum would be paid as 
profit-sharing bonus to employees • The sum thus 
set apart was to be distributed among employees in 
proportion to their total earned income for the year. 
The bonus was linked to profits and the attendance of 
the employees. 
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During the years of var, profits had been high 
and naturally the amount of bonus has also been corres-
ponding y highJ but with the cessation of hostilities, 
both began to dwindle. At the request of the Employees' 
Union, the Company once again revised the scheme. "This 
revised scheme shall be deemed to have ccaae into force 
with respect to the profits of the company earned and 
to be earned from and after 1st April, 1948, and will 
be in operation for a period of four years ending 
31st I4arch 1952". as per the first clause of the 
agreement entered into between the I-lanagecient ara? the 
Union. 
Accordingly, the employee of the ccmpany is 
entitled to get 27k per cent of the antoial net 
profits of the company and such shares shall be credited 
to and/or distributed among the employees of tht company 
in proportion to the basic salaries and wages earned or 
deemed to be earned by such employees respectively 
during the year in which such net profits were earned by 
the c omparor. For the purpose of the scheme "net annual 
profits" means the profits arrived at in the manner 
shoim in the audited Profit and I*os3 Account of the 
company f or each year after making the following 
deductions. 
(1) All taxes payable except to the extent 
(if any) already provided in the audited 
profit and Loss Account and except 
Business Profit Tax or any Taxes of a 
similar nature. 
(S) Depreciation at the rate of tbrae per cent 
on the figtire of gross block shown in the 
audited Balance Sheet of each year. 
(3) Loss(if any) carried forward from previous 
year's Accounts. 
(4) A sum equivalent to the fixed dividend (inclusive) 
of unpaid arrears if any) on preference, 
second preference and other preference share 
capital of the company plus 5 per cent (free 
of income tax) on all other issued share-
capital (including premiums revised by the 
company on issues of capital made at a 
premium) as at the close of the year of 
accounts. Issued share-capital shall exclude 
any share capital issuer' in the slxape of 
fully paid shares by capitalisation of 
reserves and other fur^s of the compare. 
The profit-sharing bonus shall become due after one 
saonth of the passing of accounts. 75^ of the bonus 
payable to each employee shall be paid i!iinediately the 
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bonus becomes due and 35^ shall be credited to a special 
account along \dth the Employee Provident Fn^* This 
shall be paid to the employee when he ceases to be In the 
service of the c<Mipany. Apart frdm the increase in the 
percentage of net profit to be shared, the new plan 
required that the depreciation allowed is not at the 
Income-tax rates, but only V^ of the gross block. They 
can be better observed froii the fact that for 1949-1950, 
while the depreciation calculated according to income-tax 
rates would have been a crore aiKl 60 lacs, the 
depreciation allowed for under the new arrangement 
was only one crore and 9,0 lacs. The prof It-bonus 
distributed to 31,000 v/orkers was Rs 55/- lacs for 
April 1948 to inarch 1949. In the 17 years for \iiich 
the profit bonus has been in existence the company has 
paid a sum of P^  25/- crores and 28 lacs. 
The scheme was revised and the revised scheme 
"shall be deemed to have come into force with respect to 
the profits of the cdnpany earned and to be e arned from 
and after 1st April 1952, anc^  will be in operation 
for a period of five years ending SLst March 1957," 
In accordance with the revised scheme, the pfoflts 
of the year-ending 31st March 195S, that is fe 106,50 lacs 
will be credited to anfl/or distributed among ttie employees 
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In proportion to their monthly wages as calculated on 
the basic wages of such employees as on 51st March 1953, 
In respect of the profits for the reraalninc? 4 years ending 
31st March 1957, the employees of the company "shall 
be entitled under H is profit-sharing scheme to a 
share of 30^ of t^^  e annual net profits of the ccMpany"* 
Such si all be crediter! to and/or distributee' among the 
employees of the company in proportion to their monthly 
wages calculated on the basic wage of such employees as 
on 31st March of the year. Another change that was 
brought about in the revised scheme was, so far employees 
were given 75% of their bonus immediately in cash and 
the rest credited to their account. According to 
th© new arrangement, only 66f per cent was inaaedlately 
distributed while the rest was credited as before to 
the provident Fund Account. In all other respe cts, the 
agreement tallied with tlie previous one. 
The profit-sharing scheme in the I'atas satisfies 
all the main tenets of a genuine profit-sViaring plan and 
can be regarded as a true example of it in India. 
The Buckingham & Carnatie Mills, Madras. 
The Buckingham and Carnatic Mills started in 
1380 were amalgamated to form the present concern of 
Binny and Company, I-Iadras in 1919. Even before the 
amalgamation, a gratuity fund m.s instituted in each of 
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the mills in 1906 to provide a consolidated payment of 
a suta after a fixed period, as a percentage of the 
wages, which was to be determlaed by the management. 
In 1944, a Provident Fund scheme was started to 
which the management contributed 7i^ of the basic 
wages and the workers were given the option either 
to come to the Provident Fund or alternatively to 
continue in the gratuity funr scheme until the 
maturing of the existing scheme. 
The Bonus Scheme was starter^  in 1919 which was 
introduced as per the management order in the following 
terms. "The Directors have for some tirae past j^ad under 
their conslreration the question of giving the x^ ork people 
an Interest in the profits of the Mill, as is done in 
some English Companies. They have,therefore, the 
pleasure to announce that for half year ending 51st 
December 1919, they will pay the Indian Work-people in 
their employment on that date a bonus on the aggregate 
wages earr^d by each employee during that half year 
at the sarae rate as the ordinary dividend paid to the 
share-holders during the 6 months ending June 30th, 
1919". 
Thus if an employee has on December ?lst earned 
Ite SO/- per month (or Hs IPO for 6 months) the ordinary 
dividend paid on 30,6.1919 being 5^, the employee will 
receive a t the ra te of 5^ on i^  120 or ^ ^ - « I t 
has been speeifieally stated that paya^Rt would be made 
only in the abseoee of asgr stoppage oi work, ^Q to 
causes such a« s t r ikes , loekouts etc« S^ r ESiother 
carder Sated S,3.1939, the prijociple was i^st&ted 
that in jhiture th© rat© of b&xms will b© the saa© as 
that of the aisBMal rate of 6trM9Ti6 «eclare^ each 
half«year, ei^nthmigh tm two piHifioiis occasions, no 
cot vaM made in t i ^ ra te of bonus vhsn the half-yearly 
dividend was reducof* from 10 per cent for tl^e f i r s t 
half-year of 1936 aafl t\m second l^af-year of 19S8, 
¥&t example, i f the dividend declares to the 
sliareholders i s U^ per cent tlae IK»IIUS pai^ Is i s i 
divided by 100 z IS eq:iials one and half months* 
wages. H«ice i t i s known as the W'age dividend l^an of 
proflt«sliaring. Sri M. V«ikataraaayya in his Textile 
Award of 19th ^nne, 1947 ree£»siten?ed tlie Bjjmy Flan 
as t l ^ best i^ttK>d of distr i lmting lN»a»Sf If the 
share-bolders ^ l^o have contributes^ towards cap i ta l get 
a cer tain percentage Q€ divlfenr?, the uama percentage 
should be aade a ^ i l a b l e to tf^ woz^ers whose 
invest^^nt, v i s . , labour i s ^ralnated a t the wages 
paid to thea in th® year."^^ Hence he snggested t i a t 
the bomis paid should be linked to th@ dividend declared. 
S3. Madras feaetile Blspotes inward • 194S, p . 57. 
Probably, the Industry In suggesting a llJik, between 
the quantum of bonus to be pair? -.nc^  the rfl'/ldend 
declared for the year, is inspiref? by th? ic'ea of 
equalising the respective shares of labour and capital 
appropriated from the amount of ^he net profit. As 
wages represent the effective measure of labours' 
contribution and dividend the visible s;niibol of the 
productivity of capital, at once servinc. as the 
remuneration of their respective servlcesj at'ainiaent 
of equality between bonus given and dividend paid, 
will be pricing the services of each accordIn^; to 
Contribution. 
But it must be remembered that the dividend 
declared is not a true index of the rate of profit 
earned by the company. A large proportion may bo 
carried forward to the reserve in order to reduce the 
amount that raay be available to t'ne share-holders, 
thereby lowering the dividend. Another danger is 
from the practice of stock watering or by the issue 
of bonus shares. The conipanj' can issue nevr nominal 
shares or bonus shares to the existing share-holders 
and expand the capital, thereby lo^ rerinp the dividend 
rate so as to evade the regulation of the state to 
limit dividends or to avoid increased payment of bonus 
in good titees wheii the dividend rate must necessarily 
be high. 
-113* 
But the hlmxy and Company d c issue bonus shares 
in 1943 without defeating the basic purpose of the 
bonus scheme by doubling the c'ividend rate to 
arrive at the rate of bonus. 3ince 1943, for 
example, %i?hei, the dividend is only 72 yer cent 
the bonus is calculated aC the rate of 15 p.c. 
Without questioning tUe good intentions ox the 
ioanace.uent, having no fixed relation between the 
real amount of profits aecriied and i;'ie dividend 
declared, the linlc between dividend and tix: bonus 
need not be in proportion to the profits niade. 
True profit-sharii^ must fix the amount of bonus 
as a percentage of profits. Hence the Blnny plan 
represents a transitloiial phase in the evolution of 
profit-sharing. The following figures since 19?6 
give a picture of the working of the bonus scheme 
and the contributions made to tise welfare activities 
of the corapany. 
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TABLE SHQWIIJG THE AMQUKT OF BONUS PAID BY DIFFEREHt 
PDUSTRIES DUHIMG RECENT TEAB3. 







Mills in Bombay 
City) Members of 
the Bombay Mill 
Owners• Associ-
ation. 







For 1947. 11/60th 
of the total earn-
ings . (exclus ive 
of clearness allow-
ance etc.) 
Tho3e who worked 
for at least 63 
days during the 
year. Persons 
who \forked for 
more than 80 clays 
but less than 63 
days, half the 
amount. 
Those who worked at 
least 75 Cays dur-
ing the year. Per-
sons who worked 
for more than 32 
days but less than 
75 days. 
3. Cotton Mills, 
Ahmedabad. 
For 1948, 3/ath 
of earnings in 
1i>48 (exclurMng 
dearness allow-
ance bonus etc. 
- do ~ 




For 1948. 7/24th 




Those who worked for 
at least 63 days du-
ring the y ar. Per-
sons who worked for 
aore than 20 days 
but less than 63 
days - half the 
aaount. 
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5. B & C Mills, 
Madras* 
Half-yearly bonus 
Is paid. Bonus is 
calcialated on the 
gross earnings of 
the worker in the 
previous 6 months 
on the basis of 
dividend paid on 
ordinary shares 
of the Company. 
For the first half 
of 1943, a bonus 
at the rate of ^5% 
of gross earnings 
during the period 
ending 30th June 
1948 was paid. 
6. Madura Mills 
& Co, Ltd., 
Madura* 
In 1948. 3 months* 
basic wages. 
Full to thos« who 
complied x^ ith the 
leave rules. Other 
were pair' 25^ of 
the earnings. 
7, Sri Meenakahl 
Mills Ltd. 
Madura. 
For 1347-48J 25% 
of the basic wages. 
8. All Mills, West 
Bengal. 
Bonus paid accord-
ing to the follow-
ing formulae. 
Total ft Total no. 
wages & 5 of days 
dearness il worked 
allowanceO plus 
earned byO authori-
the work-0 sed hold-
er in theO ing and 
year raul-5 leave on 
tiplied 0 full pay 
by the H jmiltipllec? 
dividend H by the 
declared.!} number of 
il days in 
^ the year. 
Those absent for 
iiiore tlian 60 days 
In th' year 
debarred. 
^ im -^  





For 1947$ all mills 
paid bonus at the 
rate of 255^  of basic 
vages* Only one mill 
pair! at the rate of 
22% of the basic 
wages. 
For 1947| Approxi-
iiiately 5 months' 
basic wares. 
11, Cotton Mills in 
Indore (Members 




For 1947. IsijS of the 
total earning. 
12, Minerva Mills 
Ltd., Mysore. 









14. Devenagare Cotton Three months' basic 
M i l l s . , Lt<5. sa lary for 1946-194' 
15. Sr i KrishJia 
Rajeridra - l i l l s 
Ltd. 
Same percentage of 
bas ic wages as d i v i -
dend declared, sub-j e c t to a maxiimim of 
10^ of bas ic vrages 
earned in the half-




Besides ce r t a in 
service condi-
t ions a kilniiaum 
attendance of 
105 days is 
requi red . 
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I I . WQOLLEK MILLi, 
1. Ind ian Woollen 
M i l l s , Bombay. 
For 1947. 1/5th of the 
e a r n i n g s exc luding 
dea rnes s a l lowance . 
2. Cavnpore VJcdlen 
M i l l a , Ltd. 
Kanpur. 
G r a t u i t y palfl a t the 
r a t e of 4 aiinas on 
the b a s i c ea rn ings 
fo r 1947. 
3 . J .K, VJoollen 
Manufacturing 
> i i l l s L td . 
Kanpur. 
4 . Ind ia Woollen 
T e x t i l e , 
Arar i t sa r . 
r'o, 





5, Bangalore Woollen 15^ of the earnings Permanent 
Cotton & Silk Mills (excluding clearness workers 
allowance etc.) for only. 
1947 and 20J^  for the 
last half of 1948. 
Co. Ltd. 
Bangalore. 
in. SlUi HILL3. 
1, The Sassonand 4i caonths* wages for 
Alliance Silk Mill, the year 1948. 
Bombay. 
2, Bombay Silk Mills For 1948 J li raonths' 
Ltd. Bocibay. wages. 
3, Silk Weaving 
Factory, Mysore. 
For 1947-43. 1/6th of the 
total earnings (exclusive 
of dearness allowance, 
bonus and other alloi/aiiCGs) 
- 1 1 ^ -
4 . Governriient S i l k 
Weaving F a c t o r y , 
S r i n a g a r . 
1/12th of tbe 
e a r n i n g s . 
IV. JUTE MILLS. 
1 • Haheswo^ri 3J6V1 
J u t e Mi l l s Ltd. 
Kanpur. 
2. J.K. Jute Mills 
Ltd. Kanpur. 
At the rate of 4 annas 
per nrpee on earnings. 
do. 
3. Mahabir Jute Mills In 1947-48, As. 4i per 
Ltd. Kanpur. irupee on thf basic wages 
earned during the period 
1st October 1947 to 30th 
Decetaber, 1948 was paic^  
as bonus. 
¥. IROM & 3TX^:EL. 
1. Tisco Ltd. 




Emploveeo entitled to a share 
of 221 ^  of the annual profit 
of the cotapany. 3uch share is 
credited to an/or distributed 
among the employees of the 
coijpany in proportion to the 
basic salaries and wages 
earned or deemed to be earned 





8 wages for each 
cent declared. 
3. Steel Corporation 
Bengal, Ltd. 
fiO, 
4. India Steel & Wire Approximately three month's 
Production Ltd. wages. 
5. Tin Plate of India Bonus is paid on a slab system 
Ltd. which Is linked to dividend 
declared. The rate varies from 
- ISO -
from one weeks wages 
(If the dividend declared 
is more than 7ij? but less 
than &t%) to 6 weeks* 
wages (if the dividend 
declared is more than isf^ 
but less than SlilJ). For 
each additional 2t^ dividend 
workers are paid one week's 
wages. 
VI. SMEMT. 
1. Six Factories 
under the manage-
ment of the 
Associated Cemen-
ted Co. Ltd. 
For 1946-47, bonus at the 
rate of li months* wages 
was paid. 
2. Sone Valley Part- One month's wages, 
land Cement Co. 
Ltd, Japla. 
3. Rhotas Industries For 1947-48. li months' 
Ltd. Cement Fac-
tory, Dalraia Bagar. 
Whose in service 
on 31st October 
1948. 
VII. DOCK YARD. 
1. ScIndia Shipyard, During 1946-47. 
Vlzag* 1 month's basic wages. 
2* Mazgaon Dock| 
Bombay. 
3. Bombay Steam 
Ha^lgation Co. 
Bombay. 
Two months' earnings. 
During 1947. 2i months' 
basic wages. 





In the previous chapter, x^je have seen that there 
is a large multiplicity of methoc^ s beinp adopted by 
the various undertakings in India for paying the 
bonus. This variation is mainly due to tbc 
absence of any agreed principle for the determination 
and distribution of bonus,, Towards the end of 
1947, the Government of India convened an 
Industrial Conference to which representatives of 
Provincial and State Governments, leading businessmen, 
industi^ialists and leaders of labour organisations 
were invited. The lOciin object of the conference was 
to five its dae consideration to the steady fall In 
most spheres of production and to devise measures 
which would not only put a stop to the deteriorating 
situation, but would bring about concrete results 
in the field of production. Among the many matters 
which met with general agreement was the recognition 
that improvement in employer-labour relations was the 
most essential pre-requisite to enhanced production. 
Although there v/ero vital differences as to how 
best industrial relations could be established, 
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maintained and enlarged, the realisation by all of 
the limediate urgency of the problem and the 
resulting willingness on the part of both the 
employers and workers to come to a practical 
solution enabled the conference to arrive at a 
general agreement known as the Industrial Truce 
Resolution, The main principles of this Resolution 
are best described by quoting the relevant part of 
the Resolution itself. "This conference considers 
that the increase in industrial production which is 
so vital to the economy of the country cannot be 
achieved without fullest cooperation between 
labour and management and stable and friendly 
relations between them. The employer must recognise 
the proper role of labour in industry and the 
need to secure for labour fair wages and working 
conditions; laboiir for its part must give equal 
recognition to its duty in contributing to the 
increase of the national income without which a 
permanent rise in the general standard of living 
cannot be achieved. Jfutual discussion of all 
problems common to both and a determination to settle 
all disputes without recourse to interruption in or 
slowing down of production should be the common aim 
- 12S -
of employers and labour. The system of reiainera-
tlon to capital as well as labour must be so 
devised that while in the interest of the consumers 
and the primary producers excessive profits should 
be prevented by suitable measures of taxation 
and otherwise, both will share the product of 
their coBDaon effort after making provision for 
payment of fair wages to labour, a fair return 
on capital employed in the industry and reasonable 
reserves for the maintenance and expansion of the 
undertaking". 
The Government of India accepted this 
Resolution as part of their Infiustrial Policy and 
appointed a committee known as the Committee on 
Profit-sharing to assist the government in the 
implementa tion of their policy. One of the 
functions of the committee was to enunciate 
principles for determining labours share of the 
surplus profit "on a sliding scale normally 
varying with production". 
The CoaaaitteG was of the opinion that theore-
tically, it should be possible to evolve a principle 
which would link labour's share of the surplus 
1. Industrial Truce Resolution. 1947. 
profit to the total production of a firm in some such 
way as followsJ if normal production is "X", labour's 
share might be, say, 50 p,c. of the surplus 
profits. If produ ction in any one year Increases by 
20 p.c. and is • f § ^ labour's sliare might be 
60 p,c« of the surplus profit. Similarly, if 
production drops by 20 p.c. labour's share in 
surplus profit might be reduced to 40 p.c. There 
vfas also a suggestion that a similar forrmila might 
be devised in which "X" i^ ill be t'ne total 
production of the whole industry and not of any 
particular under-taking. The cocmlttee was of the 
firm view that as a practical proposition, it was 
impossible to work out any such sliding scale varying 
with production. The reasons, according to tSien, 
are th^ e composite nature of profit and that 
labour's contribution towards it is not amenable 
to any precise measureaent. Further, the basic 
conditions in any one year may be quite different from 
the conditions on which the iK>rra has been determined. 
The production equipment might have increased or 
diminished or improved or deteriorated in the meantime. 
The size and composition of the labour force might 
similarly have chanted. There may be involuntary 
interruptions for which no oi^ was responsible. Hence 
• 185 -^ 
the coflffliittGe came to the conclusion tha t i t was 
not in a pos i t ion t o prescr ibe a i ^ d e f i n i t e ru le 
for linlcing l abour ' s share in surplus p rof i t s to 
production and that i t would have to be determined 
only in an a r b i t r a r y manner. In view of the 
lack of experience with p ro f i t - sha r ing , the committee 
was against any l a rge - sca l e aidoption of prof i t - shar ing 
schemes in Indian i n d u s t r i e s . I t , therefore 
recommended (though not uminimously) that to begin 
with, p rof i t - shar ing should be t r i e d out 
for a period of l i v e years and that i t should embrace 
2 
only the following industries. 
(1) Cotton 
(g) Jute 
(3) S tee l (main producers) 
(4) Cement 
(5) Manufacture of tyres 
(6) Manufacture of cigarettes. 
The CoHiinittee added tha t i f the i n i t i a l 
experience i s encouraging enough "we uould fur ther 
recoraiend tha t government should consider extension of 
the scheme to other su i t ab le i ndus t r i e s " " I t iiiade 
the suggestion tha t in the above indus t r i e s " labour ' s 
share should be 50 p . c . of the surplus p rof i t s of 
2 . Report of the Committee on Prof i t - shar ing , pp. 7-8 
published by the Manager, Government of India 
Press , Delhi , (1951). 
3 . Ib id . p . 8 . 
the uiKtertakings, The Individual wo»ker's share of 
p ro f i t s should be in proportion to his toJo l earnings 
f'urinf- th: preced ng ti/clve montlis miraxs cear i^ss 
allowance and any other business received hy him. 
This shauld be in s u b s t i t u t i o n of any of er p ro f i t -
4 
sharing borais that is pale' now. For purposes of 
this scherae, tJie coanaittee defined ai rpliis profits as 
net profits minus 10 p,c, for reserve minus 5 p.c, on 
capital employed. It held "that paid up capital plus 
reserves (including all future allocations of reserves) 
which are held for purposes of business, is the nearest 
practical approximation to capital employed in the 
5 
industry. 
After studying the question in i t s varied aspec t s , 
the committee recommended a scheme x r^here prof i t - shar ing 
should normally be un i t wise, but in c e r t a i n selected 
cases, would be on an Industry-cum-locali ty b a s i s . Me 
consider t h a t , to bepin with, p rof i t - shar ing on an 
industry-cum"*locallty basis should be t r i ed out in the 
6 
Text i le Industry of boiabay, Ahraedabad and 3holapur", 
In these cases , t';e comialttee observed tluit the 
surplus p ro f i t s of these u n i t s vrill be pooler for the 
4 , Ibid. pp. 10-11 . 
5, Ib id , p . 9. 
6, Ib id . p . 1 1 , 
pRippos© of ascer ta lninE wliat slKjuid be the profl t -shuri i ig 
botus payable to labdor in the lijeustry i n the l o c a l i t y , 
rh is bonas sha l l be i ayable , iis a mlnimimf by eiyery un i t 
to i t s lao^mr Irrespectiv^s of i t s p r o f i t s . iJUt iu those 
u n i t s ^ . e r e h^ilf the surplus p r o f i t s (thut i s the 
aBount *u® o laboftir i n thai un i t ) exccseds tha sua 
reguirec to pay the oinimim bunus r^Serre^ t o , sueb 
excess s h a l l a l so be j^aie t o tr© workers of that unit* The 
coaaiittee fur ther suggested " tha t in a l l cases , hot«ver, 
i ag iv idual cash disburseaent v i l l 1^ l imitcc t o ?5 p«c« 
of a worker 's bas ic vages anr any exees> v i l : m kept 
i n h i s account, provident funf or otherwise*-. 
Ihe recoaaiendatioss of the prof it-shiskrlni, coaclttefe 
l i tre conai^ered by t.-e Central A^vis-ry tiMiucil of I*abaur 
when i t iml ill Kew l e l h i in July 194 J, I t was not 
poss ible for the Oimneil to c o ^ t o a uniuaijaous decis ion 
ac€ £io fixkil recoa-eQe.itian was ^ d e by tl-;.-: b o ^ , /»» 
intera i i i* is tcr ia l stud^. of the iSj^liCiitioi^ of the scl-ieme 
was re^jortec to have ra i sed doubts ao-jut i t s r e l a t i v e 
i®^rtaiiC©» 3c^» of the Hin i s t e r s f e l t s t rongly t^i^t 
i n the then existing: sconomic condi t ions , tL^ 3h..ring of 
p ro f i t s with labour would r e s u l t !& the i r r a t i ona l 
d i s t r i bu t i u i i of c a p i t a l thereby hamperin£ t :c £OV«>ri]eaent's 
ixiSustrial prograsiae aia! '^joli? ^iscourace the invsstaaent of 
?• Ibid pp. l l - l f» . 
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f r e s h inc^igen us anc' f o r e i g n c a p i t a l In Ind ian 
i n d u s t r i e s . The U.P. Latsour Ennuiry Conmittee 
a f t e r considering; the pros anr" cons of bonus a t 
g r e a t l e n g t h , came t o the conc lus ion t h a t bonus 
should be lioiked x^'ith the p r o f i t s of the i n d u s t r y . With 
regard t o t b ; raetliod of l i i ik in ; , the cornmlttee recommended 
tha t ' bonus should be l i J c e d to dividend dvoclo.red on 
share C a p i t a l p a i d . Such a scheme, t h ' committee 
h e l d , wi l l e n t a i l no d i f f i c u l t i e s of d e t a i l e d anal .vs is of 
account f ig^ j res , no waste of t ime and expend i tu re and 
no ijcope fo r mis-under s t and ing and m i s - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
In a d d i t i o n such an arrangement was found to be simple i n 
concep t ion and easy t o o p e r a t e . 
QUAHTUI4 OF B0HU3. 
As fo r the quantura of bonus to be paid t o the 
vrorkers, the committee v/as of t he vievr l;hat t l i . 
i n d u s t r i e s vrere no t l i k e l y to inako high p r o f i t s as fchey have 
done dur ing the war. As the coroiaittee iias a l ready 
provided fo r an adequate wage and adequate and f a i r 
deurness a l lowance , i t recoiajiended t h a t t he workers i n the 
United Prov inces should be allowed two d a y s ' t t i s i c wages 
fo r every one per cent decl i . rec on o rd ina ry s h a r e -
c a p i t a l paid up . In the case of p r i v a t e companies where 
8 . The S ta tesman. Delh i September 2 , (1950) . 
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dividend method is not ar!opted "we recoiniaend that 
25 per cent of the net profits of the concern diould 
be distributed among t:^ e workers in an equitable 
9 
manner•" 
CUl^DITIQ;i3 OF BQMU3. 
The Committer; found t h a t the payment of bonus 
t o workers was r e g u l a t e d "by a v a t i e t y of cone" i t ions 
i n each u n d e r t a k i n g , which d i f f e r e d from one concern t o 
a n o t h e r . In the ma jo r i t y of r,hen, the payment was 
regarded a^ j c ' i s c r e t i o n a r y . The committee did not 
endorse t h e d i s c r e t i o n a r y a s p e c t , and re com; tended tViat 
a l l employees i n c l u d i n g watch and \^ard s t a f f , c h a p r a s i s , 
m a l i s , Svreepers^ c l e r k s e t c . , whether periaanent, teraporary 
or s u b s t i t u t e were e l i g i b l e t o i t , i f he or she has 
worked fo r ::iore t t ian 50 days i n a y e a r . Employees, ^>iho 
have ceased t o be so on th- day of d isbursement of the 
bonus , w i l l a l s o be e l i g i b l e for i t , provided they were 
no t dis ia issed for mis -behav iour accord ing to tne s t and ing 
o rde r s of t h e concern . Ho o t h e r qua l i fy ing c o n d i t i o n 
was p r e s c r i b e d by th-- committee. I t heir! t h a t " the 
amount t o be d i s t r i b u t e d in each case should be c a l c u l a t e d 
by d i v i d i n g t o t a l b a s i c earr^iiigs of each employee in 
a year by h a l f t h e number of man days worked by him 
9 . TJ.P, Labour Enquiry Coiaraittee Repor t . Vo. I . pp . 246-247. 
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during the year for etery one percent dividend 
declared." 
IIES:R7ES. 
The Comraitte*; opposed the inclJiSioa of reserves 
in " cap i t a l " for the purpose of declfarins:. dividend. I t 
heir tha t rcravrves wluch are nothing hut appropriat ions 
out of p ro f i t s carmot be consif!erec* to be the sole 
property of ti;e entrepreneur. I t a£ree<'; v/ifn the- p r inc ip le 
th£it vvorkers have a. cltaai on p ro f i t s as '/leli. a'- on a l l 
other items to which appropria t ions are niudo out of 
p ro f i t s such &.S re se rve . If, tbe re fore , a business i s 
about to be closed or t ra t . s fer red , the workers should 
get t h e i r shc.re of the r e se rves . But so lont' as th is 
i s not tlie case, the Comtttittee did not find suf f ic ien t 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n to recomisiend the r i s t r i b u t i o i i (jf n part 
of the accumulated p ro f i t s of a going concern among i t s 
employees. however, the Comriiittee made tV;e recoii lendation 
tha t no part of p ro f i t s or reserves sliouldj in fu tu re , 
i n any shape or form s}50uld be c redi ted to share-holders 
such as by issue of bonus sh.j.res, or completely reserved 
for them as by t r ans fe r s to dividend equalis/j t ion funds, 
without making a correspond ins, appropriat ion in favour 
11 
of employees of the concern. 
10. Ib id , p . S47. 
1 1 . Ibid, p . 248, 
• in • 
CHAPTER VI 
PROFIT->SHARIHG, BOHUS AKD THE COHCEPT 
OF COPARTNERSHIP. 
From the foregoing, it is seen that almost all 
the known schemes of profit-sharing in Indl a are of the 
Cash profit-sharing type with the exception of a few 
which satisfy the main tenets of conventional schemes. 
Whether such schemes have arisen as a result of the 
awards of the Industrial Tribunals or they have 
eioerged from previous agreements between enployers and 
workers, they have helped labour to share in the 
profits of the concern in which they have been working 
especially when they reach abnormal proportions- But 
it is doubted whether the scheme of cash profit-sharing 
has ushered in a period of better industrial relations 
with increased efficiency and enhanced output. "The 
International Mission on Productivity in India " in 
their final report has expressed theaselves strongly 
against the present practice of cash bonus as an 
incentive to higher productivity. It has recomiaended 
that this form of profit-sharing could, with advantage, 
be replaced by equitable payment by result schemes, 
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on a weekly basis, whlcl would five the workers 
1 
as much as the present awards. Even in the field 
of better industrial pelations in this country, 
profit-sharing in its present fona does not seem 
to have exerted much of a salutary influence. 
Although there is feel in?: both among employers and 
workers that it has preventer^  industrial relations 
from going worse, industrial relations exhibit 
2 
evident signs of deterioration. 
The reasons for these gloomy results are not 
far to seek. In the first instance, ttie bonus payment 
is too remote and small to exert any energising 
influence on the workers. The basic fallacy that 
underlies such a system is that what spurs on the 
one to action will, when divided, stimulate the 
maiQr, 
But much more importalit than this is the 
psychological attitude of the worker to his 
share of the profits. The worker has never been 
a sharer in profit and wben he actually gets an 
extra, it is qpalte likely that he should put it on 
one of the categories ^ich experience had made him 
•| ' ' — 
1. Indian Labour Gazette Vol, XVI. July 1956. p. 18, 
2. Vide statement on page 207 of Chapter X of the 
Thesis, 
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familiar with. If he were a share-holder, he 
might have an opportunity of understanding the 
fluctuating and prob].ematic nature of profits. 
The bonus will appear to him as a revmrri for 
services alreac?y rendered, a deferred wage or a 
windfall. If he thinks of it as the fonaer, he 
will wish it to be regularised in the form of 
higher waces. On the contrary, if the share of 
profit is looked upon as a matter of right, the 
worker will continue to expect it anr- will be 
disappointed if it is stopped or reduced. This 
attitude of mind has been responsible for the 
wreckage of quite a iaumber of bonus plans both in 
the United Kingdom and United States of America. 
Few employers who have practised profit-sharing for 
long seem prepared to claim that this comparitlvely 
small sum serves as an Incentive to greater output 
and increased deligence except perhaps in the month 
Before dividend is declared. There is, however, a 
generally accepted view that a bonus can inflttanee 
the conduct of the fopesjen and employees holding 
responsible positions and to this extent, it can 
have an influence on the fLrrnfe output. 
If then both t^eoi^ and experience combine to 
point toxmrds the ineffectiveness of cash profit-sharing 
- 134 -
a s an I n c e n t i v e to gr* a t e r i r a ^ u s t r l a l cnitput aw! t o 
t"-!f; -n-iintr*nance of bs^^t**? in r 'w^ t r l a l r o a l a t l o n s , wiaat 
shonlf* be the nex t st«:.) t o achie ' rs theses hlFthly 
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implemented, it is to be achieved by some sort of 
democratic control in industry^ Our quest as to 
how best this could be done leads us to what 
is called the concept of COPARTiffiHSHIP" in 
industry. 
Copartnership denotes an attempt which has 
been raade in many industrial concerns to create 
within the frame-'work of the enterprise itself a 
aeuBe of partnership, of identity oi' interest 
between the parties engaged in a coBuaon venture. It 
tries to liquidate the socially disintegrating and 
industrially sectionalising influence of 13ie present 
method of production. It is based on the belief 
that the business structure of any community depends 
on the active and willing cooperation of workers of all 
grades, each of them contributing the best work and 
the most diligent thought in an atmosphere where 
rev/ards oi" activity and diligence axe distributed in 
a vj ay which appeals to the workers' sense of 
justice, Copartiaership in a laitshell, is an attempt 
to translate into industry, to the extent possible, 
the idea of goverriinent basec on th& consent of the 
governed. The priiajiry requireae nt is a leadership 
capable of inspiring those who have to obey orders 
and of earning their confidence that the working 
~ ISO -
arrangeiaerits of the business are so organised that 
the workers can earn as much as industry can afford, 
that thej too as well as the oimers of the capital 
or management have a sense of proprietorship in 
the concern and timt their abilities are utilised 
for tne common benefit. 
There is no generally agreed definition of 
the term copartnership anr so far as is Icnovm^  
there has been no attempt to arrive at a definition 
by International ..greeiaent. By iraplication, the term 
covers any arrangement in which a business is so 
organised and conducted that the employees feel that 
by virtue of their services, they are genuinely 
partners with the employers in a joint undertaking 
although there is no partnership- in a legal sense. 
This is broadly speaking, the objective of every 
firii with cji enlightened industrial relati ons policy, 
but it is manifestly impossible to indentify those 
particular undertakings vjhich could be said to have 
achieved this objective and which are therefore 
examples of copartnership. There is, however, a more 
rigid conception of copartnership system as being one 
which ensures that there should be a sharing of 
profits with empldyees supplemented by arrangements 
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for the employees to acquire some share in the 
control of the unaertaking by owning share capital 
or in other vays» The scope of the concept was 
sufficiently defined by L.W, llunc'y when he said 
"the Idea is simple. The principle is that all 
workers shell become partners in the business in 
vhlch they vork; such partnership vill confer the 
right to share in prosperity or profit, to share 
In oiraership or capital, anf to come into 
knowler'ge and consultatloi about the business." 
To clinch the matter further, its cardinal 
features are th^ ree in number. 
(a) The sharing with the employees of predetermined 
portion of net profits of the business in 
accordaiiCf^  i/ith a scheme i^ iich has got th© 
prior consent of all concerned. 
(b) The enabling and encouraging of eraployees to 
acquire capital in the uiKjertal^ lng which 
employs them. 
(c) Tte granting of a share in the raariageLicnt of 
the business to the oaployees by the setting 
up of copartnership committees, x/ork councils 
or other channels of consultations along 
with information and ideas which can flow 
freely between employer ara^  employed, 
5. Copartnership Today, p.9, op.cit. 
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To he a peal success , no rfcheaie can afford 
to exclude t ; e workers from aa j one of these tlire« 
spheres , i 'heir presence in the other tx/o i s 
©sseiitiai to t h e i r completely successful presence in 
oi;e of them* Let ua t ry to rea l with each of 
these poitit^ at som& l ength . 
The quest ion t h a t i s posed often enough i s 
as to how labour i s t b e o r e t i c a l l y en t i t l ec ' to a 
share In the p r o f i t s of the concern when they are 
already recelTing wages or s a l a r i e s for t he i r vork 
&n8 why the owners sh<ml<^ ^sroluntarlly forego par t 
of the p ro f i t which i s l eg i t ima te ly t h e i r s . An answer 
t o t h i s has already been fiven in the beginning of 
the t h e s i s . 
3hfi.re-holcUng shoulc in fac t be ref-arf's^- as 
the ideal keystone of V:o arch of co^artn'^rsfcip, 
the aha of vhlch i s i:o pro&ace a happy sho ;^- of 
employees with a c^eveloped scaso of thf^ir 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , Efai5loyGes of the eowpcvn^ ^ are 
in the same pos i t ion as o f ' e r people lii buying 
i t s shares on the atyck exehaiice; but some 
ccaapanles have i n t r o ^ c e d schemes with specia l 
shares which can only be hel^ by employees. These 
achenies all v^ry in some c'etail though all of 
them are devices of saving an(^  are intender* to 
increase the interest of the employees in the 
STiccess of the business. Where profit-sharing and 
share OT^ mershlp are llnlcer! together, the vhole or 
part of the rmount due to an employee ra.-i.; be 
invested in special shares. Acs^uisition of shares 
may be voluntary or compulsory. In some case, the 
decision is left to the employees as t^ how much 
he trill take in casli and how imich he will invest 
in shares. Thus in the Bryant and May Cor?ipany Ltd., 
employees may use the amoamt of their profit bonus or 
any part of it for the purchase of the partnership 
stock. A notice is issued by the Trustees to all 
employees i^ .rticipating advising thera of the jsi ount of 
bonus due to tliea and inviting them to state on a 
form provided, vfhether they wish to receive such 
amount In cash or to subscribe for partnership stock 
6 
to the full extent or for any less amount of stock. 
In other schemes, the employee is required to invest 
the whole or a specified proportion, often one-half 
of his share of profits. 
6. Vide Appendix, p. ill 
In some companies, shares can be bought by 
instalments paid by deductions from wages or they 
may be bought out of" personal savings. Usually, 
the shares, are sole* to employees at par. 
Another inducement is to pay an increased rate of 
dividend, in some schemes a double rato, to 
emp^ -oyees who own shi.res eciu^ l^ to a year's wages or 
half a /ear's wagf^ s. Inducement ma;/ be given for 
employees to buy shares by offering them at 
less f an market price. An alternative to the 
purchase of shares is for the irhole or part of 
each employee's share in profits to be nut into 
a savings account and a fixed rate of Interest paid 
on the credits thus accumulated. Thrift is 
encouraged and many workers with lonf service 
accuHtulate large number of shares v;hich increase 
their interest in the business and tend to minimise 
labotir turn-over. Sometimes, it is argued that 
employees should not "put all the egrs in one 
basket" and that if their savings are accumulated 
in the company vbere they work, they may in times 
of depression lose both their savings and .lobs. This 
is one of the reasons why some schemes provide 
safeguards to maintain the value of the shares. 
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Because of t h e i r smaller r i sk of c a p i t a l l o s s , 
business which are s t ab le an^ l e s s l i a b l e to 
vide f luc tua t ions i r e more suited fop shax^-holdlDyg, 
The r a t e of c'ividencF pair' on sp-^clal shares 
i s usual ly the same as tha t on ordinary shares , 
l a some coaipanies, however, specia l preference shares 
are issued with a specifios' r a t e of i n t e r e s t j they 
may be cuaulat ive or noii-caisulatlve a-uc' ma;- or may 
itot part icipci te aii<? recei ' /o a« I t iona l I n t e r e s t i f 
dividends beyood a given r&te are i<^  to ordinary 
stiares* VJhere a cempany haa ^jrofit-sharlnf- and 
share ownership, the eaploi'eea receive Sie i r share 
in the p r o f i t s ai-r^  a l so i n t e r e s t or r'lvlden??s on 
the shares they holti. A ty^ i c il exaiaple i s to 
be I'ouuf"' in che Johnson Bros, tyers Ltc'. , Liverpool* 
iiomB scheaes provide for higher dlvldf^nds to be 
paid <m employee sh&res thai., on ordinary shares , 
llm t o t a l naaber of special, shares •^.'hlch ms(r 
be issuec for employees i s Sixtid. in sono cotapanies. 
In soi^ schemes, a fixed number o: not loual shares 
or c e r t i f i e a t e s of no par value arid unsaleable I s 
issued aiic the dividends on these shsrfjs d i s t r i bu ted 
to the eaployees, i u t t h i s i s csHent lany a method 
of determining the aiaaunt of profif.;s to be 
d i s t r i bu t ed r a the r than a system of share-holding 
by emi^oyees. In soae compaotsies, the t o t a l minber 
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of shares are increased from time to time. For 
example, the Bryant and May Company Ltd., 
started with an initial stock of 200,000 shares 
of £ 1/- each. It was increased to 250,000 in 
1935 ancl was further raised to 300,000 in 1951, 
Some schemes limit the; number of shares that 
any employee may hold. Alternatively, the maxiimim 
holding of an employee may be related to his annual 
wages, that is, the holding not to exceed double or 
four times ttiis amount. Allocation is arranged 
in scaae companies so as to prevent a sniall number 
of better paid employees from holding a sizeable 
portion of the shares issued. In a few companies 
"good conduct" is made a condition for the allotment 
of shares to enable employees to become copartners, 
recommendation being made by their foremen or the 
heads of their departments. 
Where special siiares are held by the employees, 
restrictions are Imposed on the holders. Ordinarily, 
the shares must be relinquished to the company on 
death or on leaving the company's service whether 
by resignation or dismissal. Soiae schemes allow 
holders to retain their s^ lares when they retire. 
In general, the shares being for the benefit of the 
CTiployees, they must be returned to the company as 
A% 
soon as the holder ceases to be empl^yei by it^ 
except that some schemes treat shares a s savings for 
old agft. Usually, when shares are solr back to the 
company, or to the trustees appointed under the scheme, 
the price paid, is the par value, but in some 
schemes, the market value is paid, The first method 
has the advantage of protecting the s avings of the 
work people against loss; but it weakens the value of 
the scheme as an education in the risk run by 
investors of capital. Funds are ofteii put in 
reserve as a guarantee of the par value of the 
shares and are administered by the trustees. When 
shares are thus protected against capital loss, they 
represent a stake in the business as measured by 
dividends and not hy changes in capital value of 
the shares. 
Employees who own special shares ure usually 
precluded from selling their shares whenever they 
wish as ordinary share-holders are at liberty to do. 
The latter can therefore exercise their own judgement 
when to sell to make a profit or avoid a loss; but 
since employees holding special ^aares are not able 
to do this, they are guaranteed the par value. 
Thus some rules provide that employees should not 
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transfer or sell shares, or pledge them as security 
for loans. 
Others allow an employee to sell some of 
his shares, if the value of his holding is more 
than the aaount of an year's wages, but only 
the surplus beyond that amount. Some schemes give 
greater freec^ om, for example, by the company or the 
Trustees undertaking to buy shares or authorising 
holders to sell thea to other qualified employees. 
In some companies, the rirectors can require employees 
to sell back trelr siares and this could be used 
to terminate a scheme. Iii the event of the company 
Itself beinc wound up, soiae schemes provide that 
employees' shares shall rank equally with ordin.:.ry 
shares in the disbributiou of the assets. But in 
others, they participate in the asset only up to the 
par value of the s'^  ares. 
In general practice, it has been founc' that 
the best t...':ie of schemes allows fors-
(a) The shares are to be ordinary shares of the 
company Inscribed as '•Employee Shta^ es". 
(b) Purchase to be voluntary out of savings or 
by profit-sharing allocation. 
(c) The number of shares held by any one 
employee to be restricted. 
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(d) Voting-rights to be same as for ordinary 
shares purchased in the open market. 
(e) The shares to be relinquished on 
termination of service, 
(f) The shares to be then sold only to another 
anployee or to the share Trustees or to 
be transferred by the secretary of the 
company. 
(g) The sale to be at price not exceeding the 
par value of the shares, which should 
invariably be given a guaranteed minimum 
value. 
(h) Some means should also be; devised in order 
to give priority to employee shares, ^oold 
a winding up becomes necessary. 
It has been found by Professor Charles Gide, 
that by far the most successful in practice has been 
the profit-sharing type in conjunction vith the 
automatic accumulation of part or whole of the profits 
7 
so shared into the capital of the corapariy. 
If, however, an employee wishes to buy addi-
tional shares out of his v/ages as well, every 
facility should be rendered for him to do so. There 
are cases where shares are issued to employees in 
7, Professor Charles Gide. Booklet entitled 
"Workmen's Share-holding". (L* Actionnairiat Ourrier, 
Paris 1910). 
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instalments. Such a system is in vogue in the 
United States of America, Share-holding ihould 
be regarded as the conerstone of copartnership, 
LABOUR PARTICIPATION IM MAl4AGBJffiHT. 
Just as each of the three factors — capital 
labour and management —— is essential to proda ction, 
so also it is necessary to give the workers a share in 
each, if copartnership is to harmonise effectively the 
interest of all concerned in industry and to give all 
alike an identical interest in raising efficiency. 
Schemes do exist in which the workers have a share in 
only one or two out of the three, and these schemes are 
useful as milestones on the way to complete copartnership. 
But practical experience from an examination of schemes 
in operation in foreign countries shows that where 
a scheme rests on one or two legs only, it will be 
unsteady and that a full realisation of the objects 
of copartnership cannot be achieved by anything less 
than a complete scheme. 
Copartnership with employees implies that they 
have some share in the management of l^ e business. This 
may range from consultation in work eoimcils and 
partnership committee, to attending and voting at 
8. "Profit-sharing and Stock Ownership" by Bryce 
H. Stewart and Walter J. Cooper, op.cit. 
general meetings of the company and electinr employ ee 
representatives to the Board of Directors, though 
this last method Is exceptional. Many companies 
supply information regularly to their eraployees about 
the financial position of ihe compariy, its problems, 
policies and prospects. Addresses on these matters 
are periodically given by the Manafing Directors, 
and summaries published in the Works Magazines. 
Representatives of the employees take part in many 
firms In the management of Welfare Schemes and 
social activities. In these various ways, the 
status of the employees is raised and I^ Teir 
understanding, interest and influence in the business 
in which they work are increased. 
Some schemes exclude holilers of employee sliares 
from any direct part in the management of the company, 
provision bein;^  made that they have no voting rights 
or rights to attenr^  raelitings of the company. In 
some companies, even where as a result of the operation 
of profit-sharing and employee share ownership over 
many years, the employees are not given such rights. 
An example of this type is to be found in Messrs 
J.T. and J. Taylor Ltd. Though the ijorkers own more 
than half the capital of the company and draw in their 
dual capacity as share-holders and profit sharers. 
i of the profits of the undertaking, they have no 
votinjg rights. The company only undertakes to make 
a full statement to them yearly. * Possessions of 
shares without a voice in control is of little 
value in raising the status of the employees. 
Especially in a society where control is based on 
ownership, such a thing seems paradoxical. In 
priiiciple, it is desirable that the employees should 
be able to acquire the right to vote. In ether 
schemes, employees who own shares have the same 
rights as other share-holders to attend and vote 
at general meetings. In this respect, the plan of 
the Bryant and iiay Ltd., where when employees have 
acquired fifty employee partnership shares, they 
secure the right to attend tre annual general meeting, 
has much to comiiend it, because it ensures that 
those with longer service and greater interest in 
10 
the firm acquire greater responsibility. 
A few schemes gp further, and provide that 
employee share-holders shall be represented on the 
Board of Directors, though usually their representa-
tives are in a minority and therefore control over 
9, Bowie. "Sharing Profits with Employees" p. 115. 
London, Sir Isac Pitman & Sons, Ltd., 1922, 
10. Vide AppeBdix p iv. 
policy does not get into the hands of the employees. 
Before nationalisation of the gas industry in 
Britain, many gas companies had profit-sharing and 
copartnership schemes which provided that employee 
share-holders would elect three representatives on 
the Board of Directors, but that there w>uld be 
at least five other Directors, thus leaving in a 
minority the Directors representing the employee 
11 
share-holders. Only those employees who have 
considerable service with the company, for example 
ten or twelve years, can be nominated for 
Election as Directors. 
ADMIHISTRATIQH OF C0?ARTI^ER3HIP. 
Various methods are adopted for the administration 
of profit-sharing anr* copartnership. Somc5 are 
controlled by the Directors of the company, and 
other by a Joint Coramittee half of whom are 
nominated by the Directors and the other half 
elected by the employees from among them. Candidates 
for election must usually have had not less than 
a specified period of service with the company, often 
five years and in copartnership schemes must hold 
at least 25 shares. In some companies the number of 
shares he holds, for exapple, one vote for every 
11. Henry Richardson "An Introduction to the Study 
of Industrial Relations" p. 113. London, George 
Allen & Dnwin Ltd., 1954. 
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25 shares from 100 to 300 and one more for every 
50 after 300. Some Joint Committees merely 
decide what aB»unt of the available funds shall 
be distributed and how much shall be carried 
forward for equalising dividends over severed years. 
Often, provision is made tliat a ccanpany can 
terminate its profit-sharing or copartnershing at 
any time. 
THE VALin:: OF COPARTKFRSHIP. 
Experience with the working of the copartnership 
plans has shown that the greatest advantage that is 
derived from them is the possession of a happy shop. 
It is already seen that cash-bonus sharing has 
nothing to comraend except a transient feeling of 
satisfaction on the part of the employees. A 
significant example of the failure of the cash 
bonus profit-sharing scheme is to be found in the 
Proctor and Gamble Soap l^mifacturers of the United 
States of America. This firm started cash profit-
sharing on the firm belief that such sharing would 
itself give rise to a sense of common interest 
which would eventually leac* to a harmonious and 
contented service on the part of labour. But so 
radely shocking were the results of the experiment. 
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that the sponsor had to give it up in preference to 
a system under which the employees had to qualify 
as participants by acquiring shares in the company 
vrhich required them to iAvest some portion of 
their own savings. This scheme has been in operation 
1? 
since 1903 and has proved a success, " Another 
example has been the King County Press Ltd., at 
Waikato, which has successfully operated a copart-
nership scheme, for a fairly long period. By this 
scheme, labour shares to the total number of ?;0,000 
were issued by the firm to its employees in proportion 
to their wages with additions for length of service 
and efficiency as the Directors decided, but the 
total number issued was limited in view of the voting 
rights carried hy them to 2/5th of the number of 
ordinary shares. Profits are allocated first to a 7^ 
c^ jRilative devideaS on the ordinary shares and then 
to a non-cumulative payment on each labour share 
equal to 7^ on an ordinary share. The balance after 
making provision for reserves, is divided equally 
between capital and labour until 9% has been paid An 
ordinary shares. The holders of labour shares are 
entitled to attend and vote at all general meetings 
of the company and to enjoy all the privileges of 
IS, Bowie •'Sharing Profits with ^ployees" op,cit. 
p. 110 
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the ordinary share-holders. The scheme was started 
in 1927 and the dividend paid on labour share has 
Varied between 5 & if* During the great depression 
of 19S9-1932, no payment was made. Commenting on 
this, Mr, A.E.C, Hare, an authority on the Industrial 
Relations in New Zeland remarked "There seems little 
doubt that the profit-sharing side of the scheme has 
not proTed the success which the workers hoped and 
has given rise to some disappointment, the amount 
received annually in dividend only amounting usually 
to between two and three weeks* wages. The system 
of labour Directors, however, and the consultative 
voice in the aariagement of the business which they 
13 
secure have undoubtedly been a success", 
A good deal of light has been thrown on the 
utility to a firm of profit-sharing and copartnership 
by some researches undertaken by the United States 
Senate Committee on Finance in 1937. The results of 
the research are based on the questionnaires sent to 
several hundred companies and would appear to be the 
first attempt that has been made to evaluate quantita-
tively the value of profit-sharing and copartnership 
13. A.E.C. Hare. "Report on Industrial Relations in Kew 
Zeland, Victoria University College, 1946" Quoted 
in the U.P. Labour Enquiry Comnittee Report, pp. 228-239, 
op. cit. 
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schemes in promdtlng loyalty. These results have 
been worked up Into charts by the Investigators 
concerned. 
The important conclusion drawn was that 
those firms which practised the more advanced type 
of profit-sharing and copartnership are proved to 
be less affected by labour troubles than others. 
It may be objected that the firms which carry on 
advanced profit-sharing and copartnership are just 
the firms which would have enligbtened labour 
policy so that their greater freedom from labour 
troubles may be due to their attitude anc not to 
their copartnership plans. Apart from this 
objection, the figures are conclusiv^ e and tlieir 
statistical soundness is unquestioned. 
One of the clear tests of loyalty is the 
absence or otherwise of strikes. The results of 
the questionnaires on this subject to 73S companies 
are tabulated in the following figure. By way of 
explanation, it should be pointed out mce more 
that the United States Senate Comsalttee accepted 
a far wider definition of profit-sharing than was 
accepted in Great Britain. Therefore, the figure 
includes many schemes which do not belong to the 
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conventional type. It will be seen that S3.4 
per cent of the firms with no profit-sharing 
copartnership plans reported strikes whereas only 
9,9 per cent of the firms with profit-sharing 
or copartnership schemes in which all employees 
could participate reported strikes. A most 
interesting result of these figures is that from 
the loyalty point of view, the introduction of 
plans in wtiich labour does not share (that is 
bonus and inducements to Executives and Keymen) is 
almost worse than useless. This type of 
schemes results in higher incidence of strikes 
than no schemes at all. 
From tile incentive point of view, t' ere is 
no reason to doubt the general observation that the 
grant of a bonus to an executive has a 
greater incentive effect than a bonus granted to an 
employee. But where the incentive bonus is 
granted to Executive only, its salutary effect 
is offset by worsening labour management relations. 
This is particularly the c ase where there is one 
plan for labour and another for executives — an 
arrangement which no doubt draws the workers' 
attention to dl sparities betvreen his share of profits 
and that of the Executives. A fact which is brought out 
by the charts is that two groups of corapanies with 
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spdeiaX schemes for Executives had a lower incidence of major 
strikes, about 10 as a£ainst 18«7 p,c» in firms witfe no 
schemes of any aort» It is only in the matter of minor labour 
troubles that they have a worse record than tlie ccmpanies 
without any plans. 
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In view of the f .ct that the above figure 
includes tm.ny plans vhicli do not conform to 
the traditional pattern figure II is of 
interest as a cheek. The column Showing 
"Partnership plans" may be taken to include 
schemes which would satisfy the main 
tenets of profit-sharing and copartnership 
since they include those plans such as 
profit-percentage, stock ownership and 
wage-dividend wherein the employee has a 
definite interest in the fluctuations 
of the profit. The "non-partnership 
plans" include pension schemes and bonus 
granted at the discretion of the 
Bianagement, without being automatically 
linked to profits. It will be seen 
that figure II confirms the 
value of true profit-sharing ana 
copartnership in decreasing strikes 
and labour turn-over. It is 
also reported as conducive to 
increased efficiency and loyalty. 
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Finally, figure III analyses the 
return of 2S4 ccaapanies with plans in 
which all employees participate, and again 
bring out the favourable result achieved 
by true profit-sharing and copartnership schemes. 
The bonus plans in column "B" refers to a 
bonus granted more or less arbitrarily at 
the discretion of the management. The 
"profit-percentage" and "wage-dividend plans" 
either distribute a fixed percentage of 
profits irrespective of whether a dividend is 
declared, or distribute a dividend on wages in 
proportion to any dividend on stock. It will 
be seen that this latter group, which is 
the true copartnership group, makes the 
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The comparatively poor record of pension schemes 
is Interesting. It is found that a pension scheme is 
too remote to be an effective output incentive and these 
figures suggest tlrat it is not outrtanding in 
securing employee good-will. let on its merits, no 
one could deny that a pension scheme is one of the most 
beneficial long-term means of raising the status of 
the employee. The fact that results which indicates 
that there is a large element of philanthropy and less 
of business value in running a pension scheme is probably 
a reflection on the diort-term outlook taken by labour. 
An examination of 87 true profit-sharing plans shows 
that those which saved the bonus for the worker had 
a better loyalty record than those which distributed 
the bonus in cash. The tendency of the worker to 
take his bonus for g ranted, increases his standard 
accordingly, and then shows disappointment and 
resentment if the annual profits do not provide a 
bonus, is suggested in the Report as an explanation, 
i m ^ ' ^ 4TTTTUPE yo P0P4PPRSBTP SCp^§. 
The trade union movement has on the whole been 
hostile to profit-sharing and copartnership for the good 
reason that historically, the purposes for which it 
was often introduced militated against the prime 
objectives of the movement. It was used as a weapon 
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to fight the Inroads of trade unionism into the 
ranks of labour} but such of the schemes as were 
started towards this dubious end soon came to 
grief. But today, the old hostility has diminished 
into indifference as the movement has acquired 
greater confidence in the security of its objectives, 
and latterly, there have been signs of a positive 
willingness to acquiesce in or even to welcome 
schemes if the relations in the firm were such 
that from the trade union point of view, the 
scheme could do no harm. In many of the present 
schemes, there is embodied in the constitution of the 
scheme arrangements for safe-guarding the position of 
the unions in everything which legitimately concerns 
them. 
This change of attitude on the part of trade 
unions is attributed partly to the marked increase 
in the number of schemes introduced and maintained in the 
United Kingdom since the last war. * A recent 
survey conducted in the schemes now in operation in 
Great Britain serves to show that it is only where 
the employers and unions fail to work together amicably in 
other respects that there is any trouble over 
15 
copartnership. 
14, Manager, March 1956. p. 212, op. cit. 
15. Earnest Marples. '*R*ad to Prosperity." p. 130, 
op. cit. 
In a copartner*^Ip ln<?tjstry, th® tr»!e ymion 
has got a verjr constxnaetlv© role to play. Th© 
iaanag«B®nt. of bwalness in the BKWfern world is such 
a difficult urn complex a ffalr that It requires 
thorough atu^y ar**' training before It la taken up. 
The particlpatloi that is given to labour in aanagement 
W the copartnership acheae rendera it neceaaary that 
labour ahould give their aerloua attention an*' 
atudy to the problem of business aanageaent. Though 
they will not be asked to hoi*' key positions in the 
initial stages, they Buat aecure the necessary 
training to take up the oneroua duty whenever called 
upon to do so* Any atep to UBder-estiaate its vital 
iaportanee will be fraught with dangerous eonaequencea. 
Lenini during the early atages of the Huasian 
Hevolution thought that capitalism has so 
aiaplifled and routiniaed methoda of buaineas 
operation that aocialiaed industry could be opesated 
by ai^one "who can read and write. The ability to 
obaerve record and to make out reeeipta «-• thla 
with knowledge of the four rulea of arltbaetic ia 
1$ 
all that ia required". The Manager waa thought 
to be laerely an inatrument concerned with the 
aiphoning off the "aurplua-value" created by the 
workers* Therefore Factory Committeea took over 
Id. 3tate and Hevolution. Quoted in "Hoad to 
Prosperity", p. 41. 
Kid -
the functions of liie, ovners and managers of the 
enterprises in which tiiey were employed. But after 
soioe time, Lenin saw that this would not work, 
because the workers were not trained to deal with 
the problems of supply, mmufacture and distribution. 
A few years of operating without trained and 
authoritative business management resulted practically 
in the drying up of economic activity in all 
parts of the country. Therefore, the old Managers 
were called back to meet the deteriorating 
situation. As to "drying up" the following 
figures are very eloquent. 
g , 5 5 
f Year j Index of Production in J 
J S Soviet Russia. « 







Source: "Communism in Action" prepared by the 
Legislative Reference Service of the 
Library of Congress in 1946 (Quoted 
in Road to Prosperity). 
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this Is tfe© reason why trad© uSiions have 
started in x^eent tiaes to give their increased 
attention to the training of Ida our in the 
art of hosinsss raanagesient. A typical example 
is TugoslaYia* 
In co&elusioni it is to be observed that 
there ore at least a fev conditions vhleh aoy 
scheme of eopartnsrship «2St fulfil if it is 
to be peroanently sueeessfol and satisfactory to 
every one. 
(1) It oust be siaple 
(S) It oust place no financial risk, nor 
liability upon those who have not 
acquired the reserve of capital 
vhieh aloiae could enable thea to 
face such a liability* 
(3) It oast be unselfish* 
(4) It oust enable all to share in the 
prosperity of each* 
17* Vide page 172 of the Thesis. 
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CHAPTER VII 
PRCErr-SHABINOA: _ ; - i I - J 
PLANKED ECUKQMY OF lUDlA. 
Having thus seen the concept of copartnership in its 
various aspects, let us direct our attention as to how far 
it fits into the Socialist Society and Planned Economy 
of India. It is today generally accepted that without an 
increase in production, there can be no lasting economic 
progrtiss. i^ t.erefore, in sany countries of the world, in-
creased production has been the major target in recent years. 
During the war, it was a decisive factor. Even after the 
cessation of hoslitilites, it continues to play an injportant 
role in the develoy^ient of war-devastated countries and in 
their economic recovery. Increased production provides 
the key to the rapid industrialisation of the undeveloped and 
under-aeveloped countries of the world. Be£5ides these, 
political develo|5fiBents in recent years have fiven rise, in 
several countries, to aneconomic system of "armed peace" 
which of necessity be based not or-ly on the restrtetion of 
civilian consumption, but also on an appreciable increase 
in production. 
Apart fro£a the fact that it is an outstanding economic 
necessity, increased production is now recognised as a pri-
mary social one, if not by all workers at least by a graining 
number of their leaders. Strong support is now gaining for 
the view that improvement in social welfare is to be obtain-
ed not only by measures aimed at ensuring a more equitable 
distribution of the national income, but above all, by 
increasing production and efficiency . This is t rue of all 
countries irrespective of the type of economic and social 
systems in vogue. A significant example is to be found in 
the preamble to the time and motion study agreement concluded 
in 1943 between the Swedish National Employers* and 
Workers* Organisation *^ich runs as follows: 
"A continual develofmient of efficiency in industry and 
production is a general and essential condition for raisirg 
the standard of living of labour and the nation. Such ration-
alisation must be carried out continually in each enterprise 
in order to enable it to keep pace with technical develop-
ments. The common interest of the entire staff of every 
enterprise is to assist in making it truly competitive. 
Like all other members of the community, the employees will 
benefit by a rationalisation which leads to increased produc-
tion and thereby basically contributes to a general improve-
ment of the standard of living. 
But it is also increasingly appreciated today that 
production can be stepped up only with the help of all 
participants, especially the wage earners who constitute 
1. "Cooperation in Industry" p.10 I.L.O. publication. 
the vast majority. For an undertaking to be able to prodice 
more goods, it is necessary in the first place that all its 
members should be convinced of the need to do so; they must 
then be asked to consider themselves how the undertaking can 
be made to produce more. The workers need to be assured 
that they will get substantial benefits from the increased 
production and to be given the opportunity of putting forward 
their own view as to the methods of securing the increase. 
India has already launched her Second Five Tear Plan. 
One of the major objectives of the plan as laid down by the 
Planning Commission is to bring about a sizeable increase in 
the national income by stepping up production both in the 
industrial and agricultural sectors. Since the plan has a 
pronounced bias towards industrialisation the role of labour 
becomes very important. If there is cooperation from all 
sections of labour and if there is sufficient mass enthusiasm 
initiative and discipline, the success of the plan is assured. 
But if the workers in the country hesitate to contribute their 
due share, planning will be a failure. 
In countries where labour is not highly organised the 
industrialists often seem to forget that vjorkers have an 
effective role to play both in the matter of enhanced produc-
tion and equitable distribution; it is also forgotten that 
workers are an integral part of the industry with integral 
responsibilities. They are even now considered as mere wage-
earners and the employers have still the rijsht to "hire uaH 
fire" whenever they like. If the national plan for developing 
industries is to be a success, workers vrho are employed in 
the industrial sector must be given such conditions as will 
place thesi in a position to devote to their work all the 
intelligence, enthusiasm, physical energy and skill which they 
possess, so that their vjork will be efficient and the output 
both in quantity and quality will be the highest. Under the 
present industrial system in InrUa, only those who invest 
capital in the industry control it fully. So long as the 
employer acts in isolation and prefers to impose technical 
progress, he will not inspire in the ^ f^orkers the confidence 
required for fruitful cooperation with bis efiorts, however 
Justified they may be. The great fear that lulsks the minds 
of the workers is that to the extent they iraprove their effi-
ciency and their production, they stand the risk of unemploy-
ment and of Wares going down. To free them fro;'i this risk 
an<' to eliminate their fear, it will not be enough to provide 
Social Insurance and machlriery to fix thdr wages j without 
changing the system as regards the conditions un'-'er which 
the labourers wci-k. 
It is an oft-quoted dictum in political science that 
good governraent is no substitute for self-government. Although 
politically S:.:-aking the workers under a democratic system 
have the satas rights as all other citizensj in t>'e industries 
in which they are working, they feel often enough that they 
are mere cogs in the proletarian wheel anc I., a. t everything 
is imposed, from above, because in general they are not given 
any hand in the taking of the decisions which nevertheless 
vitally affect them. Therefore, in the industrial system 
in addition to imparting good conditions of work, they 
will also require the higher satisfaction that by doing their 
work efficiently, they are rendering service to the community 
as free and independent men. In order to give the satisfac-
tion of a higher motive, the workers will require to be given 
a hand in the conduct of the industrial system. 
Therefore, unless there is a thorough re-orientation 
in the attitude of the employers, in the matter of labour 
cooperation in the conduct of the industrial system, planning 
is not likely to succeed. Cooperation in industry, in 
common with other concepts, must change with the change in 
the pattern of the society. Upto this time, we have been 
working in India under a capitalist system. But now we 
have changed the whole structure, which should lead us to 
the establishment of a welfare state, or a cooperative 
commonwealth slowly evolving into a socialist state. 
The second Five lear Plan considers the attainment of 
a welfare state not merely as a long-term objective, but as 
a goal that has to be reached as early as possible. It 
is this fact that explains the growing volume of emphasis 
upon various types of redistributional measures both in 
regard to income and ownership of wealth. The hi^er extent 
of expenditure upon social services as well as upon transport 
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and communication can also be partly explained on the basis of 
the above. It appears that the general approach of the Second 
plan is that it is possible to obtain a high rate of capital 
formation, simulatenously with a high rate of approximation 
to the welfare state. If we have to achieve these objectives, 
there must be full cooperation between labour and management. 
Private enterprises should slowly lessen the idea of profit-
seeking and more and more become the guardians and custodians 
of the nation's production. 
A socialist society places grave responsibility on the 
creative forces of the state. In the industrial sector, 
the burden must largely rest on the workers and technicians. 
In the capitalist industries, the workers have to bargain 
from time to time with their employers for better conditions 
of services and wages. ^ t in a socialist system, if the 
patriotic urge does not adequately replace the profit-motive 
on the part of the employers, it will be for the v.orkers to give 
a lead in the matter of production. 
To cite an example, in Soviet Russia, the responsibi-
lity of the workers is of a very severe nature and a 
particular section of the workers known as "STAKNOVITE" goads 
the Directors of the Board of Management on to an ever-
increasing tempo of production and thus the Directors are 
always afraid of this section and would utilise their 
individual initiative, and enterprise in securing production. 
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as otherwise, they may be liable to punishment.^ The very 
basis of Socialist State necessitates the maxiraiaation 
of production, by every possible means, and there can be 
no limit to the workers* contribution so long as that 
contribution is made possible without undue interference 
v/ith their health and dignity and consistent with adequate 
wages and just conditions of service. 
In the United Kingdom, workers and mar^ gements believe 
in Joint Standing machinery at all level for arriving at 
voluntary agreements in the matter of the settlement of 
trade disputes, and on the question of production by joint 
consultation from time to time, the object being to give 
employees wider interest in and greater responsibility for 
the conditions in which their work is carried out. A number 
of industries managed by private industrialists have special 
schemes such as profit-sharing and association with the 
management through coparthership for the efficient running 
of the unit. In some industries, the representatives of 
employees are having a voice in the control of the industrial 
system. 
In the Scandinavian countries, workers-managements 
relations are advisory in character; but they have estab-
lished the right to be consulted on many vital subjects 
relating to the running of the indus-try. Thus, for example^ 
2. V.V. Giri. "Industrial Relations" p.23 N.M. Tripathi Ltd. 
Bombay 2 (1955) 
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in Sweden) the production committees are authorised to examine 
the Balance Sheet, Profit and Loss Account, Directors and 
Auditors Eeport and have thier say in all these matters. 
In Germany, in the year 1951» laws were passed 
especially in the Iron and Steel and the Coal Industries fcr 
the participation of Workers* representatives on an equal 
footing in the management, or "co-deteiroination" as it is 
called is being recognised and representative of labour have 
a place in the Beard of iJirectors.^ 
In lugoslavia, under Marshall ^ito, according to the 
law established, factories, mines, communications, transport 
etc., are managed by workers* Collectives through workers 
councils and Management Boards. These Boards run the business 
and are responsible to the workers councils and the competent 
state organ. inuring the tenure of the Management Board which 
is for a year's duration, members remain in their regular 
jobs in the factories and receive no extra pay for thevrork done. 
The system of management by workers is still in the process 
of development. The Yugoslavian Trade Unions, on their part 
have been engaging themselves in training the workers in the 
art of business management **iich is very essential for the 
success of the system. The new changes have produced bene-
ficient results such as appreciable reduction in the working 
3. Ibia. p.25. 
4» Indian Labour Gazette, July 1956.p.3. 
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population in individual undertakings coupled with an increase 
in the overall production, saving in raw materials, fuels 
etc. 5 
Thus the system of association of workers with 
management and control through copartnership schemes and 
otherwise is gaining influence over the management in many 
countries with Planned Economy, But in India, the idea 
of workers* participation in management control was not 
appreciated both by labour and management alike. The latter 
thinks that it is too strong and independent to allow any 
labour infiltration into their ranks and similarly organised 
labour on their part feel that they too are strong enough 
and do not like any position leading to a compromise. They 
are still working at cross purposes and at best, there is 
only "cease-fire" friendship, between them, ^ince independence, 
both legislation and public opinion have sought to better 
the workers* lot and have succeeded to some extent in doing 
so. But these have not appreciably affected the outlook of 
the employer. He has no doubt yielded to the new measure; 
but there has been, by and large, not very much of a change of 
heart. % t of late, employers have begun to recognise the 
need of associating labour with management. It is the 
duty of employers as the guardians of the natiojte prociictive 
resources to set a new ideal fcr the future of the country. 
5. The Eastern Economist. June 20, 1956*^*1006* 
6. Refer Preamble to the Supplemental Agreement dated 
4.3,1956 between TISCO and the "Tata Workers* Union" 
(Contd*. on next page) 
The time is ripe for a bold experiment in the matter 
of conceding to labour an increasing share and voice in the 
conduct of the industry, The expenditure Ss 71OO crores 
during the period of the Second Five Tear Plan of which 
a siaeable portion is earmarked fear the industrialisation 
of the country requires much organisation and cooperation 
between the two indispensable partners of the Industrial 
system namely employers and workers. It is to be remembered 
that the workers are the integral partners in the industrial 
undertaking and v/ithout their good v?ork, diacipline and 
integrity, the industry will not be able to produce effective 
resuits. However efficient the machine touch in an industry 
may be, if the human element refuses to cooperate, the 
industry will fail to prosper under the present world condi-
tions. Therefore it is necessary that labour shcu.^ d be 
given a new status in the industry through copartnership 
shemes. '^he mere financial incentive produced by giving 
to the workers a share of the profits in the shape of annual 
(continued from the last page) 
which states that*the company appreciates the view that 
an increasing measure of association of Works Employees 
with frianagement in the working of the industry is desirable 
and would help 
(a) In promoting increased productivity for the benefit 
of the enterprise, the employees and the country. 
(b) in giving employees a better understanding of their 
role andimportance in the working of the industry 
and in the process of production,and 
(c) in satisfying the urge for self-expression. 
Also vide the Preamble of the Agreement signed by the 
workers and management of Belur Aluminium Works and those of 
Alwayt Aluminium Works. 
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bonus, as is being practised in the various industries in 
the country is not enough, thou h it is something: towards 
the right direction. This something \ ill be all the greater 
if profit-sharing is combined with a share in the owaership 
and management of the business. Especially in a property-
based democracy like ours, participation in control and 
management without ownership is a paradox. '•^ 'hercfore, in 
all industries where employers realise their full responsi-
bility cind workers have responsible organisations which would 
speak in a reasonable way, workers and employers should sit 
together and evolve participation on the priitciple of 
cop .rt.'.ership. Such a step should merit serious consider-
ation and is worthy of being given an honest trial in a 
country like India which is trying to strike a middle road 
between western capitalism and eastern socialism. Profit-
sharing with distribution of stock to the v;orkers -will pave 
the way tow^ ards the realisation of industrial democracy and 
the building up of a pattern of socialism that may be in 
greater consonance with Indian Social Traditions based on 
harmonious personal relationship between labour and manage-
ment. 
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following stateiaent bears ample tes t imon/ to the pitJgrc-
sslve d e t e r i o r a t i o n of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i ons since 1953« 
Apart fror;! t h i s , s i g n s are not vnntini^ to show t h a t 
I n d u s t r i a l relict ions raay de t e r i o r a t e l\irtlier, tlm ratdn 
Itmici. t ion being tha deinund ror increased yagSs. •". con-
tBT&ncn of t rade tUiions tn BOiabay deaunded a substiinti-il 
3 
inercjciSto in t h e i r vagos as oarX/ .MS October 1956. 
ii s i a l l a r d©J:iaid ^as riade by tha I,'T,?.U,s:, in '"o^eraber 
1950, .»uGh deac'Ki Tor yii;^v6r wages has i?w-,riably been found 
to oti the precursor of 'i^ 'ors^Dnlng l^^bour rclcj-tions. TT-iiE was 
Jus t i f i ed by the s t r i ke - th re i i t s froi2 var ious quar ters whicli 
resiiltci^i in the appointment oT the present ?ay Cooiraission by 
the •'•nlon Govemnisiit. ;.'Uc^ a s ta te of aff-^irs i s very lauch 
d i squ i e t i ng , and with the iiecond Vi^a "ZeriT Plan with i t s 
i n d u s t r i a l b i a s , i t i s ;.la2?mi?^3, The success of tho plan, 
and thu capab i l i t y of the Gentfal and .itate Govemr.'^j-ats i^nd 
the ^.srivatG sector to step up ant-put und to uet up r.cv/ 
indust r icd un i t s ^ i l i , to a l:.rgc cjctent, depend upon tho 
jaiiiot«nance of i n d u s t r i a l pe^ iCG i:\ the conntiy* 
Indian Express, "'ow .s^olhi, di-tcd 27th 
October, l<»5e. 
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IT! I^DIA SINGE X953. 
Year 





j'»"o* of sian-da/s 
lost* 
1953 772 466,607 3,382,608 
1954 840 477,138 5,372,630 
1955 1,166 527,767 5,697,848 
1956 1 | 6 U 970,450 6 ,709,962 
I n d u s t r i a l p r o f i t , i t h&s been s tead i ly 
r i s i n g a f t e r the post*Korean recession in 1952. ihxring 
the year 1954, the economy made a d i s t i n c t recovery 
and t h i s was re f lec ted i n a s iseable r i s e in 
p r o f i t s as seen in th© following table 
shoving tho i r d e s numlxsrs of i n d u s t r i a l p r o f i t s since 
iiourc©: Annual ''Uabor of Capi ta l , 'JenerabzT 1956. p , 39i 
1940. This is further reinforced by the 
analysis, conducted by the Reserve Bank of India, of 
the finances of 750 Companies for the six years 1950-56 
4 
with special reference to the first plan period 1951-55. 
The study covered public limited companies registered in 
Indiaf with a paid up capital of not less than Rs 5 lacs 
each> but excluded banking, insurance investment companies 
and also government companies. The total paid up 
Capital cf companies included in the study constituted 
2/3 of the total paid up coital of public limited 
companies in the Sectors covered. 
The afialysis showed that the companies, as a 
whole, recorded a continuous growth from 1953 onwards. 
Most of the principal industries recorded rise in 
1955 in the rate of dividend, the companies as a 
whole making the highest distribution of i\s 32 crores in 
1955 compared to iis 29 crores in the previous year. Sales, 
f 
the main income, rose during the year by 113 crores to 
tis 1,114 crores as also the total gross capital formation 
by lis 35 crores to iis 136 crores in 1955 against a total outlay 
of iis 443 crores for the five years. 
4. Summary of the Reserve Bank of India Report 
published in the Indian Express, Delhi 
dated October 8, (1957). 
- 130 » 
Profits before tax during the period rose by 
51,6 p.c. from Rs 64 crores in 1950 to Rs 97 crores 
in 1955, and profits (after tax ) were higher by 
53.8 p.c. rising from Rs 39 crores to Rs 60 crores 
during the six year period. Dividends during the 
period went up by 33.3 p.c. from Rs 24 crores in 
1950 to Rs Z2 crores in 1955, vhile profits retained 
in companies rose sharply by 80 p.c. from 
Ps 15 crores tolls ^ 7 crores during the period. 
With regard to profits and dividends of these* 
companies, the study revealed that v>rof it s in 1955 
v^re higher than any other year o: the First Plan 
p;riod including the Korean boom year of 1951. Profits 
before tax which had fallen sharply from fe 85 crores 
in 1 *51 to % 56 crores in 1952 rose continuously to 
!fe 97 crores in 1955, reflecting mainly the general 
growth of economic activity. 
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IKDEX NUMBERS OF INDUSTRIAL PROFITS. 
BASE : 1939 - 100 
Iron All 
tear. Jute. Cotton. & Tea. Sugar. Paper. Coal. Cement. Indus-
Steel, tries. 
1940 359.1 U2*5 103.6 99.1 100,3 236.3 100.8 102.d 13S 
1943 376.3 640.0 111.8 142.3 157.^ 352.8 95.6 147.9 245 
1946 415.4 408.9 101.3 19s.8 122.4 266.4 19S.5 194.1 229.2 
1949 d9.3 292.0 116.0 138.4 216.4 316.7 287.2 295.0 181.5 
1950 456.9 356.6 134.2 271.2 262.4 479.0 209.2 333.4 246.6 
1951 679.1 551.1 157.7 103.9 420.8 604.1 178.4 419.7 310.5 
1952 183.4 262.8 162.6 BB,$ 409.1 566.8 220,4 293.4 190.6 
1953 326.2 379.4 179.4 391.4 419.8 512.7 145.5 279.0 261.2 
1954356.4 3^7.2 222.9 712.3 334.9 666.1 153.0 341.4 314.2 
Besides these, the statement which is given below 
shovs that industrial profits continued to maintain its 
steady growth during 1956 also. The statement though 
meagre, indicates the increasing amount of profits earned 
by certain companies between the years 1953 and 1956. 
Source: Ministry of Finance. Quoted in the Eastern 
Economist, Annual Ntiaber, 1956. 
PIGLAUED PIIQFIT^ OF CEHTAXM IKDUSTRISS. 
{In lakhs of Hupees) 
^ J. 
i 
Hauie of the Goapany. i 
i-
Set profits for the year ended 
31st March. 
1953 t 1954 ! 1955 I 1956 
1. lauian o tarcard feagon Co, 
Lta. Calcut ta , 15.99 
2 . Great i;ast9rn d i p p i n g 
Co. Ltd. Bombay. 6.71 
3 . HetaX Box Company of 
India Ltd. Calcut ta . 17.92 
4 . ^ e Bombay >>uburban 
E lec t r i c Co. Ltd. 6.15 
5. ilysore Paper i i i i l s Ltd. 5.^5 
16.9 23.76 28.37 
^.34 10.38 24.95 
16.65 22.66 31.82 
10.55 13.39 19.22 
2.42 3.74 5.12 
As to the .uestion of a rise in price, it Vis to be 
viewed froai the background of the deficit-financing envi-
saged in the Second Five lear Pl-;n. The plan provides 
for a deficit-financing of the order of M 1,20C Croree over 
a period of five years, or an average annual ex.endlture of 
«3 240 crores. %is mear.s that according to the plan, the 
Source: Qospiled fro@ the Commerce dated 13th Oct. 10th 
Nov. 7th July, 21st July and 15th Sept. of 1956. 
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government would spend an annual average of Rs 240 crores 
over and above all the taxes, loans and other resources, 
it could raise from the market. This has brought forth 
different estimates from different exports as to the extent 
of the possible rise in price during the plan-period. 
Coming to an assessment of the likely reactions of 
the proposed deficit-financing, the Planning Comniisrion 
obeerves that ivs 200 crores can be set off by drawing ciovm 
of sterling balances by an equal amount. The remairang 
deficit of lis 1000 crores representing the net addition to 
total currency is expected to result in a secondary expansion 
of credit by banks. It is assumed that if the ratio between 
currency in circulation and deposit money remains unaltered, 
money supply would show something like a 66 p.c. increase 
over the plan period, and national inconie, during this period 
by 25 p.c. Hence the Planning Coioiaission is of the opinion 
that the resulting increase in price level of about 40 p.c. 
5 
is not beyond the safety limit. 
Professor Das Gupta calculates that the existing 
money supply at the beginning of the Second Five Year 
Plan is of the order of Es 1,300 crores, and if the plan 
is implemented there will be an addition of Bs 1,2.00 croros. 
5- Second Five Tear Plan (Original) p. ^5. 
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Deducting from it Hs 200 crores being roughly the aaiount 
which can be matched against the release of sterling 
balances, the net increase in note circulation is expected 
to be to the tune of us 1,000 crores which is about 77 p.c 
of the existing voluiae of money. Against this, the plan 
envisages an increase of aggregate output by about 25 p.c. 
of which the share of consumers goods v/ill be about 20 p.c. 
If allov-'ance is made for some transfer from the non-mcnetiiry 
sector to the monetairy sector, then the consumers goods in 
the exchange economy will come tc about 25 p.c. TV'erefore, 
Dr. Das Gupta concludes on lines identical with those of the 
Planning Commission that if the income velocity of circulation 
of money remains more or less the san^ e, during the plan 
period and further, and that the volumes of credit will 
move pari-pasu with currency, there v/iJl be a price rise of 
about 40 p.c. 
But much more pessimistic and alarrcin- is the 
estimates of Professor B.H. Shenoy. He assumes that the 
total money supply at August 1955-, to be a round figure 
of lis 2000 crores at the inception of the Second Plan. 
To finance a 20 p.c. increase in output at stable prices, 
money supply should rise to Hs 2400 crores by I96O-I96I, 
the closing year of the plan. To this may be added 
6. Dr. Das Gupta "The Economic Weekly" Annual Nuraber 1956 
pp. 125-128. 
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Hs 100 crores, being the amount the public is likely to hold 
Biore in cash as income expanded. The fiscal operations 
of the state being through the Central Bank, the amount of 
the Central Bank money with the public would rise by the 
amount of the deficit financing. Part of it would pass into 
circulation ss currency notes, A part vwuld get into the 
comniercial banks ^nd increase their reserves and enable 
them to expand their credit-loans, advances, over-drafts, 
and discounts. Total money supply therefore, vould rise 
by more than the aiiount of the deficit financing. Tlie ratio 
of currency notes to the total money in circulation ia India 
is such that on an average, every Hs 100 crores of deficit-
financing would add HS 70 crores to the currency notes v'ith 
the public, and the rest of -is 30 crores would c,o to 
augment the reserve of the commercial banks. Co mercial 
banks deposits being five to six times their reserv-s, 
they would build, on the additions to their reserves, 
deposits of Is 15O-ISO crores. i'or every .is 100 crores of 
deficit-financing, total money supply vould thus rise by 
.is 220-250 crores.. 
For an expansion of money supply of .is 500 crores, 
the permissible magnitude of deficit-financing would 
be Hs 295-31S crores or an annual average of ^ 59-64 
crores. In this coKiOutation, it is assumed that 
us 125 crores of this sum would represent deficit-financing 
to acquire the currency reserves for the public sector and 
would therefore involve no addition to the money in circu-
lation. The transaction in effect would amount to no 
more than book-keeping entries aa between the Ministry of 
Finance axid iieserve Bank of India. The rest o£ the 
deficit-financing ( M 170-193 ) might add Hs 119-135 
crores to the cuuiency notes with the public and raise 
commercial bank reserves by ris 51-3$ crores. Coiamercial 
bank aeposits might then grow by Its 3^5-375 crores, 
i^s 290-306 crores of this representing secondary expansion 
of credit based on the addition to the commercial bank 
reserves and iis 75 crores representing the credit created 
in connection with the use, by the private sector, of the 
foreign exchange reserve of the Reserve Bank 
of India. Under such an arrangement, total money supply 
would rise by lis 5OO crores and prices vrould remain stable. 
i-ieficit financing by its 1,200 crores would expand 
money supply at the end of the plan to Hs 4267-46^^ crores, 
allowance being made for lis 125 crores for the purchase of 
the foreign exchange from the Heserve Ban.K for the use of 
the public sector. As money supply would be vastly larger 
than the permissible arriount of -is 2,500 crores this r^ ight 
raise prices by at 3.oast 7t to 95 p.c. in five years 
or 16 to 19 p.c. every year.*^  In actual fact, 
7. Prof. B.R. iihenoy "Dissenting Report" submitted to the 
Planning Conimission. 
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contends Professor >henoyj that prices rnlght rise faster. 
Fix^t a rise in prices would raise the isoney co is of the 
projects before they are completed and necessitate lariier 
deficit-financing, oecondiy, people v-oiild hold a ssaller 
percentage of their income in cash. In an effort to 
protect the v^ 3 ;Q of their savinj3a, they would try to invest 
as much of tholr savings as possible. This would tend to 
accelerate th<j velocity of circulation. 
The above discussion clearly indicates that all the 
experts including irieasbers of the Plannin-' Coimniaslon are 
unaniisous in their forecast of a rise in price, althouf^ h 
there are differences with regard to the extent of t'^ is 
probable rise. Leaving aside these theoretical cors ider-
ations based on the "crude but operatiorially useful Quantity 
Theory of Money" it is necessary to face facts and realities 
as they present theaaelves at present. 
The main emphasis of the plan is on long period 
industrial expansion, vshich will fructify or.ly rafter a 
number of years. This moans that while the :2oney supply In 
the hands of the people has increased, the corresporidin.: 
supply of Hoods Villi reach the people only after some tiae. 
In the meanwhile, a rise in price is sure to take p3ace. 
Hiis could have been obviated or kept under reasonable 
limit if the country i-iported food-grains, cloth nnd other 
- las r 
consumer goods from foreign countries in sufficient guan-
titiBs. But that is not to be because of the very delicate 
situation in the country's foreing exchange resources. 
As things stand, the imports of machinery , iron and 
steel and other essential broods for implementing the 
programoio of industrial exparsion has increased the country's 
balance of deficit from Zs 46 crores in 1954 to '-s 1^ 9 crores 
in the first eleven months of 1956. As a consequerce, the 
sterling balances have declined from its 742 crores in January 
1956 to 539 crores in November 1956. 'iTiis means thst import 
of consumer goods from foreign countries is out of uestion. 
The alternative lies in the stepping up of production of, 
consumer goods in the country itself. Even if t'-^is is 
achieved, a part of the increase v/ill have to be exported 
to match our steadily growing imports. All t'^ is points to 
the conclusion that a general rise in price level if; -oinr to 
persist during the plan period. This is further reinforced 
by the fact that a certain degree of risinr.; prices iv. inevi-
table in a developing and expanding econoroy. The growing 
pressure of demand on the economy has already led to a 
significant rise in prices. i'he sharp decline in prices 
in 1954-1955 ^as virtually reversed in 1955-1956 and on 
March 31, 1956, the general index of vrholesale price 
at 390.3 v.'as only <:t little below the level reached before 
the Korean war (397) or before the 1954-1955 decline in 
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p r i ces (404,4) , By ^loveraber 24, 1956, the index of 
wholesale p r i ces has advanced to 434,2. Although 
a g r i c u l t u r a l p r i ces have receded somewhat since then 
on a r r i v a l of the nev/ crop in the market, the decline 
has not heen sus ta l ied and has not basn of the normal 
seasonal orddr. Over 1956, as a whole, the general 
index of wholesale p r i ces increased by 13 p . c . froa 
373,4 to 421.9, On February 16, 1957, the index stood 
a t 424.4. 
To some ex ten t , the increase in whole-sale pr ices 
i s a t t r i b u t e d to ex terna l developments, l ike the Suez 
crisiSi , But there i s l i t t l e doubt tha t p r ices of goods 
produced and consumed domestically have also r i s en . This 
i s evident from the fact t ha t the a l l - I nd i a working-
c la s s consumer price index (1949-1950 i s equal to 100) 
which i s l i t t l e affected by the ex terna l factors has 
a lso increased from 100 i n March 1956 to 110 in ^lovember 
Q 
1956. These are enough to prove tha t the country i s 
Passing through a period of i n f l a t i o n , due to the 
developmental spending, and which i s l i l e l y to pe r s i s t 
throughout the period of the plan. 
8, Budget speech of the Finaiice . 'da is ter in Parliament 
"Times of India* dated 20th t%rch, 1957. 
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Thfts i t i s seen tha t a l l the condit ions conducive 
to the successful launching of p ro f i t - sha r ing and 
copartnership obtain in the economy at present . 
The psychological atmosphere also seems to be 
favourable. I t i s therefore eminently des i rable to 
introduce copartnership schemes in a l l those 
i n d u s t r i e s which are wel l -es tabl i shed and in which 
there are responsible t rade unions functioning. I f 
f a i t h fu l l y implemented, i t v;ill transform indus t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s and fos te r a sense of par tnership and 
spontaneous cooperation between the two in t eg ra l pa r t s 
of the i n d u s t r i a l system. Sudfc a step w i l l be 
cons is tent with our cherished concept of 
cooperative ComKionwealth which aims at the widest 
d i f fus ion of property ovmership and wi l l be 
conducive to the cap i t a l formation which i s a 
v i t a l necess i ty in the coutext of the present 
plan requirements. 
The government too has a constructive 
role to play in t h i s experiment, instead 
Ox remaining passive on doc t r ina i re grounds. 
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I t i s v e r / often expressed by spokessaen of 
goveraasnt ' s labour policy tha t there i s a 
d i s t i n c t i o n between labour wox^cing In the 
gov&Tnm&nt concerns and those employed in 
the pr iva te sector} in the sense t h a t 
the foraer are not Morkinz for any c a p i t a l i s t . 
I t i s fur ther argued thut t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n has 
c e r t a i n vi tc . ! impl ica t ions . I t i s t h i s a t t i t u d e 
thcit has been responsible for a dichotomy of 
approach and paction i n the f ie ld of gjvemtaent's 
liX'or.^T poIiQ/» f M s has i-l30 ^aade govemrsGnt'r: 
lu^xyar pol icy l e^ s of a natio. ial charac te r . -But 
rccGfitly, i t has bee;i antiouaced h;/ the Iifibaur 
Minister in the Par l iaaent t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n 
refer red t o above " h a s not ip t t h i s implicat ion tha t 
ttrssf who are working for the nomrmnity 
s^.yuld be duprivea of what i s due t a thess,^ 
I t I s equal ly tBiM to s&y tha t i t has QXBO not 
got t h i s lapllc?^.tioa tha t those who are working for the 
eoRJsunity sJiouid be discriminated against t h e i r counterparts 
in the pr iva te sec to r . I f we are to recorieilc public 
9# Time;^  of X?idia, August 84, 1?57« 
- 192 -
ownership on a j-;rand scale v-ith energy, ersthusiasm and 
with individual l i l e r t y , in a pufciic concern, sonio d i r ec t 
i n t e r c u t in the r e s u l t s and 3on:e special r •'preset.t;.:;,tior. of 
the workers wr.o are ac tua l ly in the f i e ld ere h i hly nece-
ssary , uince they aro Vforkit.r for the comciiinity, i t does 
not m«an tha t ihej iihould remain the v,np;e-servafitB of the 
coeuttuiiity for v^il tiiue to come. In the l a s t ana ly s i s , 
employees in the public sector should, by atid l a rge , 
be a t l e a s t on a par with t h e i r compeers in the j r i vu t c 
err^uoysient. Therefore, i f the -•.overnir.ent -^re prc-Dared 
to discard t h e i r doc t r ina i r e a i t i t u d * fcr the sake wl a 
Bore buffiane approach towerds labour in the public 
sec to r , there i s plenty of scope for s tar t ini^ coonrtner-
ship schemes in the govarrraent cos.cerr;s the number and 
oagnitude of which a re grovlnr with the implementation of 
thfc plan. In general , those business underta-d:; s of 
government which aim a t rr.aking a p r o f i t , and v/hich wi l l 
o rd ina r i l y be orgariised in th« fonn of corporations can 
be se iec tea fcr the above purpose. Tne example thui :iet 
i s sun ' to be emulated by the pr iva te lioctor. 
In those i r iduatr ies \*1iere there ia profit-charii .^, 
bi«t where i t may not be poasible to introduce copartner-
ship uchemes, i t i s advisable tha t workers arc asKea to 
save a par t of the bonus inn toad of the en t i r e arx>unt 
bein^ given in cauh, t o r a auccessful profi t-sharinp: 
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scheme does not stop with the mere cash distrilution. 
The universal observation has been that when given an 
extra cash, the worKer nearly alvays spends it, but 
rarely uses it to safeguard his future. To quote 
an example irora American experience in 1939, of 700 emp-
loyees of a large institution v/>:ich had distrltuted a cash 
bonus, itvas found that B'3 p.c. had saved nrthlvr. at 
10 
all, a:id only 3 p.c, had saved all of it. If this 
is the case of the v/orld's most Jiighly paid labour, it 
is better to imagine the attitude of Indian labour torards 
such payment than to describe. Therefore there is 
growing conviction that profit-sharing standing by itself 
does not accomplish the desired objectives and the employee. 
saviiig should be coupled with it. It is not vithcut some 
significance that even the oldest profit-sharin'.c plan 
adopted in the United States of America in I887, by the 
Proctor and Gamble ncv* has a condition of eligibility that 
employees should contribute for six years at a rate of 
5 p.c. of their earning subject to an annual maxirauia 
of 100 dollars. A study conducted in 194^ in the United 
States by the National Industrial Conference s''-'0';'ed that 
22 out of 100 deferred distribution pl.^ ns required 
employee savings.''* In the TI3C0, according to the 
10. Copartnership Today." p. 30. op. cit. 
11. National Industrial Conference Board."Prcf it-
sharing for workers" Nev/ York, 194B. 
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revised profit-sharing scheme of 1952, only 66 2/3 p.c, 
of the annual bonus is distributed in cash while the rest 
is being credited towards the accounts of labour. Therefore 
in the interest of the future of the v^orkers, it will be 
desirable to ask labour to save a portion of the bonus 
that is annually distributed to them, with the concerns 
in which they are v^ orking. This will not only act as a 
safeguard a rjiriat future coxstinf^ ency, but also serve as a 
curb on the present inflationary pressure vrhich persists 
in the economy. 12 i^ ^y^^ ^^^Q ^£ accelerated invest-
iuent and the pracarious nutur*? of the balance of payment 
position wage^earners cunsumption has to be -.ept at 
a li^ vel at which a suiTicieut amount of savings will come 
forth to make possible non-inflationary financing of 
invest.'nent necessary for the mainttinaice of steadily 
incrcasin,: production anci for keepini; home prices of ^ o^ods 
and commodities intern;rtionally com]>etitive. 
12. Vide. The Hindu "Survey of Indian Industries S-ction" 
Section II. December 1956. Article entitled 
"Functioning of Credit Coi trol" by S.T. Sadasivan, 
General i^ anager, United Commercial Bank. p.6^. 
"If the implementation of the plan results In a 
rise in note circulation unaccompanied by a -Large 
expansion of bank deposits, the remedy for the 
resulting inflation is vage restraint and the 
introduction of Compulsory saving'; schenrss to take 




A word more of copartnership, by way of conclusion. 
The question that Is very often asked is» In what way is 
copartnership superior to the present wage systemV The aiain 
advantage, it is said, is that it can bring about a much 
more rapid advancement to labour which the raising of 
wages can never give. It is argued that so long as land and 
capital are in the hands of a limited few, and labour merely 
rewarr'ed by wages, the betterment of the mater lad lot of 
labour cannot be anything but slow. A trade union by virtue 
of its capacity for higgling and haggling may secure for its 
members an increase in wages; but this increase does not mean 
that capital and land are given a smaller reward. A rise in 
wages Is ad<^ ed on to cost of production which very soon 
reflects in higher price for the articles prooiced. In that 
case, such a rise in wages is almost futile. But on the 
otl er hand, if th© workers are given an interest in the 
profits of the concerns in which they are working, it is 
possible to supplement their total earnings which do not in 
any way raise the cost of production. This implies that 
prices are also not raised. When that share of the profit 
is invested in the stock of the company, the workers not only 
receive tha capital, but an armual share of that part of the 
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aggregate produce which goes to remunerate capital. This 
again does not enter Into cost. On the contrary, the 
accumulated profits of the xvorkers constitute a solid contri-
bution towards the aggregate supply of the capital of the 
country. This may have the .ialutary ffect of pushing down 
the interest rate which may mtan a rise in wages. Finally 
the possession of that capital hy tae working clas;> the 
changes that will flow from it, the shareholcers rirhts and 
responsibilities, the more efficient work and the raore sympathe-
tic control - all these are expected to change the very 
atmosphere that now prevails in the factories. These are 
the nanifold reasons why it is said that copartnership 
may secure a much more rapid improvement in the economic lot 
of the worker than is possible under the wage system, pure and 
simple. If th^ ^ principle of copartnership is widely adopted 
in all the factories big and small, private anc' public, and in 
the vast number of smaller businesses, will it not, in conjunc-
tion with the other measures of reform, obliterate the fatal 
distinction that now exists betv.een the employer and the 
employee? Will it not convert the various factories and 
workshops which are now the hotbeds of conflict and 




UONisTITUTlONo uf 3UHE UOP.lKTNEti-SUHEMSJ. 
• y -T T*. 
The copartnership scheme ms introduced by 
Bryant ana May Ltd., in 1919, and has been in 
succedsi'ul operation siuce that ^ irne. 
The scheme is based upcu tl o 'Ti'-ciple th'^ t 
after capital and labour have received a good 
reward in the sh^pe of interest cr dividends 
and salaries or v.ages, respectively, and after 
due allowance has been niade for depreciation and 
reserves, the amount of profit which it is 
decided to aistribute should be divided between 
capital aiid labour as represented by the stock-
holders of the com) 5nv on the one h-md, :^ nd the 
limployees of the company on the other. 
Profit-sharing. 
AFTKH:-
1, Due allowance has been made for 
depreciation and Heserves, 
2, The Dividend on Preference Stock, 
3, And a Dividend of 10^ (free of 
income tax) on ordinary and partnership 
stock. 
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An amount not exceeding £ 120,000/- (free of 
income tax) is diviaed equally between the ordinary 
stock-holders in the shape ol extra dividends and 
the iJaiployees cxs a Bonus upon sclaries or wap-;es 
up to IZi^y. 
Pyticipation, 
No employee can participate until he or she 
has been exclusively in thy service .1 the company 
over s. period of three full business years nnd is 
still in the company* 3 employ on '^arch l^ lst of 
the year in respect of which f^ e profit-shnring 
fUnd is being calculated. 
Division of JBund. 
The division of fund among those qualified to 
participate is in pro,i.rtion to the omount of 
salary or v.ages actually received by them di^ ring 
the year in which the diatribn.tion is nnde. 
The attiount allocated to the salaries or wages 
of those employees \/ho have Veen employed for less 
than three full business years, cr whose work has 
been itregular or unsatisfactory is not paid to 
those employees but is transferred to a fund 
called the "Brymay B»nefit Fund", 
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The amount payable to the employees is paid to 
a Trust called the Brymay Partnership Trust Ltd. 
for "division among the employees in terms of the 
Trust Deed", 
Employees may use the amount of their profit 
bonus or any part of it for the purchase of Partnership 
Stock. A notice is issued by the Trustee to all 
employees participating advising them of the amount 
of bonus due to them and inviting them to state on 
a form provided whether they wish to receive such 
amount in cash or to subscribe for partnership stock 
to the full extent or for any less amount of Stock. 
The ir»artner3hip Stock, of which 200,000 shares of 
£ 1/- each were created at the inception of the scheme 
(increased to 250,000 in October 1935, and converted 
into stock of £ 1/- units in April 1942, and 
further increased to 300,000 in April 1951) carries 
no interest in the company's reserve funds. It is 
issued to the employees at par, and must be 
relinquished to the Trustee at the par value on 
the death of the employee, or on the omployee 
leaving the company's service except in special cases 
decided upon by the Trusteer. 
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Th© partnership stock receives a dividend from 
the company at the same rate as the ordinary stock 
up to ^0% free of tax. When the dividend on the ordinary 
stock exceeds 10^ free of tax, the additional dividend on 
the partnership stock is payable out of the proportion of 
the profits handed to the Trustee on behalf of the employees 
but the total dividend on the partnership stock is 
limited to 155? free of tax. This has the effect of 
giving a great share of the profits to those who have long 
service and have taken up the largest amount of partner-
ship stock to which they are entitled. 
An employee who holds £ 50/- or more partnership stock 
is entitled to attend and vote at the General Meeting of the 
company. 
On a winding up of the company, the Partnership stock 
will only participate in the distribution of assets to the 
extent of the par value. It is not transferable or saleable 
except as above provided to the Trustee, and may not be pledgsd 
as security for loans. 
The Committee of Management of Trustee coxisists of 
not more than 14 persons, of whom half are DiB#ctors of 
Bryant & May Ltd. (or stockholders nominated by the 
Directors) and the other half employees or persons appointed 
by them. 
COMSTITtJTIQH OF THE WORKS C0M14ITTEES. 
This committee, which forms a part of the Joint 
Industrial Council organisation for the industry as a whole. 
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is composed of IS members, seven being workers ( of whom 
a fair proportion are wc»nen) and five staff and jnanagement. 
The workers' representatives are elected by ballot, 
the employers representatives by appointment. The period of 
service of the Workers' representatives is one year, sub-
ject to retirement in rotation. 
The qualification for election is continuous employ-
ment for not less than one year. 
SCOPE OF DIoCUSdiQN. 
Any matter which is pertinent to the general well-
being of the corapany and its employees excepting those 
matters such as wages, etc. for which negotiating machinery 
already exists. 
Ho other matter is exclude*^ and the management do 
all in their power to supply any information asked for. 
PRIVILEGES OF MBJMBLR3. 
Every member is wholly free in the performance 
of his duties as a coh.mitcee member. In addition, the 
Trade Union Representatives may also attend meeting of 
the works caamlttees, but in an advisory capacity only. 
PRQVIDEKT FtJND SCHEME & WELFARE WORK. 
Additional to the profit-sharing and stock-holding, 
schemes already described, the company, as part of their 
full copartnership ideal, operate other schemes to assist 
their employees such as »-
lion-contributory Life Insurance; Pension Fund} 
Savings Bank; Tontine Benefit Societies; Insurance 
on Marriage; House Purchase Assistance; Supplementary 
Workmenit' Compensation; Meals, Including breakfast 
for early workers; Fully qualified Nurses and free 
Medical Treatment and Dental clinics; Holidays with pay; 
Sports and Social Clubs for b oth girls and men.* 
JOHHSOH BROS. DXBB3 LTD. 
The firm of John Brothers was established in 
Liverpool in 1817, The present worlss in Bootle were started 
in 1896 - 61 years ago. The number of employees at the 
works is over 1500 and there are a further 800 employees 
at the 500 branches, scattered over the country, which feed 
the works, making a total of over 2,300 employees. In 1889, 
the total number of employees was only 32. 
Great efforts have been raade to preserve personal 
relationships between employers and employees, and to share 
ai^ prosperity which may have been achieved. To assist in 
this, a copartnership scheme was established in 1911 which 
is in successful operation today - 46 years afterwards. 
Details of the scheme are as followsJ-
The share of profit accorc'ing to the worker is based 
on fixed percentage of the net tracking profit after all 
prior charges have been met. 
Sources "Roaf? to Prosperity" by Earnest Marples M.P, 
pp. 45 to 48, 
Participation. 
Ho employee participates in the profit-sharing until 
he or she has been in the contiiraotas service of the company 
at the works for 12 months prior to April 1, of any year. 
The profit-sharing fund divided into units which, 
for the purposes of division, are t ermed 'A* stsares, 
Employees are graded accorr'lng to the rate of wages earned 
per week and are allotted 'A' shares on the following basis. 
Ui^ .er 45 shillings per week 1 'A* share. 
Between 45 shillings and 59 
per week. 2 do. 
Over 59 shillings per week. An additional 'A' share 
is awarded for approxi-
mately for every 22 
shillings of the weekly 
wages. 
Forexample, an employee whose weekly wages is 
60 shillings per week would receive three 'A' shares. 
Foremen receive double the number of 'A' shares. 
An employee who is dismissed or leaves voluntarily 
for other employment is not entitled to any profit-share 
accrued or accruing at the date of his leaving. 
Should an employee be absent, from v/ork for more 
than a period of 4 weeks, his or her participation is 
suspended until the reason for such absence has been reviewed 
by a committee of workers presided over by the Managing 
Director. 
- viil -
If an employee is persistently late, in any profit-
sharing period his or her share is rec^ uced as» 20 half-hours 
average lateness, a reduction to half-share. Over 30 
half-hour average lateness, share is forfeited altogether. 
The profit-sharing bonus is usually paid out 
during the last ^ek in June. 
SMPLOITESS' SHAREHOLDING. 
Employees are given the privilege of taking up shares 
in the ccanpany to the extent of 10^ of their earnings. These 
shares, known as Employees' Participating Preference Shares, 
receive the same dividend as the ordinary shares of the 
company and rank next to the preference shares. In 1947, 
there were 612 employee holders holding between them 
89,252 shares and the dividend has averaged ^Q% since the 
start in 1914 to 1947. 
These shares are issued at par on 1st July of each 
year and can be purchased out of the profit-tfharing bonus. 
In the event of an employee leaving the employ of the 
company or retiring on pension, the shares must be resold 
at par to trustees who will in turn allocate them to to 
other employees. 
PEH3I0MS. 
There are pension scheaars to secure the future of the 
staff, non-contributory in the case of recepients of less 
than £ 3/17/0 per week, and in the case of more than this 
sum, contributions are mac'e by both the firm and the employees, 
The non-contributory scheme was established in January 1004 
and the contributory scheme in 1907, The annual amount 
contributed by the firm for pension purposes for the benefit 
of the staff is £ 11,000/-/- a year. The amount standing 
to the credit of the two funds on April 1st. 1947, was 
Contributory scheme .*•• £ 363,938/-
lion-contributory schame •. £ 178,644/-
WQHKS CQMHITTEES. 
They meet at regular intervals to consult with the 
management on questions of internal administration* 
Savings Bank. In adr'ition to these financial benefits, 
there is an Employee Savings Bank, money can be deposited 
each week and may be drawn out at 3 days' notice. Four 
per cent interest is paid on all ataounts exceeding £ 1. 
The amount on deposit at present is over £ 77,000/-/-. 
Welfare Scheme. There are also Welfare schemes, comprising 
medical, dental, and chiropody services; summer camp, a sick 
benefit society and continuation classes for junion employees. 
Sources **Road to Prosperity". pp.56-68, 
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